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HOW FAR SHOULD AMERICA INTERFERE?

THE Europe of 1914 was a heavily armed camp. It is no cause for surprise, in retrospect, that its explosive possibilities were realized in the early summer of that year. But it has been pointed out that those armaments were regarded as essentially defensive, that Europe blundered then into a conflict not desired by any of its major participants, and also that the very quantity and quality of those arms were sources of confidence in the unlikelihood of their being used. The destructiveness of modern arms (1914 vintage) is such that it is unthinkable that civilized nations will resort to their use, for that would be tantamount to the destruction of civilization; so ran the comforting argument.

In retrospect again, we may smile at the naïveté of such reasoning. There is no need to expatiate on the improvement of means of destruction since 1914, or even since 1945. It is perhaps the line of endeavor that mankind has pursued with greatest pertinacity rewarded by greatest success. There are some obvious parallels, along with some important differences, between the situation of 1950 and that of 1914. There are vast quantities of highly efficient weapons strewn about the world which is again an armed camp. Again we hear echoes of the 1914 reasoning, although the experience of two world wars within the span of a generation induces greater caution in the use of the argument of destructiveness as a source of confidence in its avoidance. We also hear much of a divergent approach which the war of 1914 served to popularize: the likelihood of conflict deriving from the very existence of large supplies of arms.

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Historic precedent is of little use at this point. If it remains true that the same causes produce the same effects, it is equally relevant to point out that conditions are different—the nature of our weapons, for one—from what they were on any preceding occasion. The future alone can tell whether weapons are to be used, and, if so, what their effect will be. But that there is ample reason to bend all energies to the avoidance of their use few would gainsay at present. The rise in the political consciousness of our atomic scientists bears witness to the new condition.

After both world wars there was widespread advocacy of disarmament. The failure of the first attempt and the current stalement of the second are on record. Perhaps it is time to realize that the attempt to deal with the problem of arms, as such and in isolation from others, is essentially futile and probably foredoomed to failure. In the long and dreary discussions of the question after the First World War the debate reduced itself to the insoluble issue of security versus disarmament. It was largely an Anglo-French debate, with ourselves, in so far as we participated, mainly on the British side. In simplest form, give us security and we shall disarm, everlastingly repeated the French; disarm and you will be secure, untiringly retorted the British. By the time the French insisted on ironclad systems of supervision and control and came to inject the factor of war potential in the discussion, it was felt that they had put the problem in hopelessly impossible terms. Indeed they had, even though logic was on their side. We and the British thought them rather tiresome, if persistent, and not a few suspected the genuineness of their avowed motives. At best, we sympathized with what was often regarded as their regrettably pathological fears. Actually, it was a case of honest differences of opinion, reflecting the combined effects of the related differences of geographical position and historic experience. Technological progress has been such in the last thirty years that even we—let alone the British—no longer feel confidence in the security that ocean barriers have traditionally afforded us. It is both interesting and enlightening to contemplate the extent to which we have come around to the French position of the nineteen twen-

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ties: We shall disarm when and to the extent that we feel secure. It is a position from which retreat cannot be forced, a position impregnable in logic, and in practice a hopeless premise for debate. Hence the stalemate in both instances.

The basic reason for the stalemate is not far to seek. Granting that the existence of a large amount of explosive material in itself constitutes a certain danger, we need to realize that armaments are a symbol and a consequence rather than a cause of problems deeper and more fundamental than that of their own existence: distrust, fear and insecurity. The British were quite right when they used to insist with their French colleagues that security was to be found in confidence rather than in legalistic schemes of control. Where they erred was in assuming that disarmament per se would contribute substantially to create confidence—an error understandably induced by their own feeling of reasonable security. Now, even we no longer feel sufficiently secure, with the consequences that have just been mentioned. It is probably well to keep alive the discussion of limitation of armaments; it constitutes a psychologically useful expression of hope, but the solution of the present tensions should not be looked for in that direction.

The problem is political and psychological in its essence. There is no need to explain at this hour of day that the hoped for One World has sharply split into at least two. The appeal of the One World ideal, as a political concept, does perhaps more credit to the quality of impetuous generosity of the American nation than to its critical faculties. However that may be, we do now have two worlds locked in earnest contest. How this has come about and the apportionment of responsibility for the result are interesting problems, largely historical in content, which it is not intended to consider here. But, starting from the existing state of affairs as we find it, there may be point in examining the direction of our policy and some of its current and prospective manifestations in this contest in which we find ourselves engaged.

On the broad lines of American policy there may be said to be at present a very great degree of agreement in the American electorate (and the significance of the American electorate, ex-

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pressed in the shape and functioning of the American political system, must always be borne in mind in any consideration of American foreign policy). This is not very surprising, for American policy since the end of the war has largely been shaped as a negative reaction to an active Russian policy of expansion. It took time and effort for Russia to destroy the accumulated goodwill of the war period, but destroy it she did; and, granting numerous individual mistakes on our side, allowing even for understandable (though largely self-induced) Russian suspicion toward the outside world, the fact remains that the American people as a whole were, in 1945, hoping for a fair and reasonable settlement and were not primarily motivated by either fear of or enmity toward Russia. The growing conviction that their goodwill has been met by distrust and their confidence taken advantage of is what has brought about the present degree of their unanimity. The deep-rooted aversion of the American people to war has been reflected in the policy of their government which has reacted on the whole with mildness (though a decreasing mildness) to the verbal lashings of the Kremlin and at the same time has been pursuing an increasingly firm policy that the word "containment" best describes. This policy is still in process of taking shape: with a relatively clear view of the situation and, on the whole, a successful effort in Europe, it has been sadly floundering in the Far East,[1] while the Point Four program represents an interesting and tentative basis of approach for our relations with much of the world.

Containment is a negative concept, for that reason largely alien to the American experience and spirit characterized by optimistic bias in favor of positive action. To be sure, Wilson had already used the slogan "too proud to fight", but it is a largely novel experience for the American people to indulge in passive restraint. There is much demand for a more positive

[1] The events which have taken place in Korea since the end of June have in large measure determined policy instead of being the result of a previously considered course of action. The Korean episode is not likely to have been completely liquidated when these lines appear in print, and it would be surprising if our Asiatic policy had crystallized by that time.

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policy, a demand which contains elements of danger that the nation, still confident in its power but no longer in its complete security, might seek seemingly attractive short cuts to clearer solutions of the world dilemma.

Let it be frankly stated then that we are engaged in deadly earnest in an all-out contest with the Soviet state. Let it also be recognized that we are clear in our own minds that the best, if not the only, possibility for us to survive in independence, while at the same time avoiding open conflict, it to prevent the further expansion of the area of Soviet control. Reduced to its barest and realistic essentials, that is indeed what our policy has come to be and there has followed the inevitable consequence of engaging in competition with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of those regions of the planet which still find themselves in the position of being able to make a free choice. One may regret, though hardly deny, that such is the present state of the world political map. The fact is that the concept of a Third Force in the domain of international politics has failed to materialize; it is a valuable and attractive concept, one that may well be worth returning to when circumstances permit, but there is no use denying that the potential components of this Third Force are at present and are likely to remain in the immediate future wholly dependent upon our power in order to maintain themselves.

We have thus been struggling with the problem of how to make our influence paramount in the non-Soviet world. The Marshall Plan and its logical consequence the North Atlantic Pact were among the first concrete beginnings. But they were no more than beginnings and, short of a hardly conceivable American return to isolationism, they have set us on a path which is likely to be long and arduous and to lead us through unexpected landscapes. The question, then, reduces itself perhaps to that of deciding whether we prefer to proceed by improvisation, by negative reaction to outside initiative, or whether we might not do better to seek a clear view of the road and to chart as much as possible its course in advance. Mere muddling through involves too many risks, although it does not

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follow that we need be committed to a wholly rigid and unadaptable policy.

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In facing the question of the bases of our relations with the outside world we find ourselves immediately confronted with enormous domestic perplexities. The debate will be recalled that surrounded the adoption of the so-called Truman Doctrine, first clear move in the novel orientation. If the move was sound in its essence, the manner in which it had to be "sold" to Congress and to the country was unfortunate: fear, panic and hysteria are dangerous tools that need to be held in check quite as much as the Soviet danger. In passing, much of our press and some of our legislators are furnishing, by the irresponsible levity and petty partisanship of their behavior, excellent arguments against and causing substantial injury to the freedom they claim to be defending. If such tools were resorted to in 1947 it was on the plea of the urgency of the case, an urgency which in turn resulted from an earlier reluctance to recognize a reality that should have been long evident.

The great cry that was raised by most of the opponents of the Truman Doctrine was that of imperialism. Actually, those critics who feared that this was the thin end of a wedge that would expand the range of our commitments were more sound than those supporters of the action who sought to emphasize the exceptional and unique circumstances of the occasion. Conceivably we may get out of Greece, if the tension in that particular spot sufficiently relaxes, but certainly our commitments in the whole region of the Near and Middle East have not lessened; and one may confidently predict that our involvement will deepen. If our action in Greece was necessary, and if our further involvement in the Middle East follows as a logical extension of it, can it not be said in effect that we are open to the charge of having become the exponents of a "new" imperialism? The question may well bear examination.

Considering the course and record of our own expansion, bearing in mind our nineteenth-century wars with Mexico and

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Spain, as well as our dollar diplomacy, it remains fair to say that the American people have not been imperialistic, certainly not by comparison with the Western Powers of Europe. That this was a fortunate result of our continental growth confirms rather than alters the fact. What essays we had made in the direction of empire until the Second World War had left us with a few islands in the Atlantic and the Pacific: Cuba was not acquired and the Philippines were being relinquished.[2] It is not surprising, therefore, that, especially since the First World War, the temper of the American people has been violently and overwhelmingly anti-imperialistic. The combination of the fact that the British structure has been the prime example of successful imperialism with the traditional American fondness for twisting the lion's tail resulted in a large body of American opinion being willing, if not axious, to preside with cheerfulness at the liquidation of the British Empire. Of French and other imperialisms we knew less, but did not take a much more favorable view.

Of the sins of omission and commission of British, French and other imperialisms so much has been said that there is no need to rehearse them again. Our sympathy for subject peoples derives from the memory of our origins and from the feeling that these peoples have been exploited, a view which holds much undeniable truth in it, yet contains the distortion of oversimplification. The paradox might be pondered that we have fallen heirs to much of the British imperial influence, a process likely to continue and expand, and that we are at the moment debating the manner and degree of our intervention in Indochina.

We remain, however, unhappy, hesitant and confused about all this, alternately hoping that we are dealing with a passing emergency and pleading to ourselves the overriding necessity of

[2] The continental character of the growth of the United States presents an obvious parallel to that of the Russian state. But the Russian interest and efforts at expansion *in regions of settled population and established culture*, the Balkans, the Middle East, Manchuria, are clearly of a different nature from the settlement and incorporation of Siberia. Some of the border regions, for example, Turkestan, are transitional.

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defensive action. We tend to be apologetic about our actions, and it is not long ago that Mr. Truman used the phrase "imperialism must go". We find ourselves meantime open to the charge that our actions belie our proclaimed beliefs, that we are merely cloaking in novel—or perhaps not so very novel—rationalizations something not fundamentally different from classical imperialism. Even the recipients of our bounty point out that we are really acting primarily in defense of our own interest, whether strategic or economic.[3] This aspect of the matter is one indeed that we ourselves are apt to emphasize when appropriations are before Congress, while to our prospective allies we stress the community of their interest with ours. There is at least a superficial inconsistency in these approaches.

As recently as half a century ago a vigorous British imperialism saw little reason to apologize for its actions. Even though there were critics of it in Britain, a Kipling was more representative who could with conviction give enthusiastic voice to the glory of the white man's deeds and the "rights" which, as a consequence of his capacity and mission, were the white man's prerogative. It would be futile to expect and impossible to seek to foster a revival of such an attitude in present-day America. In that sense, imperialism is gone, not in America alone, but in Britain as well. But one aspect of Kipling was valuable: the conviction in the validity and desirability of the course of action pursued, a sense of optimistic confidence instead of an embarrassed and apologetic outlook.

Can we retrieve some of this virtue? The British scene offers again some grounds for relevant considerations. A century ago, English industry was developing under the hardly mitigated blessings of laisser faire. The condition of the British laboring class under that dispensation is well enough known: such epithets as "incredible" or "unspeakable" can alone be used to characterize it by modern standards of the West. But the action of Tory paternalism, the new liberalism of the latter

[3] It is enlightening, in this connection, to consider some of the statements made by Asian representatives at the conference that recently met in Lucknow. The incident of the Bell mission to the Philippines, with its report and Philippine comments thereon, is further evidence of this tendency.

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part of the century, and finally Labor's own power in our time have radically altered the scene. The accelerating rhythm of two wars has brought about an unthought-of economic leveling in British society, until redistribution of wealth is no longer a major issue and its place has been taken by discussion of adequate measures for the common endeavor of survival. Hence the little margin of maneuver and the large area of inevitable agreement in practice between Conservatives and Labor. Present-day Britain, under either dispensation, has taken foremost place among the socially progressive nations of the world. There is increasingly less point and response to the raking of superseded scores: they still provide Mr. Bevan his motivation and the source of some effective oratory, but the serious thinking of British Labor is moving increasingly along different lines.

The United States has lagged considerably behind Britain in the matter of social legislation. In compensation for this—in large part the reason for it—our enormous, rapidly developed, even plundered, resources have furnished the American people with an economic standard far superior to any other. The great depression and the response to it in the form of the New Deal have brought us a long distance along the path of progressive social legislation. In any event, we, too, rightly consider ourselves a modern progressive state, and the one that offers its people by far the highest material standard of existence. That the rest of the world largely acquiesces in this view is shown by the simple fact of the numbers that would emigrate to the United States, if only they could do so.

At this point we run into one of the strangest paradoxes, namely, the fact that, by the standards of most of the rest of the world, our social structure and practice represent a highly revolutionary state of affairs, while at the same time we have maneuvered ourselves in the eyes of outside observers into the position of a bulwark of reaction. This may be a result, in part, of the fact that our own labor movement has traditionally been apolitical by contrast with labor movements elsewhere,[4] of the fact that we still have large concentrations of wealth in private

[4] From the failure of the Chartist movement to the early part of this century British labor had a similar tradition.

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hands, and of the uncritical devotion of much of the American business community to outworn shibboleths of a no longer existing unrestrictedly free enterprise. If our conservative Republicans could only realize how revolutionary their practice is by the standards of much of the rest of the world! After all they accept the income tax, unhappy though they may be over its dimensions. It is a simple fact that, outside of the English-speaking world and of some small countries whose power precludes their playing a significant rôle in world affairs, a substantial and honestly enforced income tax as one of the chief props of the state's revenue represents a revolutionary innovation for the major part of the planet—not excluding that would-be monopolist of modern revolutionary thought and practice, the Soviet Union.

Here it would seem, to take this particular but important example, is the source of a most effective argument: without altering our belief or practice, we can present ourselves to the rest of the world as the exponents of the simple idea that the individual should contribute to the state in proportion to his capacity; that, as a nation, we have accepted the practice that the power of taxation should be used, not indeed to destroy, but to implement a social policy of broad egalitarian intent. Moreover, this has all been done under the aegis of our democratic institutions, not by a paternalistic, if enlightened, state. This we can present as fact to the masses of the world who, contrariwise, will respond only negatively to our advertised fears of what a Labor government is doing in Britain or to the inept suggestion that we use our economic power to interfere with its social program.

On this basis we can confidently present ourselves as able and willing to meet any challenge that the Soviet state can offer. For good or evil the masses of mankind are coming into their own. The process may be full of unpleasantness and crudity, but the traditional background of our experience and practice entitles us to the leadership and direction of the movement, if only we will take advantage of the opportunity. The trend cannot be balked or the tide pushed back: but depending upon our understanding and our ability to draw in-

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telligent conclusions there is at least a possibility of directing and canalizing the movement into fruitful productive channels instead of letting it result in a wave of destruction and retrogression such as the Russian Revolution has caused. The possibility must not be equated with foregone success, but it is one that exists and offers grounds for hope.

The late Henry Ford created a sensation with his announcement of the basic $5.00 day. This was indeed a revolutionary act, though Ford was hardly one to have been tainted with radicalism. The point is that Ford's approach in this matter was not political, but rather economic, realistic and unprejudiced; he expressed what has become a commonplace platitude of the American mass-production economy: the bulk of the American production is to be absorbed by the American people and it is therefore to the best interest of American industry to pay good wages. This largely accepted view has hardly brought about the millennium, since strife between labor and management is still with us; but, broadly speaking, it can be set down as one of the basic reasons for the unparalleled economic growth and standards achieved by this country. Because of the different experience of European and other nations, such an innocuous (to us) development is apt to be associated elsewhere with political radicalism. This is what we should realize, with the consequence that, instead of being frightened by an alien political radicalism into a reluctant association with forces of reaction abroad, we can and should, turning the tables, welcome the familiar experience of economic progressiveness as a reason for feeling that we can easily coöperate with what, by our domestic standards, passes for political radicalism. Boldly, frankly, and with considerable justification, we should present ourselves to the outside world as the genuine and prior advocates of both economic and political progressiveness by comparison with which the Soviet system and régime represent, not indeed the most up-to-date, but rather the survival of much backwardness, in some respects retrogression. Allowing for the regrettable and often deliberate confusion which has come to cling to such words as " progressive " and " liberal ", what has just been said has the perhaps not negligible advantage of

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being basically and largely true. Rooted in our tradition, if genuinely espoused as policy, it might to good effect be broadcast to the four winds.

Unfortunately again, propaganda has become one of the important attributes of modern civilization. We, too, though still at the stage of crude and hesitant beginners, are making increasing use of it. Our supremacy in advertising is a double-edged tool, compounded of valuable techniques and questionable devotion to truthfulness; for the longer run, it might be well to bear in mind the valuable cumulative effect of the reputation for reliability that the B.B.C. gained for itself during the war. It is often said that the best antidote to communism is the raising of the economic standard of the laboring masses. While this is not the whole story, it is an important part of it. In so far as the facts are correctly known and realized, the mere example of our accomplishment will tend to exert a great power of attraction. But merely to present ourselves to the world as an object lesson to be admired and imitated will not go very far. Granting that we shall be admired and envied, the question will soon be: how can others imitate our achievements? Can we, on our part, do anything to stimulate the process? Is a professedly "missionary" outlook to be the cloak for imperialistic intervention?

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In approaching this question, it will be well at the very start to divest ourselves of certain comforting illusions. On one side, though we may take pleasure and pride in our own accomplishments, it would be fatal to assume that they stem from either higher innate intelligence or virtue; on the other hand, it would be equally fatal to think that the rest of the world, or even any significant part of it, can long thrive on our bounty. The quart-of-milk-for-every-Hottentot approach will not be found very fruitful.

In the case of Europe, consideration of the problem has led to advocating the so-called integration of that continent, or at least of that part of it outside the sphere of Soviet control. We have an initial advantage in our relations with Europe in that we are dealing with that section of the world which is

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politically and economically most evolved and to which we are nearest by reason of tradition and culture. But this advantage is largely compensated by the crystallization of Europe along the lines of its existing national units, the simple fact of nationalism of which Europe is the native home. Can we and should we actively interfere in Europe to promote, possibly force, such integration?

We have witnessed in our own time two attempts to do precisely this. That of Nazi Germany ended in unprecedented disaster because of the combined resistance of its immediate victims and of ourselves. The current Russian effort we are trying to check. Both attempts have in common the fact that they depended or depend upon the use of brute force, an approach that we properly decline to emulate. But we find in Europe the curious combination of two seemingly contradictory forces: the widespread recognition of the overwhelming desirability of some sort of union and the equally common conviction that the components of Europe, left to themselves, will be unable to surmount their differences. The frequently suggested parallel of the union of the thirteen colonies is largely fallacious, because the comparison is not valid between them as a group and Europe, or Western Europe, as a whole. The only agent that can overcome the present dead point is outside pressure, a pressure that the United States alone can provide. Mere resistance to the Soviet threat is evidently not sufficient, and simple acceptance of the Soviet way seems out of the question. As Anne O'Hare McCormick recently reported a member of the French government: "You can afford to take the responsibility to force us to do what we know we should do but cannot do on our own." Count Sforza has expressed similar sentiments. These, to be sure, are isolated instances, although they could be multiplied.

This, then, is the broad path along which we should, with clear-sighted deliberateness, proceed. Obviously it raises large questions, and while it could not be the purpose of this brief discussion to offer a detailed blueprint of our course of action in Europe, or elsewhere, some further general remarks must be made.

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First, how and by what means is our pressure to be exerted? The means are already at hand and they will probably increase in future: in simplest form, our power, economic and military in the last analysis, of which Marshall aid and the North Atlantic Pact, now beginning to be implemented with the actual delivery of weapons, are the initial harbingers. It would be idle to pretend that even our present limited intervention can be continued without either our indicating our views or our views carrying considerable weight. This, in fact, is in process of happening and has already been subject to attack. What we need is not less but more and stronger intervention.

The pressure should be along two lines: that of encouraging domestic reform, whether that means land policy in Italy, wages in France, taxation in both, to cite some examples; that of international organization in whatever form and at whatever level may seem suitable and feasible initially. All this is obviously easier said than done and, as just indicated, will be subject to violent attack both at home and abroad.

Some of the European criticism may be discounted: in some cases it will even be voiced by the very people who express in private the above-quoted French view. This ought not to deter us: the necessities of home politics are not an unfamiliar novelty in America. But much of the criticism will undoubtedly be honest and serious and in the end is only to be stilled by the success of the undertaking. The manner and the specific manifestations of our intervention will be of crucial importance, and the personnel who will be the agents of our policy should be chosen with the greatest of care. Nor can we expect to act in Europe as nineteenth-century colonizers did in darkest Africa. The views of Europe should be taken into account, and perhaps a specific instance may be used to suggest the sort of approach that might be typical of other cases.

Consider the case of France for a moment. It has been said that France is the keystone of our European policy. This we should take as basic fact, established and settled once for all, for two reasons: one, that the continuation of a common

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policy with Britain may be taken for granted; the other, that a continental European policy primarily based on Germany is not feasible. It would raise such objections in Europe, in France for one but not in France alone, that the clearest result would be to secure our front lines while undermining our rear. We must think in terms of France, *and then* Germany, not in terms of France *or* Germany, at which point Britain will enter the picture. But if France is to be the foundation stone of our European policy, it is necessary first of all to have an inclusive understanding of the French position, view and problems.

As an aftermath of war France has been beset by internal difficulties. Her recovery has been substantial, even remarkable at the production level; indeed in many respects the economic problem of France should be simpler than that of Britain because of a basically better-balanced structure less subject to the whims of uncontrollable externals. But the quality of management of the French economy and finances at the national level has not been in the same category as the British. Much of the effort to fight communism in France has been wasted for the simple reason that, to a large degree, the grievance of French labor over its wage conditions has been justified. That is the sort of condition that must be righted. It may or may not mean a greater degree of state control and intervention. If French industry is thoroughly devoted to free enterprise as against *dirigisme*, then let it show that it can put its house in order. Much the same can be said of French finance. Our contribution, on the one hand, can be generosity and, on the other, a very clear and strong indication of our expectations. We may even contemplate with equanimity the charge that we are responsible for forcing certain reforms if only our interference, real or pretended, achieves the desired end.

This, however, is only one aspect of the French problem. France is now, as she has been for long, obsessed with the nightmare of security. We—and Britain—can make a very substantial contribution at this point. After all, the 1919 proposal of an Anglo-Amercian reinsurance to France was eminently sound even then; it is a concept that is no longer

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alien to our thinking and could fit easily into the North Atlantic Pact idea. Our determination should be made incontrovertibly clear, and France should on her side proceed to a thoroughgoing reorganization and restoration of her military potential.

France has also been sensitive on the score of her power and position in the world of nations. The catastrophic events of 1940 and the subsequent rôle of France are facts which cannot be undone; the resulting situation calls for tactful handling on our part and realistic appraisal on the French side. France has recently found herself involved in two (from our point of view) seemingly unrelated controversies: the Saar and Indochina. Perhaps the poorest way to deal with the Saar is precisely the way in which it has been dealt with by ourselves and the British, a procedure which gives one a strong feeling of having been through the whole performance once before. In substance, having reluctantly made some commitments to France, when France proceeded to act on these understandings, we underwrote French action but in such a way as to encourage on the German side the feeling that we really disapproved of it. That is the way to create confusion and misunderstanding and to perpetuate sores. That the Saar is German in population is a fact not open to dispute. On the plea of German wartime behavior and exactions and of the Eastern German settlement, a perfectly valid case could be made for even outright annexation of the Saar by France. It would be letting Germany off very cheaply. Such a position we could state with clarity and determination. But if, alternately, we are not prepared to support French policy in this matter, the only reasonable thing to do would have been to make our position known to France quietly, firmly, and in advance with a view to preventing French action and avoiding the needless creation of a future source of dissension. Much the same sort of considerations applies to Bao Dai's régime, in the case of which our decisions should be based on a realistic appraisal of such components as the extent and basis of the opposition to French rule, the degree of validity of French interests and claims, the capabilities of the country for self-rule. Much of our behavior in the case of

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Indonesia stemmed from sentimental considerations. To convince ourselves at one point that Bao Dai is an irresponsible playboy and puppet, at another that he is a capable and intelligent ruler, is likely to result in mere confusion and in the end serve neither Indochina nor France nor even ourselves. This is not invalidated by the recently increased acuteness of the Indochinese situation which rather emphasizes the urgency of prompt decision and clear direction of policy.

The case of the Saar is but one of many possible instances, but it was chosen advisedly for it impinges upon the German problem, one that cannot be allowed to go by default or approached merely with a view to satisfying French desiderata. In the end, Germany must assume her rightful place in the European complex; but to the restoration of confidence Germany has to make a large, though by no means an unreasonable, contribution. There are of course psychological factors at the national level that must be taken into account, on the German, as on the French, as on everybody's side for that matter. A war creates such factors and exacerbates those that exist. We enjoy the advantage of being relatively more detached than Europeans, but this advantage with its derivative of dispassionateness should not be carried the lengths that it was after the First World War when it resulted in befuddled thinking and inverted sympathies. It should rather be used to clothe our intervention with the asset of fair judiciousness. One more thing is worth mentioning in connection with France, the fact that the country has shown at widely separated levels a strong, a surprisingly strong, response to the idea of European union.

The above has not been intended as a complete survey of the French problem, some aspects only of which have been chosen by way of illustration. But mention should be made of an entirely different aspect of things which may be described as cultural in nature.

This may seem remote and far-fetched, but actually it is not for it is the basis of some of the most deep-rooted objections to American action and influence in Europe. Here again France may be used as illustration; though the issue is in no sense peculiarly French, but rather continental European, even, to a

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degree, British. Some very strong opposition has been voiced to participation in the North Atlantic Pact, such names as Siegfried and Mauriac, to cite widely known ones only, being associated in this opposition. Their objections go deeper than the immediate and narrow aspect of power and military considerations; they stem from the fear of the cultural influence of America which in some cases is presented as potentially as detrimental as the Russian. Neither Siegfried nor Mauriac is open to the suspicion of either levity or sympathy for Moscow. While many unkind and untruthful things are being said and written about America in Europe, these objections are not merely to be brushed aside as irrelevant. We may go further and acknowledge that there is considerable justification for them. By no means are all aspects of our culture undeniably good or desirable. The ethics and tone of much of our advertising, the glorification of the value of salesmanship, the exaltation of aggressiveness as a desirable personal quality, are not regarded with unanimity, even among ourselves, as unmixed blessings and tokens of a higher civilization.

Granting the validity of these fears and objections, this may be pointed out. Neither France alone, nor the whole of Western Europe together, can expect to be preserved as a museum of antiquities. The world does change, and French culture, for one, produced some of its highest achievements not behind the self-containment of a Chinese wall but by free contact with, absorption and exploitation of, foreign influences: witness the impact of Italy and Spain upon it during its golden age. This is indeed the test of a vigorous culture, its feeling that it has nothing to fear from others, but rather that it is strong enough to bear contact with and even benefit from them. The achievements of Europe for some centuries have been great; by comparison, we ourselves may be regarded as either newcomers or a mere extension of the European complex. The hand of the past therefore lies heavy upon Europe. But if Europe is going to do more than live upon its past; if it is to continue to be an active mover in the world of tomorrow, it will have to absorb, annex and modify perhaps, but still absorb and not merely resist the forces and tendencies that the American development

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has released. To be sure, in the process, some old values are likely to be lost or sadly mangled. To a degree, all living processes do this.

In some respects the situation calls to mind a comparison with ancient Greece and Rome. Greece, for all its intellectual brilliance and artistic accomplishment, did not develop the strength of unity needed for independent survival. Rome conquered Greece, like the rest of the Mediterranean, but the hand of Rome lay not heavy upon Greece, to whom it gave peace and from whose culture it benefited. It may be left to future friendly competition, rather than present futile bickering, to decide whether our cultural achievements are fated to remain inferior to those of Europe or destined to surpass them. Or one may refer to the exchange between Caesar and Apollodorus on the score of the arts versus the art of government (Shaw, *Caesar and Cleopatra*, Act V). But whether one call it the political genius of the English-speaking peoples, or the result of a fortunate set of circumstances, there is no cause to fail to recognize the fact that these English-speaking peoples have succeeded, in a way that no others have at the moment, in reconciling the value of the orderly management of society with the preservation of human freedom.

* * * * *

Further objections may be raised to the program of intervention and interference which this discussion has been advocating: the magnitude of it for one, and the related fact that it can hardly be described as an indication of either moderation or modesty on our part. As to the magnitude, the only justification for considering the prospect at all is, not the belief that our power is unlimited and our competence infallible, but, on the contrary, that, great as they may be, they have very definite limitations. Precisely for that reason, it is imperative to use them during the present transitional and still unsettled period with a view to creating a state of affairs where a large section of the world (Europe) can stand on its own feet instead of having to lean upon us. This is the familiar concept of the Third Force; a concept that does not stem *either* from blind self-interest on our part *or* from mere sentimental devotion to

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Europe, but from the simple consideration that it is desirable for the general good (ours included) that there should exist a strong and self-sufficient Europe.

If, however, we should succeed with our intervention in promoting the emergence of a restored and integrated Europe, can we be expected thereafter to pursue so self-denying a course as not to continue our interference, possibly even for purposes of narrow commercial advantage? To this, no a priori answer can be given with assurance, but some comfort may be derived from the following considerations. The example has been mentioned before of the evolution of the British domestic scene from laisser faire to the welfare state with all that this has meant in terms of human gain. A parallel evolution took place in the British imperial development of the last century. Already in the days of its aggressive nineteenth-century vigor, British imperialism became very liberal in its attitude toward those sections of the Empire that were of predominantly European composition. This attitude has been extended in our own time to other dependent parts of the Empire. To be sure, this is owing partly to the decrease of British power, but not to that alone, for there has been a very real and deep change of attitude in matters imperial on the part of the British people as a whole. With the passage of time the stress of historic perspective may well come to shift from the exactions to the benefits of the British imperial adventure. It is becoming clear and possible to recognize that one of India's valuable assets lies in its British-trained personnel of administration.

We lack the experience of Britain and others in matters international and imperial—an experience, much of which, however, can be available to us. The recent record of America's relations with the outside world, allowing for numerous individual blunders and *faux pas*, has been one, when considered whole, of rapidly growing maturity. This, be it clearly stated, should be grounds for hope, not for complacency. For much remains to be done and a myriad problems must be searchingly examined on our side. If, for example, we wish to restore a balance of trade between ourselves and the rest of the world, some readjustments in our economy are needed, some revision of our tariff

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policy and practice; it would be merely foolish to force upon the British (assuming that we could) a policy of convertibility of currency that would shortly result in chaos or a greater crisis. These are random illustrations; instances could be multiplied endlessly. Our influence must be used only to promote possible and reasonable solutions.

So much needs to be done, in fact, that many may be inclined to recoil before the complexity and the difficulties that the perspective which has been outlined presents. Success indeed is by no means foregone, but one final and perhaps overriding consideration may be submitted. Suppose that we do not succeed in avoiding an open conflict with Russia. Under the most favorable (to us) outcome, meaning our ultimate complete victory, the chances are very great that the conflict would be long and arduous and would call for such exertions and sacrifices on our part as have no precedent in our experience. So novel a situation could hardly fail to have far-reaching repercussions on the temper of the American people. We have never benefited in our national existence from the educative value of defeat; under present conditions it is too late to make the experiment. We should in all probability become both frightened and angry. The most likely result of such emotions would be a policy of ruthlessness, both during the conflict and after. We should in all likelihood waste little time and less thought when it came to enforcing the seeming requirements of our security wherever our power might carry. The result might still be better for all concerned than the consequences of our defeat; but at best it is a hateful prospect to envisage. Might it not be better to face our inescapable responsibility with clear-sightedness, accepting the consequences, however large, surprising and even unpalatable, while we are still possessed of power, but power accompanied by confidence and hope?

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THE NATURE OF OUR FEDERAL UNION RECONSIDERED

THE thinking of any age, including our own, tends to be pervaded by the illusory notion that human beings are at some final crossroads or other, that men must choose and choose quickly between extreme alternatives. Thereafter, the ceaseless struggle which had heretofore racked mankind presumably ends, and society sinks at last into the normalcy of peace. Even the politically astute James Madison sometimes spoke in apocalyptic terms. The Philadelphia Convention, as he saw it in 1787, was deciding " forever the fate of Republican Government. . . ." [1] " The two extremes before us ", he said, " are a perfect separation and a perfect incorporation of the 13 States. In the first case they would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law." [2] Subsequent proceedings proved that the possibilities were far less narrow, various compromises being achieved, even on the most controversial issues. Yet these remarkable successes did not preclude future controversy or bring national repose. The Constitution provided only the basis on which the nation could resume the march of history—a workable makeshift perhaps to avoid " civil war ", as Hamilton suggested, ". . . dismemberment of the Union and monarchies in different portions of it."

For their achievement, the Founding Fathers have not always been applauded. They have, on occasion, been accused of writing into the Constitution itself an irreconcilable ambiguity. In the struggle over ratification, strategic considerations drove the contestants to minimize or to exaggerate, thus making the evi-

[1] Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention,* June 26, vol. I, p. 423.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 449.

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dence as to the Constitution's meaning less than clear-cut. To allay the fears of opponents, advocates of ratification, especially Madison, said things which, in later years, proved embarrassing to him and misleading to scholars. Certain of the Constitution's enemies turned alarmist, portraying the proposed national charter in the most extreme terms. That is why substantial support for the revolutionary changes wrought by the Philadelphia Convention comes especially from those vigorously opposing ratification—Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, Luther Martin, among others.

The upshot was that the Constitution, a " bundle of compromises ", as someone has described it, was neither altogether satisfactory, nor crystal clear, to its enemies or its supporters. To friends of union and energetic government, like Hamilton, it was bitterly disappointing; to defenders of the " sovereign " states, it made for a " consolidated system ", one " consolidated government " calculated to be as obnoxious as that the colonists had thrown off in 1776.[3] Jefferson's position is distinguishable from that of both Federalists and anti-Federalists. Particular provisions of the document impressed him less than the Constitution's demonstration of reason as the solvent of varying interests and divergent points of view. " I am captivated ", he wrote James Madison, December 20, 1787, " by the compromise of the opposite claims of the great and little States, of the last to equal, and the former to proportional influence." [4]

[3] " The plan of government now proposed ", Richard Henry Lee complained, " is evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our condition as a people. Instead of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government." " Whether such a change can ever be effected, in any manner," Lee added ominously, " whether it can be effected without convulsions and civil wars; whether such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this country—time only can determine." *Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican*, October 8, 1787, collected in P. L. Ford, ed., *Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States*, pp. 282-83.

For a summary of the various interpretations of " consolidated system ", see James Wilson's speech in Jonathan Elliot, *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* (2nd ed.), vol. II, pp. 466-67.

For opponents of ratification, " consolidation " went even beyond that envisaged by Alexander Hamilton. See his interpretation in *Federalist* No. 32. See also James Wilson's speech, in Elliot, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 401-2.

[4] T. J. Randolph, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. II, p. 274.

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But was not the accommodation of interests Jefferson saw, or thought he saw, reflected in the Constitution more apparent than real? Did not both sides make concessions, and yet couch what had been surrendered in language so equivocal as to disguise the Constitution's true import? Obviously the Constitution did not draw the boundary line between the general government and the states, nor indicate the source from which its powers were derived, so distinctly clear as to escape sharp diversities of opinion, protracted controversy, and finally civil war. Did not the Founding Fathers, with noble motives and good intentions, plant in the Constitution itself a time bomb that, after 1860, burst the nation asunder in civil war?

Examination of this question proceeds on the generally accepted view that slavery was the occasion, not the cause, of the Civil War. Basically that conflict arose out of irreconcilable differences as to the nature of the union.[5] Any number of issues, besides slavery, might easily have provoked the holocaust—tariffs, regulation of interstate commerce, national taxing power, and so on. Indeed, dispute over certain of these matters had carried the nation more than once to the very brink of open conflict.[6] Before the slavery issue matured to the explosive stage, Lincoln himself set this tragic aspect of the war in clear perspective: "I would save the Union. . . . If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. . . ."[7] This is but another way of saying that at bottom the war grew out of bitter differences as to the nature of the organism the

[5] The approach made herein is at variance with the view recently propounded by scholars, such as J. G. Randall—that the Civil War was a "tragic mistake", being motivated primarily by economic consideration, and used to foist "exploitive capitalism" on the United States. See, in this connection, Louis Hacker's provocative review, *Fortune*, July 1947, vol. XXXIV, No. I, pp. 6-9.

[6] For a discussion of these divisive efforts prior to 1839, see John Quincy Adams, *The Jubilee of the Constitution*: A discourse delivered April 30, 1839, at the request of the New York Historical Society (New York, 1839), pp. 67-69.

[7] Lincoln's words of August 22, 1862, in answer to Horace Greeley's demand for emancipation, in J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, eds., *Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works* (Gettysburg ed.), vol. VIII, p. 15. The same thought was expressed in his Peoria speech, October 16, 1854, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 140.

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Founding Fathers had brought into being during the years 1787 to 1789.

Was the Constitution, as John Taylor, John C. Calhoun and others fiercely maintained, a compact of states, or was it rooted in what Hamilton called " that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority "—" *The Consent of The People* "? [8] One answer to these questions may be found in dry-as-dust documents; the other is written in blood. The first answer is deeply embedded in the vast record accumulated during the framing and ratification of the Constitution. When prolonged debate and bitter controversy failed to yield a conclusive verdict, the contestants carried this baffling poser of political theory to the battlefield to be settled by the arbitrament of the sword. Let us first consider the contemporary record.

If there be any single proposition to which Americans, since 1776, have been dedicated, it is this: that the people have a right to change their government, " laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them should seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." The Declaration of Independence averred that the people alone were the rightful source of legitimate authority. The opening sentence of that document speaks of the " one people " dissolving the " political bands which have connected them with another." By that act one people of thirteen united states " assumed among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitled them." [9] " Civil liberty ", Benjamin Hichborn declared, March 5, 1777, is " not a government by laws, made agreeable to charters, bills of rights or compacts." It is a " power existing in the people at large," the power " to alter or annihilate both the mode and essence of any former government ", " for any cause or for no cause at all, but their own sovereign pleasure." [10]

James Wilson called this (and many others agreed with him)

[8] The quoted words are those of Alexander Hamilton in *Federalist* No. 22.

[9] Language of James Wilson. Elliot, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 408.

[10] H. Niles, *Principles and Acts of the Revolution* (Baltimore, 1822), pp. 27, 30.

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" the leading principle in politics and that which pervades the American constitutions." Never before put into practice, this theory—that " Supreme power resides in the people "—so clearly expounded in the writings of " the great Locke ", had been working itself in the minds of men for many ages. In 1776, Americans declared themselves free and independent states, by authority of the whole people. " The distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders are no more," Patrick Henry had told the First Continental Congress in 1774. " I am not a Virginian, but an American. . . . All distinctions are thrown down. All America is thrown into one mass." [11] " It is only in our united Character as an Empire," George Washington wrote Governor William Livingston, June 12, 1783, " that our Independence is acknowledged, that our power can be regarded, or our Credit supported, among foreign Nations." [12] Lincoln echoed Washington (as did a host of nationalist orators during the intervening years) in his first inaugural address, proclaiming that " The Union is much older than the Constitution." [13]

Under this nationalist theory, the Articles of Confederation were but a step, as inconsistent as they were important,[14] to-

[11] Edmund C. Burnett, *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress* (Washington, 1921), vol. I, pp. 14-15.

[12] Mary A. Benjamin, ed., *The Collector*, New York, February 1947, vol. LX, No. 21.

[13] J. D. Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. VI, p. 5.

[14] " There was . . . no congeniality of principle between the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation. The foundation of the former was a superintending Providence—the rights of man, and the constituent revolutionary power of the people. That of the latter was the sovereignty of organized power, and the independence of the separate or dis-united States. The fabric of Declaration and that of the Confederation, were each consistent with its own foundation, but they could not form one consistent symmetrical edifice. . . . The corner stone of the one was *right*—that of the other was *power*.

" The work of the founders of our Independence was thus but half done. . . . For these United States, they had formed no *Constitution*. Instead of resorting to the source of all constituted power, they had wasted their time, their talents, and their persevering, untiring toils, in erecting and roofing and buttressing a frail and temporary shed to shelter the nation from the storm, or rather a mere baseless scaffolding on which to stand, when they should raise the marble palace of the people, to stand the test of time." Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, *passim*.

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ward union. This was "an experiment of inestimable value, even by its failure," John Quincy Adams remarked in 1836. "It taught our fathers the lesson, that they had more, infinitely more to do than merely to achieve their Independence by War. That they must form their social compact upon principles never before attempted upon earth." [15] To deal effectively with the national exigencies following Yorktown it had been as necessary in 1787 as in 1776 "to go", as James Wilson said on the floor of the Philadelphia Convention, "to the original powers of Society" [16]—the people. The Convention, in short, was a revolutionary body, acting in accordance with the proposition that "all authority is derived from the people." [17] The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are thus "parts of one consistent whole." [18] Each rests fundamentally on the natural right of a people to dislodge or alter their government and to reinstitute such new forms as they see fit.

But to assert this doctrine against a tyrannical mother country was one thing; to ground new institutions of government in such a high-toned principle was something else. In his address of 1787 to the people of the United States, Dr. Benjamin Rush observed:

[15] John Quincy Adams, *An Eulogy on the Life and Character of James Madison*, delivered September 27, 1836, at the request of the Mayor, Aldermen, and common council of the City of Boston (Boston, 1836), p. 12.

[16] Farrand, ed., *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 469.

[17] "America now exhibits to the world", James Wilson observed in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, "a gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary, and a deliberate transition from one constitution of government to another. In other parts of the world, the idea of revolutions in government, is, by a mournful and an indissoluble association, connected with the idea of wars and all the calamities attendant on wars. But happy experience teaches us to view such revolutions in a very different light—to consider them only as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and increasing the happiness of society and mankind." Elliot, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 406. See also Dr. Benjamin Rush, *infra*, note 19.

[18] "The whole people", John Quincy Adams explained in 1839, "declared the Colonies *in their united condition*, of RIGHT, free and independent States. . . . But there still remained the last and crowning act, which the People of the Union alone were competent to perform—the institution of civil government, for that compound nation, the United States of America" (Adams' emphasis). Adams, *The Jubilee of the Constitution*, pp. 15, 16, 40.

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> There is nothing more common than to confound the terms of the *American Revolution* with those of the *late American War.* The American War is over: but this is far from being the case with the American revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the great drama is closed. It remains yet to establish and perfect our new forms of government; and to prepare the principles, morals, and manners of our citizens for these forms of government, after they are established and brought to perfection. . . . Patriots of 1774, 1775, 1776—heroes of 1778, 1779, 1780! come forward! your country demands your services!—Philosophers and friends to mankind, come forward! your country demands your studies and speculations!
>
> THE REVOLUTION IS NOT OVER! [19]

Before 1787 Dr. Rush's theory—that the American colonies constituted " one people " and the continuing nature of the revolution initiated in 1776—was widely recognized and accepted. This notion, " in itself so simple," John Quincy Adams wrote in 1836, " addressed itself at once so forcibly to the reason, to the imagination, and to the benevolent feelings of all, that it can scarcely be supposed to have escaped the mind of any reflecting man from Maine to Georgia." And yet, when this elemental doctrine was projected and acted upon in the Philadelphia Convention, it stirred " State Sovereignties, corporate feudal baronies, tenacious of their own liberty, impatient of a superior and jealous, and disdainful of a paramount Sovereign, even in the whole democracy of the nation." [20] The people, that is to say, could exert themselves negatively and unitedly against the tyrannous oppression of Great Britain, but when that same ultimate authority moved constructively in the face of well-nigh insurmountable internal complexities, vested interests and political prejudice were profoundly aroused.

It was generally recognized that, to achieve the energy necessary for an effective national government, extensive restrictions would have to be imposed upon the corporate action of states, passionately claiming to be independent and sovereign. It was

[19] Niles, *op. cit.*, p. 402. The same position is taken by Joel Barlow in an oration delivered at the North Church, Hartford, Conn., July 4, 1787, *ibid.*, p. 386.

[20] Adams, *An Eulogy*, pp. 23-24.

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also recognized that such " binding ligaments ", as John Quincy Adams said, could be properly imposed by " no earthly power other than the People themselves." [21] " Federal liberty is to States", James Wilson observed in the Philadelphia Convention, " what civil liberty is to private individuals. And States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political sovereignty, than the savage is to purchase civil liberty by the surrender of the personal sovereignty which he enjoys in a State of nature." [22]

What, then, was the nature of the change effected by the Constitution? Did it merely continue and guarantee, as Luther Martin insisted at the Philadelphia Convention, the relationship of " sovereign ", " independent " states existing under the Articles of Confederation; [23] or did it, as James Wilson and others maintained, by deriving authority from the people, preclude (at least in theory) any possibility of thereafter interposing the states against national authority? [24] The answer to these questions falls into two parts. There is, on the one hand, the reply of advocates of ratification, like James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton; and, on the other, the view of opponents of the Constitution, such as Richard Henry Lee and Samuel Adams.

Under the Randolph Plan the government established was to be " paramount to the state constitutions." " Can an individual retain his equality," James Wilson argued on the floor of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, " when he becomes a member of civil government? He cannot. . . . As little can a sovereign state," Wilson reasoned, " when it becomes a member of the federal government." [25] Hamilton was equally emphatic. The Constitution of 1787 was intended to scotch forever that " gross heresy . . . that a *party* to a *compact* has a right to revoke that *compact*." [26] Emanating from " We the People of the United States," the Constitution transformed a " League of

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[22] Farrand, ed., *op. cit.*, June 8, vol. I, p. 166.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 340-41, 437.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 324, 329.

[25] Elliot, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 403, 429.

[26] *Federalist* No. 22.

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Friendship", a "loose alliance", into a government. In providing for national authority, acting on individuals rather than on states, the Constitution of 1787 substituted a government of law for one whose only instrument had been prayerful requisition or force. "This . . . is not a government founded upon compact," James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. "It is founded upon the power of the people. . . . The power both of the general government, and the state governments, under this system, are acknowledged to be so many emanations of power from the people." [27]

Ironically enough, impressive support for this nationalistic theory came from the Constitution's most rabid opponents. "It is, in its very *introduction,* declared to be a compact between the people of the United States as individuals," Luther Martin complained, "and it is to be ratified by the *people* at large, in their capacity *as individuals.*" All this, Martin explained, "would be quite right and proper, if there were *no State governments,* if *all the people* of this continent were in a *state of nature,* and we were forming one *national government* for *them* as *individuals.*" [28] "The Constitution is an ordinance," Richard Henry Lee protested, "not of the people of New Hampshire," and so on, but of "the people of America." [29] "What right had they to say, *We the people* . . . instead of, *We the states?*" Patrick Henry inquired in the Virginia ratifying convention. "The question turns, sir, on that poor little thing—the expression, We, the People, instead of the States of America. . . . Here is a resolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain." [30]

[27] Elliot, *op. cit.,* vol. II, pp. 461, 466.

[28] "Genuine Information", etc., delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, November 29, 1787. Reprinted in Farrand, ed., *op. cit.,* vol. III, p. 193. Martin's emphasis.

[29] See his *Letters from a Federal Farmer, supra,* note 3, and Elliot, *op. cit.,* vol. III, pp. 70-71, 184-92.

[30] Elliot, *op. cit.,* vol. III, pp. 54, 72. Joseph Taylor and Samuel Spencer took the same stand in the North Carolina ratifying convention. See Elliot, *op. cit.,* vol. IV, pp. 33, 80. "'We the People?' I ask why not?", John Randolph said in reply. "The government is for the people, and the misfortune was, that the people had no agency in the government before." *Ibid.,* p. 59.

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Responding December 3, 1787 to Richard Henry Lee, who had sent him a copy of the " new Constitution ", Samuel Adams voiced similar sentiments and opposed ratification for the same reason:

> I am not able to conceive why the Wisdom of the Convention led them to give the Preference to the former [national government] before the latter [sovereign states]. If the several states in the Union are to become one entire Nation, under one Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme and control the whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost.[31]

" Whether the Constitution be good or bad," George Mason said, going to the heart of the matter, " it is a national government, and no longer a confederation." [32]

The Constitution was intended, its friends insisted (and on this basic point its enemies agreed), to remedy the congenital defect that had plagued the central government under the Articles of Confederation—that " it never had a ratification by the People." Hamilton argued emphatically that by " extending to the individuals " it would slay the " political monster "—" *imperium in imperio.*" [33]

How, in the face of historical evidence so abundantly conclusive; how, in a debate where the participants were agreed as to the revolutionary character of the Constitution of 1787, could the doctrine that our fundamental law was a mere compact between sovereign states, the doctrine boldly asserted by Jefferson in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, by Madison in the Virginia Resolutions of 1799—the doctrine acted upon by the slave states—receive any credibility at all? How could our " leading principle in politics . . . that the supreme power resides in the people," the doctrine so universally accepted in 1787, be converted into the self-stultifying notion that the Constitution was a compact of independent, sovereign entities?

[31] H. A. Cushing, ed., *The Writings of Samuel Adams* (New York, 1908), vol. IV, p. 324.

[32] Elliot, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 59.

[33] Hamilton in *Federalist* Nos. 22 and 15.

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How could states' rights advocates, John C. Calhoun in particular, claim for entities called states a prerogative that belongs, under our theory of government, only to people or populations? How, in short, could the highest political capacity of the people be transmuted into the capacity of corporate bodies—the states? Investigation of these questions leads ultimately to James Madison. In the divisive effort culminating in civil war, all major participants on the side of disunion derived essential support from him.

The position of Madison on the nature of the Constitution and of the Union, also as to the scope of the powers granted the national government, stands in bold contrast to the clear-cut views of the Constitution's major supporters as well as of its radical opponents. In *Federalist* No. 39, Madison maintained:

> The Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose. . . . This assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State—the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a *national*, but a *federal* act. . . . Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a *federal*, and not a *national* Constitution.[34]

[34] In the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison dealt with the same question: "Who are the parties to it? The people—but not the people as composing one great body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties: were it, as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment . . . but, Sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent." Elliot, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 114-15.

Chief Justice John Marshall cast Madison's refinements brusquely aside in 1819, saying: "It is true, they assembled in their several states (for purposes of ratifying the Constitution)—and where else could they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments." *McCulloch v. Md.*, 4 Wheaton 316, p. 402.

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Madison labored the point; for him the distinction was fundamental. Yet Hamilton passed it over lightly in essay 9 as "a distinction, more subtle than accurate. . . ."

For Madison the task of the Convention was not to abolish the Articles of Confederation but "to reduce" them. He spells out his meaning in *Federalist* No. 40: "The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the Convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation." The Father of the Constitution elaborated his thought further in *Federalist* No. 45, dealing specifically with the nature and scope of national power: "The change which it [the Constitution] proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS." The powers of the new government, he said, "are few and defined."

The sharpness of the contrast between Madison and his collaborator, Hamilton, grew out of basic disagreement as to the source from which the powers of the national government emanated. For Hamilton the Articles of Confederation, being fatally defective, must be destroyed, liquidated, not merely "reduced". "The evils we experience do not proceed", he wrote, in *Federalist* No. 15, "from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric." The capital infirmity of the existing system was congenital—"it never had ratification by the People." To avoid the "gross heresy" that a "party to a compact has a right to revoke that compact, the fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of

Marshall points up his meanings even more sharply: "It has been said, that the people had already surrendered their powers to the State sovereignties and had nothing more to give. But surely, the question whether they may resume and modify the powers granted to government does not remain to be settled in this country. Much more might the legitimacy of the General Government be doubted, had it been created by the States. The powers delegated to the State sovereignties were to be exercised by themselves, not by a distinct and independent sovereignty, created by themselves. . . . The government of the Union, then, . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and substance it emanates from them." *Ibid.*, pp. 403-4.

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The Consent of The People." In essay 15 he had portrayed the Constitution as the proper corrective of "the great and radical vice"—"legislation for states . . . as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist." There follows his classic expression of nationalistic doctrine:

> If we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the only proper objects of government.

"The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced", Hamilton observed in *Federalist* No. 84, "that Union is the basis of their political happiness." [35] "We have

[35] Hamilton conceded (*Federalist* No. 32) that "the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation," but he undermined the concession by adding that "the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which *were not, by that act* [the Constitution] *exclusively delegated to the United States.*" Except for the word "exclusively", the emphasis is mine.

The supremacy or "sovereignty" of the central government vis-à-vis the states in foreign affairs had been recognized and enforced under the Articles of Confederation. See John Jay's argument of October 1786, *Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress*, vol. IV, pp. 203-4, 209-10. James Wilson went further, claiming sovereignty for the central government, under certain circumstances, even in domestic affairs.

In his argument upholding the 1781 Act of Congress incorporating the Bank of North America, Wilson appears not to have been embarrassed for want of an express or implied grant of such powers. "To many purposes," he argued, "the United States are to be considered as one undivided, independent nation; and as possessed of all the rights, and powers, and properties by the laws of nations incident to such. Whenever an object occurs to the direction of which no particular state is competent, the management of it must, of necessity, belong to the United States in congress assembled." J. D. Andrews, ed., *Works of James Wilson* (1896), vol. I, p. 558.

Article VI, paragraph 2, of the Constitution removes all doubt as to national dominance by providing specifically for the supremacy of the national government generally. And since the national government acts directly on individuals, that supremacy is enforceable in the Federal courts. Nor does the Tenth Amendment impair this supremacy. Therein "the powers *not delegated* to the United States . . .

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neither troops, nor treasury, nor government," he had remarked in *Federalist* No. 15. Having thus "reached almost the last stage of national humiliation," should we permit, he inquired, "that sacred knot which binds the people of America together to be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy, or by misrepresentation?"

It followed, in consequence, that the powers granted the national government by the proposed Constitution had to be new and "undefined"—indeed, undefinable in view of the great interests committed to the care of the national government. Far from possessing, as Madison asserted, only "a few and defined powers", the national government possessed "all the power which a free people *ought to delegate to any government.*" [36]

Nor was the vigor of the new government to be applied so exclusively, as Madison suggested, in the field of foreign relations. Hamilton conceived of the "Union", and of the central government as an essential force in domestic affairs as well—especially as a "barrier against domestic faction and insurrection." [37] "A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care . . . free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the People." [38] It would be, Hamilton argued, "both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are intrusted to its management." [39]

"Let us at last break the fatal charm", Hamilton pleaded dramatically in *Federalist* No. 15, "which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity." "Let us not at-

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are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The Tenth Amendment, far from qualifying or limiting national power, in effect repeats the words of Article VI, paragraph 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

[36] *Federalist* No. 23.

[37] *Federalist* No. 9.

[38] *Federalist* No. 31.

[39] *Federalist* No. 23.

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tempt", he reiterated in *Federalist* No. 23, "to reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative." Hamilton's exhortations might well have been addressed to his *Federalist* collaborator, Madison.

Some one has characterized the personality of the *Federalist* as "split".[40] It would perhaps be closer to the mark to call it schizophrenic. The major authors not only disagreed on basic issues but, at certain points, Madison was in disagreement with himself, embracing the Hamiltonian theory that the Constitution emanates from the people, as well as his collaborator's theory of the broad and "unconfined" scope of national authority.[41] For the most part, however, Madison saw the Con-

[40] Douglass Adair, "The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers", *William and Mary Quarterly*, April and July 1944.

[41] In *Federalist* No. 45, Madison said: ". . . if . . . the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes to sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape—that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? . . ."

Madison continued this nationalistic theme in *Federalist* No. 46: "The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasoning on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common Superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone."

Madison has stated his nationalistic position, quite bluntly in the Philadelphia Convention: "There is a gradation of power in all societies, from lowest corporation to the highest sovereign. The states never possessed the essential rights of sovereignty. These were always vested in Congress (even under the Articles of Confederation)." Farrand, ed., *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 471. Here Madison seemed to consider the states, as did Dr. Johnson (*ibid.*, p. 461), "as districts of people composing one political Society."

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stitution as resting precisely on those flimsy foundations Hamilton cited as incurably defective.

These equivocal views of the Father of the Constitution, expressed in a series of essays designed to win ratification, provided the leaders of nullification and secession with exactly the formula, the destructive ammunition, they used in their abortive attempt to blow up the Union. Nor is this all. Madison's theory that the Constitution emanates from and was ratified by " the people . . . comprising the distinct and independent states " is the more extraordinary because of its novelty. In 1787, " People of the States " and " People of the United States " were not antagonistic conceptions, as Madison's interpretation in *Federalist* No. 39 implies. The polar concepts familiar to the men of that day—" States " and " People ", " Governments " and " People "—had been inherited from John Locke. The term " State " usually meant, as Dr. Johnson said, in the Philadelphia Convention, " districts of people forming one Political Society." " Governments " were universally regarded as properly the creations of people, and the term " People " meant an aggregation of individuals endowed with the natural right to determine their form of government.[42] The state and federal governments were, as Madison said in *Federalist* No. 46, but " different agencies and trustees of the people." A " constitution " represented a fresh manifestation of the inexhaustible, inalienable right of people to govern themselves.[43] In this sense

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At certain points, Madison also endorsed Hamilton's broad conception of the powers granted the national government, saying in *Federalist* No. 44 that " No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included."

[42] Supporters of the states-compact theory of the Union have made much of the fact that until September 12 the Preamble read: " We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts," etc. It was then changed by the Committee on Style to " We, the people of the United States," proving (it was argued) that the Constitution emanates from the people of the states, rather than the people of the United States. But, as we have seen, this distinction was unimportant in 1787, the states being regarded " as districts of people forming one political society." Note that the Preamble, in its original form, did not read, " We the States ".

[43] See Edward S. Corwin's " 'We, the People' ", published in the *Doctrine of Judicial Review* (Princeton, 1914), pp. 81-108, 98.

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the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 had assembled "to raise", as John Quincy Adams observed in 1839, "the marble palace of the people to stand the test of time."

In the years after 1798, Madison's explosively novel theory became the stock in trade of anti-Federalist leadership; it was the central idea on which nullificationists and secessionists built their ill-fated case. Madison himself employed it in the Virginia Resolutions, declaring that the powers of the federal government are derived from

> the compact to which the States are parties . . . and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.[44]

The year before, Jefferson had asserted in his Kentucky Resolutions that the Constitution was a compact of states, and that, "as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of measures of redress."[45]

John Taylor of Caroline County, Virginia, gleefully appropriated Madison's theory in his vehement attack on Hamilton's and Marshall's nationalistic views of the Constitution and of the Union. Taylor's intellectual gymnastics, however, were mixed with legerdemain. Opponents of the Constitution, as we have seen, vigorously attacked it, primarily because its provisions made, as they said, for a "consolidated government". After 1820, Taylor, drawing heavily from Madion's numbers of the *Federalist*,[46] held that the Convention had rejected the idea of "consolidation" and of national supremacy, and John Marshall, notwithstanding this decisive repudiation, had achieved

[44] G. Hunt, ed., *Writings of James Madison*, vol. VI, p. 326.

[45] P. L. Ford, ed., *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. VII, p. 287.

[46] John C. Taylor, *Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated* (Richmond, 1820), pp. 59, 97, 132-33, 155-56, 200, *passim*.

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the forbidden end by judicial interpretation![47] In other words, a secessionist position, otherwise difficult, if not impossible, to maintain, was made comparatively easy by James Madison, whose numbers of the *Federalist* supplied John Taylor with the authoritative ammunition he leveled against Hamilton's and Marshall's doctrines of national supremacy.

It was not, however, until 1861 that the slave states cut loose. Then enlisting Madison's authority they held that the Constitution emanated from the sovereign states, that they therefore had the right to interpose their judgment against any acts of the national government deemed by them unauthorized, and that they might therefore secede from the Union.[48] It was on this theory, entangled with ethics and economics, that the South went on to Harper's Ferry, Shiloh and Appomatox.

One need not accuse the Father of the Constitution of instigating the Civil War—he died in 1836—but one may venture the suggestion that his numbers of the *Federalist* papers planted the verbal bomb that, after 1861, flared tragically. The ambiguity lay not so much in the Constitution as in what he said about it. One may reach this conclusion, and still be "captivated", as Jefferson was, "by the compromise [or semblance of it] of the opposite claims of the great and little states." It may be that this was an occasion that called for the sort of equivocation in which Madison so freely indulged. It may be that his equivocal views were rooted in far more wisdom than the comparatively greater forthrightness of his collaborator, Hamilton; for, without Madison's concessions to rampant state loyalties, there may not have been any Constitution of 1787. One may recall that Hamilton himself in 1780 shied off from his own suggestion that the Congress under the Articles of Confederation, in order to cope with the crisis, might assert and exercise discretionary power—power adequate to deal with national exigencies. This course then seemed "too bold an ex-

[47] John C. Taylor, *New Views of the Constitution of the United States* (Washington, 1823).

[48] For a detailed discussion of Madison's contribution to the doctrine of Nullification and Secession, see Edward S. Corwin, "National Power and State Interposition, 1787-1861", *Michigan Law Review*, May 1912, vol. X, pp. 535-51.

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pedient." [49] That is why he advocated calling a convention as the safer course.

Nevertheless the grim verdict at Appomatox repudiated Madison as conclusively as the record of 1787-89. A theory of the Union which reason had proved powerless to resolve was finally established by resort to force. Washington had suggested war as a possibility when he (according to Gouverneur Morris' recollections) told the Convention: "It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. . . ." And yet, even after the first shots were fired on Sumter and secession was a fact, Lincoln still searched for a theory of the Union that would go deeper than the great constitutional debates then rife. He finally hit upon an idea suggested in 1774, ironically enough, by Patrick Henry, that the

> Union is perpetual . . . much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774, . . . matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objectives for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was "to form a more perfect union." [50]

These successive efforts proved to be in vain, but eight years after Lincoln made his pronouncement the United States Supreme Court adopted his reasoning, almost his very words. Chief Justice Chase, holding that Texas had failed in its attempt to secede, said:

> Union of the states never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies . . . and received definite form, and character, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to be "perpetual" . . . the Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect union." It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words.

[49] Letter to James Duane, September 3, 1780. H. C. Lodge, ed., *The Works of Alexander Hamilton* (New York, 1904), vol. I, p. 213.

[50] Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. VI, p. 5.

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And so, through Washington, Hamilton, Marshall and Lincoln, this, the organic view of the Union conceived of as rooted in the consent of the people, had steadily advanced. Repeatedly tested by pen, and, finally, by musket, the Union was at last seen, not as "a purely artificial and arbitrary relation," but as fused, in Chief Justice Chase's words, "out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interest, and geographical relations." [51] Justice Holmes, himself a soldier in Lincoln's army, reinforced this nationalist theory of the Union in a Supreme Court opinion in 1919:

> When we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they [the framers] have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope, that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.[52]

After Sumter, reason could no longer serve as the instrument for achieving the ends of nationalist statesmanship.[53] Thus, union, like the Constitution itself, had to be "extorted from the grinding necessities of a reluctant nation." [54]

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[51] Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase in *Texas v. White*, 7 Wallace (1869), p. 700.

[52] *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U. S. 416 (1920), p. 433.

[53] This is not to imply that the Madisonian theory of the Union and of national power has since been devoid of usefulness. Following the Civil War the doctrine of "dual sovereignty" was freely invoked in leading Supreme Court cases as a limitation on national power to regulate our economy. Here constitutional theory was brought to the service of the laissez-faire dogma. See in this connection Edward S. Corwin, *Twilight of the Supreme Court* (New Haven, 1934); and my article, "The Conservative World of Mr. Justice Sutherland, 1883-1910", *American Political Science Review*, vol. XXXII, No. 30, June 1938.

[54] Language of John Quincy Adams, *The Jubilee of the Constitution*, p. 55.

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THE MODERN SCHOLAR AND THE AMERICAS

IN every realm of man's thought and experience two complementary processes of our modern age may be seen at work. One of these is agglomeration, or the tendency to disregard traditionally limited areas and to think in terms of universal classes and forces and trends. It leads us to propose social remedies based, not on our knowledge of specific groups of bricklayers, music teachers, lawyers or mechanics, but on generalizations—supported by impersonal statistical tables—about universal classes of workers or *bourgeois*. We now speak not so much of local groups of artistic personalities as of impersonal processes in the different arts: abstractionism, atonality, the stream of consciousness. We even have concepts that transcend the artistic media themselves: realism, classicism, futurism. We are bewildered by the vastness and complexity of our life. In an effort to seize it, to make it understandable, to bring it within our personal sphere, we allow ourselves to be led to the ultimate extreme of generalization. We see the whole world in neat patches of black and white; its peoples, nations, customs, become either doers or dreamers, capitalist or socialized, Latin or Teutonic, East or West. We think of the state, the church, the proletariat, bureaucracy, public opinion, supply and demand, as powerful forces operating in an arena that is somehow removed from the realm of common personal experience. Even the family—man's basic most closely knit associative unit with its wealth of meaning and sentiment for the individual at a purely personal level—finds itself in competition with these vague, superhuman elements in the business of fulfilling functions and claiming allegiance.

The counterpart to this tendency—which is in no way incompatible with it—is the atomization of society. The specific community, with its particular characteristics and its particular pattern of relationships and activities, has dissolved, as we have said, into a larger complex of nebulous, impersonal institutions.

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But these institutions, in turn, cut across the old lines of community in its various forms seeking to reach and absorb the single man. This man, taken from his old, clearly defined context, is no longer a human being with a unique character of his own. We have a new, cold term for him. He is "the individual".

This "individual" can be lifted neatly, as a specimen, from his traditional associations. The psychiatrists and gland specialists analyze his mechanism, discover in what way it generates such elements as love, fear, allegiance, or even self-sacrifice. In the practical world there are many people interested in exploiting this mechanism. They learn what elements must be fed into it to produce given reactions. These exploiters of the individual are the propagandists and publicists, the journalists, the politicians, the salesmen, the public relations experts, and, in general, the leaders of any of our societal institutions that subsist only by winning the allegiance of large numbers of "individuals".

In a sense, then, the social scientist impersonalizes his subject by reducing man to a lowest common denominator and raising man's society to a highest common denominator. This process has won us marvelous new insights. Free at last from our ancient assumptions, we have been able to break the old taboos and smash our former idols. The scope of our interests has broadened immensely, opening for us whole new sciences and fields of research. Our modern thinkers have led us away from the practice of forcing our observed experience into rigid molds, dictated by arbitrary preconceptions as to the nature of the universe. Pragmatically, they have given new structure to our knowledge. They take as a starting point the elements that are accessible to us. They observe, classify, compare them. From these elements, practicable theories, generalizations, codes of action, arise. We are learning that knowledge cannot be tailored to conform to a superimposed wisdom, but that the latter must arise organically from the former.

At first glance it would seem that we are making what our nineteenth-century predecessors optimistically called "progress". It gives us a sense of power and achievement to

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know that somewhere in the world there exists such specific and thorough knowledge about man. You and I do not possess this knowledge. But we know that *somebody* possesses it *somewhere*. We know that *somebody* can tell us the incidence of tuberculosis in Paris in 1924, or explain the intricate process by which a sharp pinprick causes us to cry out in pain.

The catch is, however, that the simple accumulation of information is not in itself enlightening. Knowledge must be assimilated as well as accumulated. Any significant addition to man's store of knowledge calls for a new appraisal and synthesis of the whole. Such appraisal becomes increasingly difficult as our store of information piles up. This is because our talents for eclectic interpretation are not well enough developed. One might draw an analogy here with the modern public opinion poll. The most accurate way to ascertain the attitudes of a nation with 10, 100 or 200 million inhabitants is to question each and every citizen. This being impracticable, the skilled analyst knows how to set up a representative sample of a few thousand people, proportionately selected from the various age, occupational, social, economic, and other groups. Before the world's knowable information, the modern scholar is much like the pollster before his 100 million citizens. Unlike the pollster, the scholar does not yet know how to take his sample. Perhaps he takes it uncritically and presents his findings without conclusions or with unwarranted conclusions. Or perhaps he makes an accurate, exhaustive survey of a specific group of people that has no larger significance—citizens, for example, who are one-eyed, or whose last names contain more than fourteen letters. In any case, the scholar is unable with such methods to furnish us with an integral and total picture, a picture with meaning for us at a human level.

What seems to have gone out of history writing, then, is this human element. Our historians are giving us something less or something more than human life. In either case they miss the vital quality of history; for history is the story of man. A monograph or a statistical abstract, however useful to the historian as raw material, is not history in the fullest sense because it does not tell us a story; it does not have a beginning and an

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end as does the life of a man. Similarly the historian who writes exclusively in terms of forces and trends and drives misses the real meaning of history because, though he may tell us a fascinating story, he neglects to give us the story of *man.* Man himself must be at the core of history, not because man is necessarily the most important thing in the universe from a detached, superhuman point of view, but because to *us* man is the most important thing. After all, we *are* men.

The business of writing history must be seen as an act of creation, in a sense a work of art. This is simply because the mathematical totality of historical fact is unavailable. Even if the information about man existent in all the brains, libraries, archives, and written or unwritten records of the world were assembled, it would be only fragmentary. And as soon as we detract a single item from the total, we do irremediable violence to absolute truth. So instead of entertaining this impracticable vision of absolute truth, let us, by conscientious appraisal and selection of our material, construct a practicable historical truth that is valid for the purposes of man. Thus history becomes an art in the sense that any art implies selection and juxtaposition of detail in a way that holds truth and meaning for the artist and for his society.

One of our hemisphere's historians who may justly be called an artist was William H. Prescott. His histories of the conquests of Peru and Mexico, written a century ago, are still read widely both by the specialized scholar and by the general public. One need say only that to establish their merit. Prescott did not have at his command certain of the primary sources and certain of our modern concepts regarding the mainsprings of historical change. But Prescott used to fullest advantage the sources and techniques at his disposal. For one thing he had a fine literary style and sense for imagery, a quality no longer deemed necessary for the historian in our era of specialization. Moreover, he was able to envision his subject as a whole, cause it to stand out from the amorphous texture of history, give it coherence and drama and purpose.

Today there are those who refer to Prescott and especially to some of his lesser contemporaries as an outmoded school of

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"drum and trumpet" historians. We are skeptical of their overattention to political and military events, to colorful characters, to feats of physical prowess. The fact is, though, that the best of the drum and trumpet writers were faithful to the most reliable primary sources, and their interpretations were valid for the times in which they lived. We today have not been able to translate the drama, the essential humanity of man's story, into the idiom and thought patterns of our modern world. A century ago a historian could conceive of two armies marching into combat, one of them embodying Satanic wickedness and the other representing the strong right arm of a just but stern deity. A sensitive historian would not of course have stated the theme so baldly, but it would have been implicit in his thinking and given his story structure and movement. Had he employed his materials conscientiously, we would still read his history with profit—not only as an artistic expression of a past era's way of thought, but as a trustworthy source of material which we could subject to the interpretations of our own time.

Today the time-honored God-and-the-Devil concept does not satisfy as a direct explanation for human conduct. We have new oversimplifications, mentioned earlier, but they do not lend themselves to a personal, dramatic treatment. We have suggested the way in which our modern pragmatic criterion tested and discarded a weighty superstructure of a priori assumptions as to the nature and purpose of the world, clearing the way for a more workable, organic view of man's thought experience. But at times it has cut away living flesh with the carrion. We have tended, for instance, to reject the distinction between human and inhuman, to deny that man is set apart by a cluster of very particular attributes. We allow him to be passed from one specialist to another like a bit of modeling clay. The clay is molded into a series of forms, each bearing no relation to the last: chemical and physiological man, glandular man, economic man, societal man, exploiting and exploited man, cultural man, and so on. Indispensable though labels be, we must not abuse our relativistic procedure to the extent that we lose sight of the essential dignity and humanity which must inhere in any and all concepts of man. It would be a bitter joke if, as the keener

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our analytical tools became, the more meaningless and chameleon-like we discovered ourselves to be. We alone in the universe have the need or the wherewithal to assume that man has dignity. We alone can make the assumption valid.

The historian, then, must find new techniques of expression that do not prejudice his function as the story-teller of mankind. His case is that of the poet, the novelist and the dramatist when the epic, the picaresque novel and classic tragedy ceased being practicable literary forms. Like them, the historian must seek a fresh idiom.

There seem to be at least four common ways by which historians have avoided the discipline of a creative synthesis. One is excessive specialization. A second is the journalistic approach, typical of the historical novel, which gives disproportionate value to elements like sex, brutality, and colorful personalities in a calculated appeal to the reader's casual emotions. A third is the method devised thirty or forty years ago by American historians who, realizing the complexity of human affairs, felt that the solution lay in making several categories—social, political, economic, cultural, and so on—of information and including them all between the covers of a volume, though with no attempt at selection, integration or interpretation. A fourth way is the quest for simplicity through an all-embracing determinism: economic, geographic, supernatural, sexual, and so on.

Each of these methods, while useful in particular instances, fails to furnish a valid point of vantage for viewing the over-all development of man's affairs. Each fails because the proponents of each, inhibited by the vast proportions of the theme, accept limitations, consciously or unconsciously, prejudicial to the act of creation that must characterize any significant contribution to man's understanding of himself.

Where, then, are we to look for a touchstone that will transform the chaos of history into an intelligible pattern or story? Our clue, I believe, is to seek an element not of substance but of procedure. It might be demonstrable that the motivation for all of man's activity is in the last analysis hunger or sex. But such a theory does little to clarify our problem, because it is not

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the "last analysis" that concerns us; this is not the level at which we think and evaluate. It matters not that our values be rationalizations or sublimations; if they attract and motivate us, they are for all purposes real.

We arrive at a more workable methodology if, instead of considering man as one of the world's millions of biological specimens, we seek out the factor that differentiates social from natural sciences. This factor is evidently consciousness. Many, though not all, of man's actions are directed by his consciousness. The polemic over free will—now becoming less and less fruitful—is here of no concern. The fact is that our minds have the powers of memory and prophecy. Whatever demonstrable factors go into the make-up of an individual or of a so-called "mass" mind, the mind is for us a basic element, not wholly recognizable as a simple arithmetic sum of its parts. Except under conditions noted by psychologists, human conduct is governed by this mind in its thinking state and by influences which must act through it. The mind is the one common denominator for all the activity of man. It would seem, then, that the mind—rather than climate, supply and demand, or the Oedipus complex—is our determinant. The flexibility of this concept devolves great responsibilities upon us, but at the same time clears the way for enlightened eclecticism and offers the opportunity for creative insight that would otherwise be lost.

Rather than carry these very general remarks about the creative task of the modern scholar on into the field of methodology, let us now place him before the concept of our American hemisphere.

Without for a moment questioning the sincerity of any or all of our American governments, I think it fair to say that we would have a hard time justifying—solely on the basis of declarations by official and self-appointed expounders of good-neighborliness—the existence of an American community meriting serious consideration as an organic entity, whether from a historic, cultural, social, economic, political or geographic point of view. Man's mind can bring together any knowable elements under the sun. One might for instance establish an ideological affinity between the Brazil of Dom

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Pedro II and the Hawaii of King Kamehameha. The universe is very large and the mind is very ingenious. We must husband our energies and set our minds to work upon only such comparisons and generalizations as help us better to understand problems and processes that hold meaning for us, though not necessarily immediate, practical application.

The Old World—Europe, the Near East, Asia, and their regional subdivisions—offers us a number of areas that are manageable for our thinking simply because modern man grew up out of the Old World. Over the centuries there have arisen thought patterns and bodies of knowledge that afford the thinker a rich storehouse of material from which to fashion his interpretations of human history. So overpowering is this Old World accumulation that it draws into its own ready-made patterns regions and even whole continents that lie beyond broad seas. It is only now that we in the New World are beginning to look about us and wonder whether the Americas are not something more than projections of the European continent, whether we Americans do not have certain peculiarly American methods and wants and values and faults and merits—and perhaps even a soul that is American. How much basis is there for such speculation?

Possibly it is specialists like the geologist and the ethnologist who have advanced farthest along the line of thought indicated. For to them the European is a scandalously recent arrival in this hemisphere; they can work untrammeled by the linguistic, cultural and political baggage with which the European has in the past 400 years encumbered the American scene. The geologist considers our great American land mass in terms of tens and hundreds of thousands of years. The majestic cordillera that traverses the mass nearly from one pole to the other has for him a very particular significance. The ethnologist likewise possesses this broad, essentially American vision. For him it makes little difference whether the sedentary, agricultural Indians be from Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, Mexico or Arizona. The plains Indians can be from Canada, Montana, Nebraska or Argentina. The forest dwellers from Brazil, Venezuela or New England. The Eskimos from Greenland or Canada. The fishermen from

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Cuba or Brazil. The hemisphere is conceived of as something integral, as a complex of regions and regional functions that add up to an organic whole.

The historian is thus provided with an invaluable point of departure, but soon finds that he must chart his own course, since he is by vocation committed to analyzing the infinitesimal span of 400 years that commences at the very point where the other scholars cease their labors. The initial concept he receives, then, is that of an American milieu—a New World immensely varied as to climate, topography, natural resources, and Indian peoples, but with these variations in no way corresponding to the political divisions of today. Despite its variety, it is evident that any Europeans arriving in any part of this milieu would face certain basic problems and experiences in common: slow and tenuous communication with the homeland; New World foods, plants, animals, utensils; policy toward the Indians, whether alliance, conquest, expulsion, extinction, intermarriage, religious conversion; relations between the first generations born in America and the immigrants who would continue to arrive from Europe; the need for an abundant source of cheap or slave labor.

There is furthermore a certain spiritual transformation to be comprehended. In the Americas, European man found no civilization—with limited exceptions in Mexico and Peru—that had attained in slightest measure the development of the one they represented. Certain native techniques the white man learned to adopt. But in general he found himself alone, and thrown completely upon his own resources. He was in direct, naked contact with the forces of nature—whether the piercing cold of the Bolivian altiplano or the winters of New England, whether the Brazilian *sertão* or the Canadian backwoods, whether the Argentine pampas or the North American Great Plains, whether the Amazon jungles or the tropical coastlands of Central America. The environment imposed a severe discipline upon the Europeans, exacting of their personal characters qualities for which the old continent had made little demand. Yet at the same time there was an immensity, an emptiness, a fresh virginity, about the New World before which many of

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the Old World preconceptions, customs and allegiances were quick to dissolve.

Perhaps we can see, then, a series of attributes common to all regions of the New World at the time of its colonization which, taken together, give us something that is very nearly a spiritual quality. This is important in our thinking if we are to carry out our notion of history as a response to mental values. Why was not the New World colonized centuries earlier? Its existence had been known to Europeans hundreds of years before the voyages of Columbus. Indeed, the Scandinavians reached American shores in the Middle Ages. Scholarship has proved that Columbus made effective use of no knowledge or equipment that had not long been available to Europeans. What is interesting about Columbus, moreover, is that he believed another land mass—in his mind, Asia—to be much closer to Europe than was actually the case. The sober minds that sought to dissuade him had truer geographical notions.

Columbus is one of those prophetic figures who synthesize the whole spirit of an era to come. It was not that he was eager for fame or conquest or fortune. He was animated by a drive, a nearly fanatic drive, to know and make himself master, in a spiritual sense, of the things of this world. His whole person was symptomatic of the new wants and values of the times. And by the intensity of the flame within him he transcended his times.

Man's fresh awareness of the world he lived in was showing itself in all the spheres of his activity: in his arts, sciences, customs; in the things he used and ate; in his manner of worship; in the way he earned his living. Wise men, lay and clerical, had known for long generations that the world was round. It was only in the fifteenth century, however, that the concept became meaningful. The old European mold was straining and cracking. Asia and Africa were no longer lands of phantasy, but arenas of real-life toil, defeat or glory for soldier, priest and merchant. Static, self-contained Europe had become dynamic and centrifugal. It no longer had room for the forces it was generating. The virgin continents across the Atlantic became a necessary response to the new conditions of Europe.

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Since the cumulative effect of the Renaissance had been to change man's whole way of thinking—and we must understand by "Renaissance" a spirit that had been taking shape for several centuries prior to the discovery of America—we must seek its repercussions in each and all of man's activities. It is too limiting to take, say, a military or an economic view of the New World's colonization. To arrive at a unified concept of the Americas that is organic and valid, not artificial and superimposed, we must comprehend the immense variety of functions which the New World fulfilled for different nations, different social classes, different forms of economic activity, different religious groups, different individuals. It will also be illuminating for us to consider how the New World affected man's self-expression. Would we find any pattern of adaptation common to all the Americas if we were to examine the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century chronicles, architecture, sermons, plastic arts, furniture and domestic arts, church music, poetry, and narratives?

Let it be made clear that we are not searching out tangible elements that can be mathematically compared. It does not serve our purpose, for instance, to count and compare the number of references to Greek antiquity found in Cotton Mather and Antônio Vieira. Nor are we trying falsely to prove an extensive inter-acculturation among the regions of America. Our quest is rather for a common process, for similar adaptations, for comparable solutions to comparable problems. In considering religious architecture, we do not try to establish a visual affinity between the early Brazilian chapels and those of Mexico or the New England Protestant churches. Instead, we examine the models brought from Europe, study the local environment into which each was introduced, and compare the modifications undergone by reason of new building materials available, a new type of community life, native Indian influences, new spiritual needs, lack of artists and skilled laborers, and so on.

In addition to comparable modes of adaptation, we must look for something common to the variety of motives which brought diverse individuals, groups and nations to cast their lot in the New World. We hinted at this in our reference to the many

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functions which the New World fulfilled. What impulse is common both to a religious minority group that comes to America to escape persecution and to priests or brothers who come, not to escape from a dominating religion, but to represent such a religion and to augment its ranks with thousands of New World pagans?

What is common both to the Bahian sugar planter, whose crops furnished a large surplus that could be sent to Europe in return for luxuries of every sort, and to the New Englander with his small farm that was nearly self-sufficient for life's necessities but yielded no handsome surplus exchangeable for imported finery?

What is common to the Paulista *bandeira,* setting out on a two- or five-year journey to the interior in quest of Indian slaves and with no thought of territorial expansion, and the army of the Spanish conquistador, crusading for king and church in search of fabled cities of gold?

Common to each and all we find a restlessness, a discontent with old systems. There is a realization that Europe is not an ultimate, final value. The New World comes to be seen as a region important in itself, where man's energies along any line bring rewards not attainable in Europe. The case of any single European coming of his free will to America signified that a choice had been made between the possibilities in the Old and New Worlds. Sometimes the immigrant arrived to extend and fortify an old system. Other times he came to escape an old system and create a new one. In either event Europe—both its dominant and dissident groups—needed new lands and opportunities wherewith to solve new problems.

This very general view of the settlement of the New World can of course lead to abuses. But by keeping it an element of procedure and not of substance, we do not exonerate ourselves from the task of diligently assembling and examining all available material. Once we are in possession of the necessary knowledge, then perhaps the concept suggested will serve as a criterion for selecting the elements that tell a true and satisfying story.

Let us now look beyond the colonization and pick at random

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some aspects of the Americas' subsequent development that particularly lend themselves to this broader treatment.

One of the deepest insights into the history and character of a people is afforded by the language they speak. More nearly than any series of events or any of the arts, language mirrors a people in its entirety. This is because language belongs to and is formed and changed by each and all of the people. Language develops over the centuries, preserving a people's past history, recording its most recent influences and contacts. If our study of language is to be rewarding, we must have in us something of the philologist, the literary critic, the folklorist, even the musician. We must understand the language as it is spoken or sung, used in poetry or journalism, pronounced by professor or farmhand. We must know intimately the strength and weaknesses of its vocabulary, its peculiar idioms, its proverbs, its swearwords, its form of address for different types of person, the nature of words it is compelled to absorb from other languages, the literary forms and the species of humor to which it most readily lends itself. We must have an ear for its rhythm, pattern, cadence, sonority. In a people's language we hear and read its triumphs and failures, its ideals, dominant emotions and talents, ethnic components, philosophy of life. And sometimes—if we are not too deeply engrossed in our scholarly research—we may, in the music of a chance phrase or line of verse, hear a people's soul.

Here, then, would seem to be one of our cornerstones: a comparative study of the four principal languages that came to the New World. If we examine the Portuguese, Spanish, English and French spoken in the Americas today and confront them with the languages of the mother countries, will we observe any similar processes of change, attributable to the American environment? In special cases there has been no change. In isolated areas, for example, of Bolivia, São Paulo state, Tennessee and Canada, there are communities where the languages of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe may still be heard. These exceptions are in themselves illuminating. But generally speaking, the four languages have received here a peculiarly American stamp. The Cuban dialect may differ from the

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Argentine, or the *nortista* from the Carioca, or that of Toronto from that of Chicago, but these variations are less considerable, in this perspective, than those between the Americas and Europe.

What has happened to languages here? Have they become softer, more rounded off? Has the rhythm become smoother and more flowing? Have Americans been more ingenious, more pragmatic perhaps, in coining new words and expressions? Is American imagery different? What is the effect of the racial and national melting pot? What preferences do Americans show in their vocabulary? What are the indigenous and African influences? The detailed answers to these and many other questions would be of far more than etymological interest and would send us on with fresh and stimulating hypotheses into other areas of study.

Another broad subject is government. The differences in the practical problems of administration for Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries have frequently and with justice been pointed out. Solution of these problems has not invariably been attended with success. In some nations the democratic political constitution has been a stabilizing force that allows for change but acts as a counterweight for disruptive extremism. In other nations the constitution has been a closed, imitated system imposed with no thought paid to local needs and conditions. Such systems must be periodically and violently rejected and renewed.

But most interesting from our viewpoint is the fact that the need for democracy, the spirit of democracy, sprang from the New World—whatever the formal elements may have been that were taken from Old World countries. The failures of American political systems have occurred where statesmen have seen democracy, not as an adaptable way of thinking and living, but in terms of rigid articles and amendments that do not correspond to local forms and spirit of democracy.

For the purposes of the student of laws, there is much to be said for considering American legal institutions in the light of those of the respective colonizing countries. But for our purposes we must look past the legal frameworks to the people themselves. If we speak broadly, overlooking large groups of

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Indians who have never been assimilated and the Negro minority in our own country—can we say that the American is less a victim of his birth than the European? Can we say that American society tends to judge the single man more by his talent and capacity than does the European? Is it true that the freedoms of expression and religion are in the Americas considered more as an inherent right, not so much as a privilege bestowed? Have Latin-American *caudillos* and North American bosses of city political machines been forced to pay a share more respect to personal rights and dignity than have their European counterparts?

Our thinking would be greatly assisted by a redefinition of democracy—a definition, not in terms of constitutions and the right to vote and socialism and capitalism, but in terms of the human being before his society and before his own person.

One of the most rewarding periods for study is that which runs from the First World War to the present. The war developed the self-reliance of the various American nations and matured their national self-awareness, which had hitherto been only imperfectly defined. We begin to get an abundant literature of the Americas to replace the phenomenon—common to many of our regions—of occasional, isolated, and almost inexplicable literary giants. By their fresh forms and uses of language our national literatures are becoming truly American. All of the arts, in fact, have been searching out the mainsprings of American popular culture. We are acutely aware of folklore, both as a value in itself and as a source of forms and rhythm to be transmuted through the mind of the modern artist. Today the sentimental, patronizing concept of the noble Amerindian no longer rings true.

Much could be learned of our Americas if one were to consider the post-war generations of each country as they came to maturity. The skepticism, irreverence, and at the same time lyricism of the 1920's; the sober, almost pedantic social consciousness of the 1930's; the eclectic, perhaps more enlightened search for faith of the 1940's—these are, of course, but labels. Yet they are suggestive as long as we do not accept them as stultifying formulae.

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What, we must ask, are the particularly American responses to world-wide problems of our century? How have our local and national governments measured up to the challenge to guarantee economic and social, as well as political, citizenship? Which, relatively speaking, have met with success and which failure? How are American intellectuals reconciling the individual—whether an intellectual or an anonymous individual—with his increasingly collectivist world?

In this brief essay it has not been possible even to hint at the tremendous areas of study awaiting the thinking citizen of the Americas who wishes to form a clearer notion of the hemisphere that has sired him forth. I have merely wanted to suggest that behind the façade of official Panamericanism, to which we pay daily lip service, there lies a more ponderable concept to conjure with. And, of course, the larger vision does not suspend or invalidate the many fine regional studies which already exist. For it is only by close analysis and appreciation of our Americas' endlessly diverse local patterns that the larger vision will gather in depth and intensity.

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FAIR COMPENSATION UNDER THE BRITISH LABOR GOVERNMENT

> In the various Measures produced by His Majesty's Government in this Parliament, there have so far been eight methods of compensation. They were: Bank of England, exact maintenance of income; Coal, agreed terms put up to an independent tribunal; Cable and Wireless, agreement or, failing that, independent arbitration; Railways, as now, stock exchange prices; Road Haulage, cost of replacement plus two to five years' purchase of profits; private wagons, scrap; Town and Country Planning, bluster combined with conscience money; and, perhaps the strangest of all, the compensation of Lord Beaverbrook for the annoyance caused him by Professor Laski, and for that hon. Members opposite have subscribed their own money. The results have had all the caprice of a sweepstake, and the lucky numbers have been drawn by the coalowners and Lord Beaverbrook. Clearly, the Government have acted on no sort of principle, or indeed of reason.[1]

So spoke Mr. Nigel Birch, Member of Parliament from Flint. Although much of the language employed by the extreme Tory press has been more choleric and most of the members of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition have failed to see any element of humor in the compensation policies of the Labor Government, Mr. Birch's statement is a fair sample of the charges which have been leveled against the present government's methods of determining fair compensation to the owners of industries being nationalized. Is there any basis in fact for these charges? Has the government really "acted on no sort of principle, or indeed of reason"?

In the platform with which the Labor party went before the voters in the 1945 General Election, it was solemnly promised that socialized industries would be "taken over on a basis of fair compensation."[2] Has the Labor Government

[1] 432 *House of Commons Debates*, 5 s., col. 1513 (February 3, 1947).

[2] *Let Us Face the Future* (London, 1945), p. 7.

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violated its pledge to the nation and taken property without giving fair compensation to the former owners?

There has developed in the United States a great body of experience in asset valuation, particularly with regard to the problem of rate fixing for public utilities. Is this experience applicable to the British situation and has it been used by the British?

Before we can answer these questions we must examine the compensation provisions to be found in the several nationalization acts thus far passed by Parliament under the sponsorship of the Labor Government.

One of the first steps taken by the new government after the 1945 General Election was the nationalization of the Bank of England. None of the government's subsequent bills has provoked so little criticism, at least as far as the compensation provisions are concerned; and in none are the provisions simpler. All of the existing capital stock of the Bank of England was transferred on a certain date to a person nominated by the Treasury to be held by him on behalf of the Treasury, and to each person who held Bank stock was issued in exchange an equivalent amount of government stock.[3] The interest rate on the government stock is three per cent, and by "equivalent amount" was meant that amount of government stock which would bring to each stockholder an annual income from interest equal to the average gross dividend declared during the period of twenty years immediately preceding March 31, 1945, upon the amount of Bank stock held by that stockholder.[4] The new government stock may be redeemed at par by the Treasury on, or at anytime after, April 5, 1966.[5]

These provisions have meant that all those who held Bank of England stock fared very well at the hands of a Socialist

[3] Great Britain, *Statutes*, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, chapter 27, Bank of England Act, 1946, section 1, subsection (1). Although the securities issued in compensation for nationalized industries are always referred to in the statutes as "stock", they are, of course, fixed-return, nonvoting securities and would be called government bonds in America.

[4] Bank of England Act, 1946, section 1, subsection (2).

[5] *Ibid.*, subsection (3).

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government, for that stock had without fail paid an annual dividend of twelve per cent ever since 1922. Under the terms of the nationalization scheme the stockholders were guaranteed the same income at least until 1966.[6] Moreover, if one takes account of stock market quotations, the terms of transfer resulted in an actual capital gain for the holders of Bank of England stock, though not so large a gain as might at first glance appear. The par value of Bank of England stock, of which there was £14,553,000 outstanding, was £100.[7] Since the new Treasury stock was to bear interest at the rate of three per cent and since the terms of purchase were maintenance of income, which had been twelve per cent per annum on the par value of Bank of England stock, it was necessary to issue four times the amount of Treasury stock, or £58,212,000.[8] For each share of Bank of England stock, par value £100, four shares of Treasury stock, par value £100, were exchanged. Actually, however, the capital gain was very much less than these figures indicate. In 1944 the lowest figure at which Bank of England stock had been sold was 365 and the highest, 384;[9] in 1945 the low was 355[10] (shortly after the 1945 General Election) and on February 28, 1946, the day before the transfer, Bank of England stock stood at 415-417.[11] On March 4, 1946, Treasury stock was first reported in *The Times* (London) at 103½-104.[12] Anyone who acquired Bank of England stock at its low point in 1945 enjoyed under the terms of compensation almost a twenty per cent increase in capital.

Lest there be any unwarranted surge of hope among the propertied classes, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Hugh Dalton, during the debate on the Bank of England Bill, said:

[6] Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Dalton), 415 *H. C. Deb.* 48 (October 29, 1945).

[7] *The Stock Exchange Official Year-Book, 1947* (London), p. 457.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[9] *The Economist*, CXLVIII (January 6, 1945), 31.

[10] *Ibid.*, CL (January 5, 1946), 39.

[11] *The Times* (London), March 1, 1946.

[12] *Ibid.*, March 5, 1946.

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> I desire to emphasize that though these terms of compensation . . . are fair and appropriate in this particular case, they are not to be regarded as a precedent for any subsequent measure of nationalization. The terms of compensation must vary from one instance to another, according to the merits of each case.[13]

The Chancellor was as good as his word, as the Commons discovered when it turned to a consideration of the coal plan. The compensation scheme adopted in that Act is quite different from that found in the Bank of England Act. The basic difference is that in the case of coal, instead of paying for stock, the government undertook to pay for physical assets. A sum was arrived at which was supposed to represent the value of the entire British coal industry.[14] This amount may be called the global sum, a useful phrase not found in the Act but used frequently in the course of the debate on the National Coal Bill as well as in press discussion of the same subject. The coal area was divided into what are called valuation districts. Within the valuation districts each unit, a unit ordinarily being all the coal property in that district held under a single ownership, was assessed and the assessed valuations of all of the units within the district then totaled. If the total of the assessed valuations did not equal the amount of the global sum apportioned to the valuation district, then the difference was prorated among all of the units in the district by increasing or decreasing, as the case might require, the sum which would be paid for each unit.

The global sum, the Act provided, was to be fixed "in accordance with the terms of reference specified in the agreement made in that behalf before the passing of this Act between the Minister and the Mining Association of Great Britain, by a tribunal constituted as therein provided." [15] The terms of the agreement referred to in the Act provided that a sum to be paid for certain of the assets of the coal industry would be fixed by a tribunal consisting of two judges of the

[13] 415 *H. C. Deb.* 47, 48 (October 29, 1945).

[14] *Statutes*, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, chapter 59, The Coal Industry Nationalization Act, 1946.

[15] *Ibid.*, section 10, subsection (3).

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Supreme Court, appointed by the Lord Chancellor, one of them chairman, and an accountant agreed to by both parties or, in the event of a failure to agree, nominated by the president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales.[16] The assets with which the tribunal was concerned were those treated as assets of the coal industry for the purpose of district wage ascertainments arrived at in agreements between colliery owners and mineworkers.[17] The tribunal was to

> ascertain the amount which the assets might be expected to realize if sold as one unit in the open market as assets of a going concern by a willing seller to a willing buyer on the basis of (a) the net annual maintainable revenue, that is to say the net annual revenue which the assets as a whole might reasonably be expected to earn in the future, if they were not transferred to public ownership, and (b) the number of years purchase to be applied thereto.[18]

Although the tribunal was instructed to have regard to "all relevant circumstances," it was forbidden to make any allowance either because the transfer of assets was compulsory or because the distribution of assets among the several owners involved expense, and it was further forbidden to increase the compensation allowed the owner of an asset to be transferred because under state ownership that asset would be more valuable.[19]

A Central Valuation Board, appointed by the Minister of Fuel and Power, made the allocations to the various valuation districts on the basis of administrative regulations made after the passage of the Act.[20] District valuation boards, also ap-

[16] Great Britain, Ministry of Fuel and Power, *Coal Industry Nationalization*, Cmd. 6716 (London, 1945), p. 2.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[19] *Ibid.* The amount finally fixed by the three-man tribunal as the price to be paid by the government for the coal industry was £164,660,000 (roughly $658,640,000). *New York Times*, January 1, 1947.

[20] Coal Industry Nationalization Act, 1946, section 12, subsections (1) and (2).

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pointed by the Minister, did the assessing of the individual units in each valuation district "subject to provisions to be made by regulations for review of the determinations of those Boards by referees in such cases and in accordance with such provisions as may be prescribed."[21] A panel of referees was appointed by the Minister.[22] The district valuation boards were required to arrive at their determinations of fair valuation on the same willing seller–willing buyer basis which was used in the case of the global sum.[23]

After the amount of the compensation had been determined, there remained the problem of the form in which it would be paid. The Act required that compensation due under the terms of the Act should be satisfied by the issue of such stock "as, in the opinion of the Treasury, is of a value equal on the date of the issue to the amount to be satisfied, having due regard to market values of other government securities existing at such date."[24] The Act further provided, however, that this stock should be hedged about with certain restrictions. Transferable stock was issued to a company to distribute to its holders of stocks and bonds if it went into liquidation, or if the company simply wanted to pay off some of its bonded indebtedness or repay some of its capital. The company might also sell some or all of its stock, if it wanted to apply the money to a branch of business in which it was already engaged (some colliery concerns were also in iron and steel, and so on) or to invest in a new line of business, but in both these

[21] *Ibid.*, subsection (4).

[22] *Ibid.*, subsection (5).

[23] *Ibid.*, section 13, subsection (4). In the interests of simplicity and readability an effort has been made in the case of each of the several nationalization measures discussed here to present them in the most general summary form consistent with accuracy. For any of the multitude of details inevitably involved in undertakings of this kind, the reader is referred to the Acts themselves.

[24] *Ibid.*, section 21, subsection (3). The purpose of this provision was, of course, to prevent the government from satisfying compensation claims against it in equivalent amounts of stock at par but amounts which were actually somewhat less at market value. Thus, if the market quotations for the government securities bearing three per cent interest were at 95, the Treasury could not pay compensation in these securities at par (100) but must take into account the lower market value of the securities.

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latter cases the prior approval of the Treasury was required. In all other circumstances, the stock issued was inalienable.[25] The avowed purpose of this provision was to prevent the former colliery companies which continued in existence as mere holding companies from throwing large quantities of government stock on the market in order to get funds to invest in the stock of more profitable private undertakings.[26]

The Coal Bill was still under consideration when another nationalization scheme was proposed in Commons in the form of the Cable and Wireless Bill which became law on November 6, 1946. The Cable and Wireless Act represents a variation on the device which had already been employed in the case of the Bank of England.

There were two companies concerned. One, Cable and Wireless, Ltd., operated all of the British telecommunications systems between Great Britain and the rest of the world. Of its total stock, 91.33 per cent was held by a second concern, Cable and Wireless (Holding) Company.[27] The Act provided that compensation should be satisfied "by the issue to the company of such amount of government stock as is, in the opinion of the Treasury, of a value equal, on the date of the issue, to the amount of the company's compensation having due regard to market values of other Government securities existing at such date." [28] Provision was also made for payment of interest on the sum due for compensation from the date of transfer of the operating company's stock to the government until the date of issuance of the government stock.[29] The amount of compensation was to be determined by agreement between the company and the government but, failing that, determination was to be made by a special tribunal on a willing seller–

[25] Coal Industry Nationalization Act, 1946, section 23, subsections (2) and (3).

[26] 418 *H. C. Deb.* 810 (January 29, 1946).

[27] Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Dalton), 423 *H. C. Deb.* 202 (May 21, 1946). The remaining 2,600,000 shares were already held by His Majesty's Government. *Ibid.*, col. 205.

[28] *Statutes*, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, chapter 82, Cable and Wireless Act, 1946, section 1, subsection (2), paragraph (a).

[29] *Ibid.*, paragraph (b).

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willing buyer basis, and the latter device was the one finally employed.[30]

Next on the Labor government's program were two schemes dealing with transport and electricity and involving very similar compensation provisions although they differed from anything that the government had done up to then. The first to be enacted, and the more complicated of the two, was the Transport Act, 1947. This Act itself contains several different plans for compensating former owners of socialized property. The easiest to describe and the most bitterly attacked was the device for valuing the railroads. This was accomplished by taking as a fair price for a railroad the total value of all of its outstanding stock as revealed by Stock Exchange quotations. The Act provided that the value of any railroad security would be taken as the average of the Stock Exchange quotations for that security on either of two series of six days.[31] The value of the security would be the average of the Stock Exchange quotation for that security on the six days from November 1 to 8, 1946, inclusive, on which quotations appeared, unless that security was quoted on any one of six named mid-monthly dates from February to July 1945, inclusive, in which case, if the average of the quotations on all of those mid-monthly dates on which the price of the security was quoted was higher than the average on the basis of the November dates, then the higher price must be paid.[32]

The valuation being completed, the railroad shareholders

[30] *The Economist*, CLI (December 28, 1946), 1056.

[31] *Statutes*, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, chapter 49, Transport Act, 1947, section 17, subsection (1).

[32] *Ibid.*, subsection (2). No indication was given as to the basis on which these dates were selected. The fact that they follow a symmetrical pattern would seem to eliminate on the face of it any suspicion of chicanery on the part of the government and in fact no such charge was made by the Opposition. However, there was controversy in both Commons and Lords as to whether the selected mid-monthly dates, all of which are before the 1945 General Election, were long enough before that period of intense political activity to avoid whatever depressing effects the threat of nationalization might have had upon the stock market. Obviously "long enough" is a criterion the vagueness of which makes application without controversy virtually impossible. And if one successfully avoided any influence of the General Election then there would be the war, and before that the brief period of rearmament and before that the depression, etc., etc.

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were given British transport stock in such amount as was, in the opinion of the Treasury, equal in value at the date of issue to the amount of compensation due, "regard being had to the market value of Government securities at that date." [33] This is the same provision already found in the Cable and Wireless and Coal Acts. The amount of government stock issued in payment for railroads and canals alone was £1,065,000,000.[34]

The Act also provided for the taking over of privately owned railroad cars ("wagons" in the British idiom) not owned by the railroads. The Sixth Schedule to the Act contains a table setting forth the price to be paid for each type of car depending on the year in which it was built. This schedule took care of cars built through 1946, and for those built after that date as well as for certain others falling into special categories the Minister of Transport was empowered to make a determination of value.[35] Payment was made in British transport stock unless the amount due did not exceed £2,000, in which case the former owner might demand payment in cash.[36]

In general, only those companies which were engaged in the long distance transport of goods by road were taken over by the government under the terms of the Transport Act. These companies were compensated for their trucks and trailers by an amount equal to the cost of replacing the vehicle by a new one at the date of acquisition less a fixed rate of depreciation for each year of the acquired vehicle's life, provided that if it were in either extraordinarily good or bad condition further adjustments might be made.[37] For all other property transferred to the British Transport Commission by road haulage companies, compensation was to be "equal to the amount which the property would fetch if sold in the open market, estimated as at the date of transfer and as if this Act had not passed." [38] In addition the former owners were to be paid,

[33] Transport Act, 1947, section 89, subsection (2).

[34] *Post-War Britain, 1948-49*, Central Office of Information (London), p. 135.

[35] Transport Act, 1947, section 30.

[36] *Ibid.*, section 32.

[37] *Ibid.*, section 47, subsection (1). [38] *Ibid.*

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in compensation for partial or total cessation of business, a sum not less than twice nor more than five times the average net annual profit attributable to the transferred activities.[39] The average annual profit was computed on the basis of the three years immediately preceding the date of acquisition, with minor variations, and if the amount so computed was equal to or less than the annual income which would be realized at a rate of interest to be determined by the Treasury on the net amount of compensation payable for equipment and other property, the average annual profit was to be taken as nil.[40] Payment was to be made in British transport stock unless the total did not exceed £20,000, in which case the former owner might require payment up to £2,000 in cash.[41]

Some of the assets taken over by the government under this Act were owned by local authorities and for them special provisions were made. After the date of transfer, the Transport Commission assumed liability for any interest and sinking fund charges for the net debt remaining of the total debt incurred by the local authority in the purchase or development of the undertaking.[42] This was justified simply on the basis that compensation ought not to be paid by one unit of government to another when the only change which is taking place is a change from one form of government ownership to another.[43] Nevertheless, there were bitter complaints from the local authorities, and during the debate on the Transport Bill as well as on the Electricity Bill many of the Labor backbenchers joined with the Opposition in demanding that something more be done for the local authorities. As a consequence a provision was added which was designed to cushion the effect of the separation of transport undertakings from local authorities. The Act provided that the Transport Commission and Minister of Transport might develop schemes for integrating road transport in various areas.[44] Where these schemes involved the transfer of undertakings from local

[39] *Ibid.*, subsection (3).

[40] *Ibid.*, Ninth Schedule.

[41] *Ibid.*, section 48, subsection (3).

[42] *Ibid.*, section 27.

[43] Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Dalton), 431 *H. C. Deb.* 1823 (December 17, 1946).

[44] Transport Act, 1947, section 63.

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authorities to the Commission, it might happen that these local authorities would then have to bear the full burden of certain overhead expenses (for example, the services of lawyers or engineers) which had formerly been shared by the undertakings. In order to soften this blow, the Minister of Transport, Mr. Alfred J. Barnes, agreed to set aside the sum of £2,500,000 to make compensation payments to local authorities.[45] Provisions for this sum, together with £200,000 for port undertakings surrendered by local authorities, were placed in the Act.[46]

At the same time that the Transport Bill was under discussion in Parliament, the Electricity Bill was being debated. It became law on August 13, 1947. The provisions made for the valuation of the assets of the electricity undertakings to be socialized were exactly the same as those which were made in the case of railroads. Even the same dates were used for determining average Stock Exchange quotations.[47] Also included was the familiar provision about the Treasury determining what amount of British electricity stock will be equal to the value of the old private shares as determined by the procedure noted above.[48] Local authorities were a problem here, too. In order to cushion the effect of the transfer of electricity undertakings from local authorities to the national government, the Act provided that a sum of £5,000,000 should be divided among the local authorities "in accordance with such principles as may be prescribed."[49] The transfer was made under the same "net-debt" scheme used in the case of transport.[50]

The gas industry, next on Labor's list of industries slated for nationalization, raised some new problems. The very structure of the industry made valuation difficult and the government was quick to point this out. In the opening

[45] 436 *H. C. Deb.* 1629 (April 28, 1947).

[46] Transport Act, 1947, section 114, subsection (1).

[47] *Statutes*, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, chapter 54, Electricity Act, 1947, section 20, subsection (2).

[48] *Ibid.*, subsection (1).

[49] *Ibid.*, section 23.

[50] *Ibid.*, section 22.

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speech on the second reading of the Gas Bill the Minister of Fuel and Power, Mr. Hugh T. N. Gaitskell, described the complexity of the industry, saying:

> At one extreme we have the Gas Light and Coke Company selling no less than 56,000 million cubic feet per annum; at the other, extremely small town gasworks selling a few million cubic feet per annum only. . . . There are over 1,000 undertakings, of which some 350 are non-statutory and mostly very small, and nearly 700 statutory undertakings, of which about 400 are company undertakings and the rest municipal. In all, the companies supply just under two-thirds of the total quantity of gas and the municipalities just over one-third.[51]

The basic approach to the problem of valuation in the gas industry remained the same as that already discussed in the case of transport and electricity, but the peculiarities of the industry as well as the later date of its acquisition by the state produced certain significant variations. So far as possible stock market quotations were used to compute the value of the industry exactly as in the case of electricity and transport except that a different set of dates was employed. In the case of gas, the average market price of securities was to be either the average of the quotations listed by the Stock Exchange on six stated days of October 1947, or the average of the quotations appearing on six stated mid-monthly dates from February through July 1945, whichever was the higher.[52] Compensation was paid in British gas stock.[53] Special provisions were made for securities issued or converted after the named dates;[54] for the securities of composite companies (companies engaged in several activities of which the manufacture or sale of gas was but one part);[55] and for the securities of those companies whose income was adversely affected by the war with a resulting depressing effect upon the value of their securities.[56] In the case of noncorporate undertakings, the

[51] 447 *H. C. Deb.* 219 (February 10, 1948).

[52] *Statutes*, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, chapter 67, Gas Act, 1948, section 25, subsection (2).

[53] *Ibid.*, subsection (1).

[54] *Ibid.*, subsections (2) and (3).

[55] *Ibid.*, section 30.

[56] *Ibid.*, section 26.

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assets were valued on the same willing seller–willing buyer basis employed in previous schemes with the actual amount of compensation to be arrived at by agreements between the Area Boards and undertakings concerned or, in default of agreement, by arbitration under the Act.[57] The assets of the British gas industry owned and controlled by local authorities were taken over on the same net-debt basis employed in earlier nationalization projects.[58] A sum of £2,500,000 was provided to ease the pain of severance.[59] Where assets acquired under the Gas Act were held by the British Electricity Authority the amount of compensation was arrived at by agreement between the Authority and the Area Board concerned or, failing that, was determined by the Minister of Fuel and Power "having regard to the amount of compensation paid by the said Authority under the Electricity Act, 1947, in respect of the vesting in an Electricity Board of any such property and rights." [60]

One significant difference from earlier nationalization legislation found in the Gas Act is the relatively large amount of detailed attention devoted to the general problem of the "Control of dividends and interest and safeguarding of assets pending transfer." [61] The noteworthy fact is that these regulations were aimed not only at private enterprises but also at the various local authorities. Mr. Gaitskell pointed out that no such provisions had been included in the Electricity Act and that some local authorities had taken advantage of the absence of restraints to make drastic and unwarranted reductions in charges or to transfer reserve funds from the undertakings to the funds of the local authorities.[62] The Labor Government found it necessary to add the various restrictions found in the Gas Act to prevent such action as these.

The Labor party platform for the 1945 General Election, *Let Us Face the Future,* had contained pledges to nationalize a number of industries. These pledges had all been honored by 1949

[57] Gas Act, 1948, section 31.

[58] *Ibid.*, section 28.

[59] *Ibid.*, section 29.

[60] *Ibid.*, section 32.

[61] *Ibid.*, section 33.

[62] 447 *H. C. Deb.* 219 (February 10, 1948).

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except in one instance—steel. The Iron and Steel Nationalization Bill, introduced in October 1948 in fulfillment of the pledge of the Labor party, was unquestionably the most controversial of all of the nationalization schemes enacted by the 1945-1950 Parliament. It was the subject of no less than nine heated debates in the House of Commons and was twice rejected by the House of Lords.[63] Its final enactment was achieved only after a compromise with regard to the vesting date had been effected. The House of Lords had insisted that the vesting date should be July 1, 1951, in order that a General Election might intervene and the electorate be given a chance to express its views once more on this important step. The government insisted on the original date of May 1, 1950, with the option open to the government of postponing the effective date for eighteen months. The compromise finally accepted by both Houses provided that the vesting date should be January 1, 1951, or any date within twelve months thereafter set by the Minister, and in this form the Bill became law on November 24, 1949.[64]

The Act set up the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain [65] and transferred to this corporation all of the securities

[63] *New York Times*, November 25, 1949. Something of the temper of the debates may be judged by the appeal of Sir Waldron Smithers to Mr. Speaker on the third reading protesting against what he regarded as an abuse of the Guillotine. Sir Waldron asked: "Can you, as Mr. Speaker, do anything to stop this country going another step down the totalitarian road and anything in defence of freedom of speech? . . . I should like to ask, with great respect, whether you will be another Sir Thomas More, and if you can find anywhere in the rules and regulations of this House means by which you, as Mr. Speaker, can say that there has been an abuse of the powers of the Government? I should like to know what would happen if you said that you would leave the Chair and take away the Mace?" The appeal was, of course, rejected by Mr. Speaker who added, "I was just a little alarmed when the Hon. Member asked me to be another Sir Thomas More. I can assure him that I have no desire to lose my head." 464 *H. C. Deb.* 1501 (May 9, 1949). On another occasion, when Lords Amendments were being considered, the House was held in continuous session for twenty-one hours from 3:50 P.M., July 25, 1949, to 12:18 P. M., July 26, 1949. 467 *H. C. Deb.* 1827-2216.

[64] *New York Times*, November 25, 1949. This means, of course, that it is still possible that the Act may be repealed before it actually takes effect and it may be assumed that such will be the case if the Conservatives are called upon to form a government before the transfer occurs. See *New York Times*, March 7, 1950.

[65] *Statutes*, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, chapter 72, Iron and Steel Act, 1949, Part I.

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of certain companies listed in the Third Schedule to the Act. There are ninety-six companies so listed for nationalization and they were selected on the basis that they produced more than the minimum prescribed annual output in any of four categories listed in the Second Schedule. A company engaged in " the working and getting of iron ore " was included if its average annual production in 1946 and 1947 was 50,000 tons or more, and a company engaged in the manufacture of steel or steel products was included if its average output for the period was 20,000 tons or more.[66] Companies engaged in the manufacture of motor vehicles were specifically excluded.[67] If the average annual output of a company is less than this prescribed amount but more than 5,000 tons per annum, it may continue in operation only if it secures a license from the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain. Compensation is to be paid by the issuance of British Iron and Steel stock in exchange for the stock of the private companies. Where a stock has been quoted in the Stock Exchange Official Daily List on all the dates (other than Saturdays and Sundays) from the first to the twenty-fifth of October 1948, inclusive, and has also been quoted on any of a series of named mid-monthy dates from February through July 1945, the amount of Steel stock issued in exchange for the quoted stock shall be the average of the mean of the quotations on that series of days which produces the higher result.[68] If a stock had been issued on or after the 1945 series of dates, its value is to be computed on the basis of the 1948 series alone.[69] Special provisions, including arbitration, are made for stocks which are not included in the categories already described.[70]

This is the record. Does it substantiate the allegation that the British Labor Government has violated its pledge of fair compensation? Clearly, one part of the charge must fall at

[66] Iron and Steel Act, 1949, Second Schedule.

[67] *Ibid.*, Part II, section 11, subsection (3).

[68] *Ibid.*, Part II, section 15, subsection (2).

[69] *Ibid.*, subsection (3).

[70] *Ibid.*, subsections (4) through (9) and section 16.

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once, for, as noted above, compensation in some form was paid in every case. There remains, however, the question of whether the compensation paid was fair. Nearly all of the criticism of the government's compensation policies, both in the press and in Parliament, appears to be based on an assumption that there exists a simple, almost mechanical device for arriving at an objectively valid "fair price" for the assets of the nationalized industries.[71] Had the Labor Government but been willing to apply this device, the argument runs, then the owners of the socialized industries could have been compensated accordingly and the pledge of fair compensation would have been fulfilled. The trouble with this argument is that no such device exists.

Obviously the basic fallacy here is the belief that, because prices are stated in mathematically precise terms, the relationships of which prices are an expression are capable of equally exact calculation. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Certainly, as early as Adam Smith, economists were aware that prices are nothing more than a statement of the value relationships between all goods and services in the market expressed in terms of a single, arbitrarily chosen standard. It is far from agreed, however, just what all the factors are which determine the relationships roughly described by prices. The studies by contemporary economists of price policies under conditions of monopoly and oligopoly have proved at least this: that the myth of "fair prices" as objectively discoverable quantities is no longer sustainable. One may select criteria for fixing prices such as a fair rate of return on a fair valuation of property. He may fix upon a percentage as a fair rate of return and prescribe some detailed rules for evaluating property. But what must not be forgotten is that each of the decisions in this process involves the selection of one out of a wide range of alternatives. These are not simple, mathematical computations; they are policy decisions. In other words, in every case the fix-

[71] According to the supporters of this argument the stock market does not fulfill the requirements of fair compensation. "The Stock Exchange value reflects human weakness and error. It is essentially subjective and not objective." Sir John Anderson, 458 *H. C. Deb.* 268, 269 (November 16, 1948).

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ing of a price is the setting of a public policy; it is a political act.

Whether or not one is prepared to accept such an analysis with regard to the price he pays for his loaf of bread, he can scarcely fail to accept it when the valuation of an entire industry, the British coal industry, for example, is in question. Clearly the standard of a willing seller and a willing buyer in an open market is in no sense a workable test for evaluating the worth of an entire industry. Nor does the addition of the standard of net maintainable revenue offer any assistance, for this can be nothing more than a guess about what the future may bring and would, in any case, be determined in part by government policy expressed in the form of regulations or taxes.

The failure to realize that government policy must inevitably influence property value would seem to be the basic error in one of the Conservatives' arguments on the Steel Bill. The Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons on February 8, 1948 that the Labor Government proposed to pursue a general policy of income limitation in order to combat inflationary pressures.[72] A month later a report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer prepared by a joint committee of the Federation of British Industries, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, and the National Union of Manufacturers recommended that, subject to discretion in exceptional cases, the gross annual dividend for the ensuing year should not exceed that for the preceding fiscal year; [73] and Sir Frederick Bain, president of the Federation of British Industries, indicated in a letter to Sir Stafford Cripps that a poll of British industry had revealed a general willingness to coöperate with the policy.[74] It was argued that this had a depressing effect on the stock market and that the government, having persuaded industry to coöperate in

[72] 446 *H. C. Deb.* 1821-1824 (February 4, 1948). The Prime Minister's statement was later issued as a White Paper, *Statement on Personal Income, Costs and Prices*, Cmd. 7321 (London, 1948), and discussed with reference to the wage freeze and dividend limitation policies on a radio broadcast by Mr. Attlee on B.B.C. on February 6, 1948. *The Times* (London), February 7, 1948.

[73] *The Times* (London), March 12, 1948.

[74] *Ibid.*, March 13, 1948.

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this policy, was taking an unfair advantage by acquiring steel stocks at an unnaturally low price.[75] The argument appears to ignore several important facts. In the first place, the policy of limitation of dividends applied to all British industry; and therefore the price of British steel stocks in relation to other quoted stocks could not have been affected to any significantly greater or lesser degree. To the extent that stock prices were affected by this policy of dividend limitation, all must have been affected approximately equally and, therefore, if the owners of steel securities were given a special allowance to compensate for this alleged depressing effect they would, because the industry in which they held shares was being nationalized, enjoy an advantage extended to no other stockholders selling on the open market.[76] Secondly, exactly the same objectives attained by voluntary dividend limitations could have been achieved by the government through appropriate tax or other policies; in other words, government policy here influenced price no more than it might under any of dozens of other conceivable circumstances and the owners of steel stocks can scarcely press for special treatment under the circumstances. Finally, if one is to attempt to take account of the depressing effects of government policy upon stock prices, then he ought in fairness to take account also of the policies having an opposite effect, such as the

75 "The Government have artificially depressed the shares and have relied on the co-operation of the industry not to increase its dividends and then bought the shares at the rigged market price. I consider the Government should consider altering the Bill to the Iron and Steal Bill." Mr. Oliver Lyttelton (Aldershot), 458 *H. C. Deb.* 92 (November 15, 1948). It should be noted that nearly all shareholders who had purchased their shares within the ten years immediately preceding nationalization received in compensation more than they paid for their shares. *Ibid.*, col. 70.

76 "There is no conceivable injustice if a shareholder who has bought his shares a month ago at 20s. is paid 20s. for them by the State. If, on the other hand, the State were, on any other compensation basis, to pay an investor or speculator 30s. for shares he had bought a month ago at 20s. that would be grossly unfair to the public, whose interests have also to be safeguarded. The additional money, moreover, would be a tax-free bonus. If we were to pay such a bonus to the holders of steel securities, we would no doubt be bombarded by demands from investors for the nationalisation of almost every other industry in the country, which might be very awkward for the party opposite." The Minister of Supply (Mr. G. R. Strauss), 458 *H. C. Deb.* 70 (November 15, 1948).

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tariff on steel and steel products in the 1930's and the abnormally high demand for steel during the war.[77] Clearly this argument in its entirety is but a variation on the Conservatives' theme that only the valuation of physical assets can give a fair price.

It is not necessary to conclude, however, that because the Labor Government did not discover some simple, mechanical means of valuing physical assets, it acted on the basis of no principle whatever. If all of British industry had been nationalized at once, then it would have been possible to avoid paying any compensation, without placing any members of the community at a disadvantage compared with other members similarly situated. Such a "grand plan" would, however, probably have been unwise and in any case would have been "un-British". Since nationalization was to take place piecemeal, it became necessary to pay compensation in order that some holders of property should not be treated unfairly by having their property taken without compensation simply because they held one kind of property, for example, coal stock, instead of another, such as a butcher shop. If the government's compensation policy is viewed in this light, it is clear that this was one principle which was adhered to in the case of every nationalization scheme discussed. In every instance the object was to leave the former owner in approximately the same material position which he had formerly occupied, although his long-run income prospects, of course, might be significantly reduced, a result to be expected in any case under the government's equalitarian income-tax policy.

If the maintenance of the economic position of the individual holder of stock in nationalized industries relative to the position of all other individuals who did not own shares in nationalized industries was to be a primary objective of the government's compensation policies, it is clear why there is virtually no evidence of any official concern with American valuation methods or experience. Clearly, both the problem and the objectives are different in the two countries. The problem in

[77] 458 *H. C. Deb.* 315 (November 15, 1948).

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Great Britain was to effect a transfer of power from private hands to the hands of officials who are presumably responsible to elected public officials who are in turn responsive to public demands. The problem in the United States is to leave a major portion of the decision-making in private hands, while regulating rates and certain aspects of service in the public interest.

The objective, so far as asset valuation was concerned, was in Great Britain to leave the individual stockholder relatively no better or no worse off than he was before nationalization. In the United States the immediate objective was to fulfill the constitutional requirement of due process which since *Smyth v. Ames*[78] had been held to require a fair rate of return on a fair valuation of a person's assets.

It is true that the unrealistic rule of *Smyth v. Ames* appears to have been at least drastically modified by the decision in *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*,[79] but the lamentable lack of clarity on certain crucial points in the decision in that case leaves a serious residue of doubt as to whether the old rules have been wholly abandoned.[80] In any case, fair rate of return on a fair valuation of a person's assets was, for better that fifty years, the guiding rule and under it almost the whole of American experience in this field was developed. This experience is inapplicable to the British valuation problem because, in the first place, the person whose interests are to be protected in the American case is not the individual stockholder, as in Great Britain, but a public utility corporation and because, in the second place, the valuation is not completed finally at any one moment but must be a continuing process for as long as the corporation exists. There has been in the past, and there no doubt will continue to be in the future, much learned disputation as to what standards and criteria are fair under these circumstances, but one point at least is clear: the continuing series

[78] 169 U. S. 466 (1898).

[79] 320 U. S. 591 (1944).

[80] See Hillyer Brown, "The Ghosts of the Hope Natural Gas Decision", *California Law Review*, XXXII (December 1944), 398-415. For a contrary view see also Robert L. Hale, "Utility Regulation in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case", *Columbia Law Review*, XLIV (July 1944), 488-530.

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of negotiations and legal conflicts which have marked the history of property valuation for rate-fixing purposes produced almost no standards or devices applicable to the British problem.

Asset valuation, however, is also a problem in eminent domain cases in the United States or compulsory purchase cases in Great Britain.[81] Cannot applicable standards be found here? Undoubtedly such standards can be found in the cases and practices in both countries, but is it necessary or wise to adhere to such standards? In eminent domain or compulsory purchase cases the object has been to render fair compensation to the *legal* owners of the assets, whether a corporation or an individual. As indicated above, however, the object of the compensation policies of the Labor Government was to leave the former *individual* owner in approximately the same material position which he had formerly occupied. As a consequence, although under eminent domain standards the valuation of the physical assets may be required in every case, under the standards of Britain's Socialist government, compensating the individual for the only thing he really paid for and holds, his stock certificate, may be justified. One may wish that they had chosen other standards, but only a blind faith in the superior merit of physical asset valuation can account for the flat rejection of any other possible standard by some of the Labor Government's critics.

The simple answer to the Conservatives' objections that the physical assets themselves were not being evaluated under some of the schemes is clear. The physical assets of a railroad may be very valuable in the eyes of the community; its continued operation may be essential to the health and well-being of an important section of the nation. But if that railroad is operating at a loss and has so operated for a number of years, the value of its securities may be very low. To pay the individual stockholders on the basis of a valuation of the physical assets

[81] For an analysis of the compensation provisions of the nationalization acts tested by the criteria established in compulsory purchase cases in Great Britain and eminent domain cases in the United States see "British Nationalization of Industry—Compensation to Owners of Expropriated Property", *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, XCVII (March 1949), 520-534.

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might well result in the stockholder receiving much more for his securities than he could possibly have secured under any other circumstances, and this simply because the value of the railroad to society as an operating unit was much greater than its value to any individual as income property. Contrariwise, if in such a situation one used a standard of net maintainable revenue, the results would obviously be disastrous for the shareholder.

The device which would in most cases come closest to producing a result equal to the real owner's understanding of the value of his property is the acceptance of stock market quotations wherever this was possible. Such a method has the additional advantage of being simple and easily administered.[82] His Majesty's Government had set out to fulfill a program which was by its very nature extremely difficult and complicated. Anything that might be done to simplify the task in any way was eagerly welcomed. This was especially true if the results to be expected from a more difficult and complicated method promised to be little different from results obtained by a more direct method. Thus, both the Minister of Transport, Mr. Barnes,[83] and the Minister of Fuel and Power, Mr. Shinwell,[84] pointed out in the debates on the Transport and Electricity Bills, respectively, the great difficulties to be experienced in any attempt to value the actual assets or to discover the net annual maintainable revenue in the case of vast and complicated public utilities such as railroads and electric power companies. Persons familiar with the endless difficulties associated in the United States with asset valuation for public utility ratemaking purposes will appreciate the simplicity of a scheme which requires little more than computing the average stock

[82] "The test we have employed every time, for one or other of these methods, to ascertain what just and fair compensation should be to the holders of securities, has been whether the method chosen in that particular instance was just to the shareholder, fair to the taxpayer, and was also, and this factor does enter into it, speedy of operation." The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Glenvil Hall), 467 *H. C. Deb.* 2419, 2420 (July 26, 1949).

[83] 431 *H. C. Deb.* 1627 (December 16, 1947).

[84] 432 *H. C. Deb.* 1415-1417 (February 3, 1947).

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market quotations for a given security and then exchanging for that security government stock in the proper amount. Whenever this device was not used, as in the cases of coal and some portions of transport, it was because administrative difficulties would have been increased rather than diminished by adopting the stock plan. Some colliery concerns were privately owned and had no stock outstanding. Many were composite companies engaged in activities other than coal. All had been under a high degree of government control and many had been subsidized. The only satisfactory arrangement was to attempt to arrive at some valuation of the physical assets to be taken. In the case of road haulers there existed an industry in which there were a great number of operators, some of them very small, and the stock method was quite impossible.[85]

On the basis of this record, three conclusions are justified. First, His Majesty's Government has paid compensation to the former owners under every nationalization scheme adopted. Second, American experience in the valuation of utility assets was not relied upon because, in the main, it was inapplicable to the British problem. Third, the charge that the compensation paid was unfair is based upon a conception of property values which is, at best, of very questionable validity. No doubt there are errors and faults of which the British Labor Government is guilty; violation of its pledge of fair compensation is not among them.

NED VERNON JOY

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

[85] "This section of the Bill will affect nearly 200,000 license holders, who operate nearly 450,000 vehicles. At the end of 1945 there were 17,637 'A' license holders with 80,551 vehicles; 27,792 'B' license holders with 53,999 vehicles; 149,192 'C' license holders with 306,443 vehicles; and 2,312 'A' contract license holders with 6,183 vehicles." *Labor and Industry in Britain*, V (January 1947), 8.

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THE ORIGINS OF UNRRA

THE United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA, was formally established on 9 November 1943 when delegates of forty-four associated and United Nations signed the UNRRA Agreement at the White House in Washington. News of this event, broadcast by radio, press and pamphlets dropped from the air, gave immediate courage to peoples suffering under the controls of the Axis. Within less than five years UNRRA brought relief to sixteen invaded or occupied nations, preventing epidemics and famine, rehabilitating transportation, industry and agriculture, restoring confidence and morale, and enabling the victims of aggression to begin to help themselves. The long-range results of this first large-scale international operation cannot yet be estimated; its passing accomplishments are a matter of record; [1] but the motives, the leadership, the compromises which made UNRRA possible have permanent significance in the extending history of international coöperative efforts. UNRRA has been called the first blueprint of the post-war order. Its founding at least represented the fusion of the work and resources of individuals, organized groups, and nations in a great collective task and generated faith in broader and more permanent international undertakings.

[1] *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (3 vols. New York, 1950). Some of the material for this article is included in the first chapter of that history.

With the exceptions which are noted in the footnotes, this article is based on the following collections of source material: the 840/48 and 840/50 series in the archives of the Department of State and three cabinets of documents covering the history of OFRRO and the beginnings of UNRRA, now in the Records Retirement Division of the Department; the UNRRA Archive now at the United Nations; OWI Overseas Broadcasts in the National Archives, and the Air Warfare Pamphlets in the Library of Congress.

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United Kingdom Initiative and the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war Requirements

Prime Minister Churchill launched the relief project when, two months after the fall of France, he committed the United Kingdom to preparations for the relief of the occupied countries. In his speech on the war situation in the House of Commons on 21 August 1940 his uncompromising refusal to allow any supplies through the blockade was softened by a far-reaching promise:

> Let Hitler bear his responsibilities to the full, and let the people of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the coming of the day when that yoke will be broken. Meanwhile we can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly cleared of German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our utmost to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held up before the peoples of Europe including—I say deliberately—the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace.[2]

The British government set about to validate this pledge in the midst of the disheartening disasters of the following months. Export surpluses, thought to be accumulating in British possessions and Latin America as a consequence of the blockades, appeared as potential resources. The United Kingdom appealed to the United States for coöperation in dealing with the surplus problem as a whole and proposed post-war relief measures as a way of utilizing these anticipated stores. It also established machinery to deal with such matters, an official Interdepartmental Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Advisor to the government, and a supervisory Ministerial Committee. While the former body took minor steps toward the purchasing and storing of surplus commodities for subsequent relief purposes, its chairman wrote to the Department of State again suggesting Anglo-American

[2] *Parliamentary Debates*, 364, *House of Commons*, 55, cols. 1161-1162.

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coöperation in the handling of war surpluses. His proposals, when amplified by John Maynard Keynes during his unofficial visit to Washington in the spring of 1941, led (with United States approval) to the initiation of a study by the European governments resident in London which estimated their requirements for the first six months after the armistice.

The United Kingdom launched this project at a meeting of the Allied governments at St. James's Palace on 24 September 1941 when the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as chairman, sought to meet the growing concern of these governments about their post-war needs by explaining British plans to supply food and raw materials to European countries upon liberation and presented a resolution organizing the preparatory work. Representatives of eight European allies, the Free French, the British Dominions and the United Kingdom agreed, in accordance with this resolution, that a bureau should be established by the United Kingdom government " with which the Allied Governments and authorities would collaborate in framing estimates of their requirements and which after collating and coordinating these estimates would present proposals to a Committee of Allied Representatives under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross." [3] The U.S.S.R. delegate alone could not accept the idea of a central bureau controlled by the United Kingdom. Instead he suggested an international body built on the principle of equal representation for all governments concerned and reserved the right of his government to put forward at a later date proposals in this connection. In spite of the chairman's assurances that his point could be met, the U.S.S.R. never appointed a representative to the Inter-Allied Committee and never submitted estimates of its requirements. Copies of all the proceedings of the Committee, however, were sent to the Soviet Embassy in London.

During the military reverses of the following year the Inter-Allied Committee set up a large number of technical committees and panels which in line with principles established by the Bureau assisted the Allied delegations in compiling data on provisional relief requirements, and its chairman, Leith-Ross, held

[3] Cmd. 6315, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1941), Resolution, Art. VI.

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important conversations on relief problems with officials in Washington at the request of the United States government. At those meetings representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States agreed that a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration should be developed. By June 1943 when the Allied military fortunes had brightened, the Inter-Allied Committee was able to present its estimates of the post-war needs of Belgium, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and the Free French in a report to the Allied governments.

United States Preliminary Action

In July 1941 the United States government not only supported the plan for the study of the post-war requirements of the Allied European Powers but took steps to provide the necessary resources. Upon its invitation officials of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States assembled in Washington at that time and after months of labor negotiated a memorandum of agreement regarding the control of the production, export and stockpiling of wheat, to be administered by an International Wheat Council representative of the contracting governments. This went into effect in June 1942 for a four-year period.[4] A wheat pool was hereby established to be available for intergovernmental relief in war-stricken countries where the member governments considered such relief practicable. Specific contributions in bushels of wheat or their equivalent in flour were required of each producing country while the United Kingdom was permitted to furnish as its gift the transportation of relief wheat. The Council administered the pool and was empowered, when it was possible, to arrange for the distribution of relief wheat through such intergovernmental body as might be set up and given general responsibility for the distribution of relief.[5] Here was the first official international effort to implement freedom from want and a forecast of an intergovernmental relief organization.

During these negotiations the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-

[4] U. S. Dept. of State, Publication 2140, *Wheat* (Washington, 1949).

[5] *Ibid.*, Art. VI, pp. 9-10.

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bor brought the United States into the war. Almost immediately a senior committee was set up within the Department of State to advise the President on post-war foreign policy. Subcommittees on Economic Reconstruction and Post-war Economic Policies reviewed the work of the Inter-Allied Committee and drafted recommendations for the coming United Nations relief organization during the military uncertainties of 1942.

When the Allied invasion of North Africa made the need for governmental relief more probable, the President himself took action. On November 18, 1943 Roosevelt delegated to the Secretary of State the responsibility for developing the United States policies toward the people of the territories occupied by the United Nations. A few days later, apparently without consulting the Secretary or the European Allies,[6] he appointed Herbert H. Lehman, then Governor of New York, Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations,[7] creating for him a new office within the Department of State (OFRRO). It was generally understood in Washington and London that this appointment indicated the selection of the Director General of the coming international relief organization.

Governor Lehman accepted two major tasks—tardily defined by the President—" to plan, coordinate, and arrange for the administration of relief of areas liberated from Axis control, and to assist in preparing for a United Nations relief organization." [8] During the ten months of his office his small staff—many of whom were later transferred to UNRRA—gained experience in estimating relief requirements, in program planning, and in the development of procedure for allocating and handling supplies which laid foundations for the later policy of UNRRA. Lehman himself went to London in April 1943 at the invitation of the United Kingdom government. There long conversations with military officers and British and Allied officials made pos-

[6] UNRRA Arch., Hist. Monograph, R. Miller, *U. K. Approach to UNRRA*, p. 41. This monograph was authorized by the British Foreign Office.

[7] *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 21, 1942, p. 948.

[8] Dept. of State (OFRRO Doc. DG 1), the President to Governor Lehman, 19 March 1943.

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sible a mutual awareness of the preparations for post-war relief on both sides of the Atlantic, the relative responsibilities of military and civilian groups, and their anticipated relationships with the forthcoming UNRRA. Lehman was also constantly in touch with the work of the political officers of the Department of State who were negotiating the Agreement. When its ratification became more certain and the date of UNRRA's first Council session was fixed, Lehman's office was merged with other war agencies in the Foreign Economic Administration and Lehman became Special Assistant to the President to perfect the plans for that assembly.[9]

The most significant work of Lehman's staff thereafter was the preparation of a handbook for the United States delegation at the Council. Herein they analyzed problems anticipated at the Council and made recommendations with supporting material on matters which extended from routine procedures to the drafts of expected Council resolutions. Although this *Handbook* was not received as the official United States point of view at the Council, it became one of the important influences in shaping UNRRA's history. Some of its papers were issued as part of the documentation of the Council, for example, "Rules and Regulations of the Council" and "Budgetary Rules"; others were used by the United States delegation who got them from OFRRO prior to the opening of the Council. Furthermore as some members of Lehman's staff played active parts as secretaries to the working committees of the Council, the material they had developed for the *Handbook* appears again in the substance of the accepted recommendations of the committees and thence of the Council.

Voluntary Relief Agencies

Relief to the suffering in Europe also became a dominant concern among the people of the United States in the early days of the war. Seven hundred agencies for foreign relief had been organized by the winter of 1941. In March the President appointed a Committee on War Agencies to register these groups

[9] Executive Order of the President 9380, Sept. 25, 1943; White House Press Release, Sept. 25, 1943.

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with the Department of State and to coördinate their activities, a committee which was later merged into the War Relief Control Board.[10] By May 1942 both registered and nonregistered agencies had raised more than $96,000,000 for foreign relief.[11] The United States decided that the work of these private groups should be fused with that of the coming international organization, and Governor Lehman asked representatives to prepare memoranda regarding the work their respective agencies were equipped to do and the areas they could best serve.[12] The United Kingdom made a similar effort to coördinate its also numerous relief agencies when Sir Frederick Leith-Ross appointed a Council on which all British societies in a position to assist with relief work were represented. Through these private organizations thousands of experienced persons were made ready for service when UNRRA had need of them.

Military Preparations

Before Governor Lehman had his authorization to plan and administer civilian relief in the territories liberated by the Allied armies, the United States military authorities had become forcefully articulate about the dependence of continuing military success upon the provision of food, medical and other relief supplies needed to keep order and prevent the spread of disease in the areas already liberated.[13] They awoke to the danger of the responsibility, already divided, in organizing this task. Roosevelt's delegation of the work to the Department of State on 18 November 1942 was a sharp contradiction to the accepted convention of international law which made the military commanders of invading armies responsible for the security of civilian populations falling within their control. The complicated machinery resulting therefrom, although sanctioned by the Combined Chiefs of Staff[14] (CCS), led quickly to confusion

[10] Executive Order 9205.

[11] *Department of State Bulletin*, August 1, 1942, "Report of the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies".

[12] UNRRA Arch., *OFRRO Bulletin*, No. 1, 15 June 1943, p. 31.

[13] War Dept., International Division, Army Service Forces, *Civilian Supply* (5 vols., 1946), vol. I, pp. 30-31.

[14] War Dept. *A Guide to International Supply*, 31 Dec. 1945, p. 86.

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and inefficiency in what was soon recognized as primarily a military operation. It was inevitable that the Anglo-American allocating agencies should acquiesce in the priority of the War Department to supplies during the period of hostilities. Civilian relief agencies without military support, therefore, proved powerless before allocating authorities as far as goods in short supply were concerned, and without military strategic guidance (impossible for reasons of security) the civilian agencies were unable to plan for meeting specific needs without wasteful creation of stockpiles unnecessary from the military point of view.[15] By the time UNRRA was established the President had decided to place the handling of initial relief requirements under exclusive military control.

To do this work the War Office in London and the War Department in Washington had been creating the necessary machinery. In July 1942 the War Office had set up an Interdepartmental Committee on the Administration of Territories (Europe) [AT(E)] under the chairmanship of the Permanent Undersecretary of War, to consider, "in conjunction with the force commanders concerned and with other government departments at the appropriate stages, the steps necessary on military grounds to insure efficient civil administration of military territory liberated in Europe as a result of operations by forces of the United Nations."[16] A request in April 1943 from Sir Robert Sinclair of the Ministry of Production for estimates of supplies for liberated areas to be prepared on a firm basis led the AT(E) to assign the task of reviewing and editing the Leith-Ross Committee estimates to groups of experts under the direction of Sir Hubert Young, liaison officer between the Board of Trade Relief Department and the AT(E). Their results, known as the Young-Sinclair estimates, when reconciled with the estimates prepared by the United States Army and by OFRRO in the fall of 1943 became on 17 February 1944 the accepted base for planning the international relief operation.[17]

[15] War Dept., *A Guide to International Supply*, p. 91.

[16] Dept. of State, AT(E) (42) 1.

[17] War Dept., *A Guide to International Supply*, p. 105.

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Master schedules prepared on a "scorched" and "unscorched" basis for three periods of six months each through the end of 1944 provided, at least in theory, a long-range procurement target within which the transfer from military to civilian responsibility would be achieved without any break in the continuity of the program.[18]

The United States took its first step toward unification of the dispersed responsibilities for civilian supply under the military in February 1943 on the eve of the Tunisian campaign. With Governor Lehman's knowledge a cable was sent to General Eisenhower stating that, in view of the fact that transport and supply during the initial stages of occupation would be closely linked to military operations, civilian supply activities should be (1) the sole responsibility of the military, (2) administered by military personnel and services, (3) planned in advance by the military on the ground.[19] On 1 March a Civil Affairs Division on War Department staff level was established in the War Department. In May a Civilian Supply Branch was formally organized within the International Division of the Army Service Forces. By July when landings were made in Sicily the decision had been taken to institute separate procurement measures for civilian supply for which the Theatre had been instructed to submit requirements. These were included within the Army Supply Program, although nominal responsibility for civil affairs still rested with the Department of State.[20]

When the United States military arrangements for civilian supply had advanced to this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff set up a Combined Civil Affairs Committee with an important subcommittee on Supply under the chairmanship of the Director of the International Division of the Army Service Forces. At the Quebec Conference in August they laid down the basic procedures and objectives to govern the handling of civilian supply on a combined basis adhering substantially to the line developed by the War Department.

[18] War Dept., *A Guide to International Supply*, p. 96.

[19] War Dept., *Civilian Supply*, vol. I, pp. 41-42.

[20] War Dept., *A Guide to International Supply*, pp. 86-87, 93.

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In CCS 324/1 of 22 August it was provided that procurement for civilian relief by the military should be confined to making available minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical, sanitary and agreed essential supplies necessary to maintain health and working capacity of the civilian population as well as to the achievement of such military objectives as the preservation of public order and maintenance of lines of communication. It was further agreed that food requirements would be developed in terms of an identic basic ration and that maximum use would be made of locally available stockpiles and resources. For the purpose of long-term production planning CCS 324/1 also provided that military procurement of civilian supplies be coördinated with procurement by the civil authorities. This order remained, throughout the entire period of combined military responsibility for civilian supply, the basic guide for all procedures.[21]

The President's decision on 10 November 1943 to throw the full burden of initial responsibility for providing relief supplies to liberated areas on the War Department merely gave authorization to the decisions made by the combined military the previous summer. It was part of the general realization that only the military could have ready at the time the machinery required for handling relief, as well as the realization that it would be many months before UNRRA could have either the funds or the organization to make its broad plans effective.[22] UNRRA thus came into existence to plan and administer a relief program supplementary to that of the Allied military forces.

The Agreement

The UNRRA Agreement, a brief document of ten articles, established a temporary organization

> to plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services; and to facilitate in

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

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such areas, so far as necessary to the adequate provision of relief, the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services.[23]

It provided for a Council composed of one representative from each member nation to make policy,[24] to appoint the Director General of the Administration,[25] and to appoint or confirm the appointment of all committee members.[26] The Council was to meet not less than twice a year, make its own rules, elect its chairman from among its members at each session, and vote by simple majority [27] except when amending the Agreement when a two-thirds vote was always required.[28] Between Council sessions, a Central Committee, consisting originally of representatives of China, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States, was empowered to make policy decisions and appointments of an emergency nature which would be reviewed by the Council in regular or special session.[29] Three standing committees were established to advise the Council and Central Committee on the provision of supplies and on the regional programs of Europe and the Far East. The Committee of the Council for Europe was to replace the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war Requirements and to inherit its records. Other advisory bodies were provided in the form of standing technical committees, to deal with particular problems such as health, agriculture, repatriation and finance.[30]

A Director General, appointed by the Council on the nomination by unanimous vote of the Central Committee, was granted full executive power within the limits of available resources and policies determined by the Council and Central Committee [31] and subject to the consent of the military command [32] in each area as well as that of the member government concerned.[33] Vague provisions for resources merely required

[23] Agreement, I, 2 (a).

[24] *Ibid.*, III, 1.

[25] *Ibid.*, IV, 1.

[26] *Ibid.*, III, 4, 5, 6.

[27] *Ibid.*, III, 1.

[28] *Ibid.*, VIII.

[29] *Ibid.*, III, 3.

[30] *Ibid.*, III, 4, 5, 6.

[31] *Ibid.*, IV, 1, 2.

[32] *Ibid.*, VII.

[33] *Ibid.*, I, 2 (a).

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each government to make contributions to the support of the Administration in amount and character as authorized by its appropriate constitutional body.[34] The Agreement could be amended [35] and members could withdraw under given conditions.[36] It entered into force for each signatory when signed unless otherwise specified.[37]

The Development of the UNRRA Agreement

The beginning of the UNRRA Agreement lies in the proposed alternative to the Inter-Allied Bureau promised by the Soviets on 24 September 1941. The Soviet government prepared their now famous memorandum before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which was said to account for the exclusion of the United States from their plans. The paper, originally submitted to the United Kingdom 13 January 1942, was transmitted to the United States with a request for its suggestions, the United Kingdom postponing its answer until informed of the American viewpoint. The chief ideas put forward included: (1) an Inter-Allied Committee as originally set up at St. James's Palace, which did not include representatives from the United States or from Latin America or the Far East: (2) a more international bureau or secretariat for dealing with day-to-day business and technical preparatory work, with representatives of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and two or three other participating countries as the designated members; (3) the setting up of two permanent commissions of experts to deal with foodstuffs and raw materials, and transport; (4) the extension of the work of the Committee to include not only the preparation of estimates of the requirements of the Nazi-invaded countries, but estimates of the resources of supplying countries including the United States, and the allocation of foodstuffs and raw materials among various countries by the establishment of corresponding quotas; (5) vague provisions for studies in the interest of price control to combat speculation on the post-war needs of Hitler's victims; (6) the provision that a unamimous vote be required for all decisions taken by the

[34] Agreement, V.

[35] *Ibid.*, VIII.

[36] *Ibid.*, X.

[37] *Ibid.*, IX.

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Inter-Allied Committee, and that none of its decisions come into force until endorsed by the respective member governments.

The Soviet proposals fell into fertile ground. The United States, itself a victim of aggression, had become a full partner in the Allied cause and the Declaration of the United Nations on 1 January 1942 had solidified the allied war effort and strengthened an international approach to the eventual peace. On 6 February 1942, the Allied Post-war Requirements Bureau followed the Soviet memorandum with broader proposals of its own, tentative proposals sponsored by Leith-Ross, but thought to have official approval. Here political control was vested in an international relief council of allied and associated nations to be set up prior to the armistice and to control relief to Europe, China, and other regions. Smaller advisory committees were to be appointed for particular purposes and a full-time executive body was to do the detailed work. The British paper conferred the honor of leadership upon the United States. It proposed Americans for both the President of the Council and the Director General of the Executive Committee. The participating nations were to bear the expenses of the administration in agreed proportions.

Both the Soviet and United Kingdom papers were submitted for study to the Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction of the Department of State. The resulting United States reply, approved by the President and Secretary of State, was cabled to London 7 May 1942. The United States agreed that relief and rehabilitation should be put on a United Nations basis with an Executive Committee composed of the four principal Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China, with perhaps some participation by other United Nations, and with an executive head who should probably be an American. Advisory committees with members responsible to their own governments were proposed to assist the Executive Committee specifically in the formulation of detailed policy on matters of finance, shipping or problems affecting particular geographic areas. The United States suggested that the Inter-Allied Committee in London be reconstituted as a Permanent Advisory Committee on European

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Relief. The actual working organization was to be a United Nations Bureau, the Director General of which would be charged under the Executive Committee with the responsibility for carrying out all aspects of the relief operation. In the interest of economy, this Bureau would seek the full coöperation of private relief agencies. The cable concluded with the suggestion that the relief organization be inaugurated at a meeting in Washington. Leith-Ross was invited to come to Washington immediately to participate in preliminary discussions with representatives of the United States, China and the Soviet Union.

Such discussions were urgent. The Dutch, Norwegian and Belgian governments were arranging to purchase basic commodities such as leather, lard, beef, clothing, and so on, to some extent in Great Britain but chiefly in South America, as relief insurance for their people upon liberation. It was known the Yugoslavs and the Greeks were prepared on a smaller scale to do likewise. With the rapid spread of the war in the Far East the supply situation was changing from hypothetical surpluses to recognized scarcities. Unrestrained purchasing for national post-war stockpiles would hamper the war effort and was most disturbing to the newly created allocating agencies in the United Kingdom and United States, the Combined Food Board and the Combined Raw Materials Board. Upon the request of the United Kingdom and United States governments the Allied governments had agreed most reluctantly to defer their purchasing activities for a short period until proposals could be laid before them for a broad and coördinated United Nations program but at least one of them was continuing attempts at purchasing in South America. The need for an international organization which would do more than estimate requirements had thus become imperative.

In spite of the ambitious proposals of his original memorandum on relief, Leith-Ross came to Washington the end of June 1942 with no plenipotentiary powers to negotiate an agreement for the establishment of a relief organization. "He was merely given discretion to deal with the organizational aspects of the problem in whatever manner seemed to him most likely to reconcile the divergent views of the Governments con-

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cerned ",[38] and the United States knew the limitations of his instructions. The United States proposals of May 7, approved in principle by the British, became the agenda for the Anglo-American discussions. They were presented as a draft of an agreement to be entered into at a meeting of the United Nations, creating the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Known as Dean Acheson's draft of 15 June, this paper had been prepared by Harry Hawkins in line with points suggested by Acheson and amended by the Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction. Secretary Hull and Vice President Wallace had seen this draft, and the President had asked to be informed about it, but it had no official sanction.

The revisions were made during three periods. In the meetings which Leith-Ross had with a committee of United States officials representing various departments of government and the American Red Cross, under the chairmanship of Dean Acheson (then Assistant Secretary of State), a revised draft was produced which Acheson gave to representatives of the governments of China, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. for comments 14 August 1942. Acheson again emphasized the tentative, unofficial nature of the draft in his interviews with these officials who had been informed of the progress of the United States conversations with Leith-Ross from their start.

After this draft had been amended by the United States War Department and in its revised form accepted by the major government agencies, it was submitted to the President for his instructions. Roosevelt in conference with the Vice President and Secretary of State on 2 September 1942 agreed to the principles of the draft and encouraged further study and preparatory work. It was decided, however, that formal intergovernmental discussion of the form of the Administration should await more favorable developments of the war. Again the latest revisions of the draft were communicated to the governments of China, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 1943 the Agreement reached its second important stage. With the turn of the military tide the previous

[38] Miller, *The U. K. Approach to UNRRA*, p. 24.

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November the United States had decided to press forward the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Formal requests from Secretary Hull for immediate comments on the revised draft of 13 August brought significant suggestions from the Chinese, British and Soviet governments. These were considered in a series of meetings which Dean Acheson held with the Washington representatives of the other three Powers between January and May 1943. The draft which the Four Powers finally agreed upon was, with Roosevelt's approval, released to the other forty allied and associated governments through United States missions abroad and through the State Department to their representatives in Washington on 10 June 1943. Criticisms from these countries and from members of the United States Senate during the coming summer, when accepted by the Four Powers, led to the revision of 20 September, the third major draft. This was released to the allied and associated Powers 23 September 1943 and to the press the following day. It became the text accepted for the Agreement and of it official translations into Spanish and French were made.

Major Issues

The Relative Power of Great and Small Nations

A few controversies during the drafting of the Agreement had long-range importance. That concerning the membership and power of the Central Committee, called in the first drafts "executive" or "policy committee", posed again the problem of defining the relative power of great and small nations in an international organization. The first United States scheme suggested a committee of the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and China, but left the way open for the addition of perhaps three more members in recognition of the feelings of other nations. During the Washington conversations in July 1942 the United Kingdom government, conscious of the troubles of the League of Nations and of the need for doing business expeditiously, instructed Leith-Ross to support a committee limited in membership to the Four Powers. Other governments, it maintained, should be invited to meet-

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ings on an ad hoc basis when questions concerning their countries arose. This and the proposed regional committees would give them adequate opportunity to express their point of view. In spite of its concern about the consequent loss of support of the smaller nations, the United States representatives deferred to the United Kingdom, and the draft presented to the United Kingdom, Soviet and Chinese governments in August 1942 restricted the membership of the Policy Committee to the Four Powers, with the Director General presiding. When the plenipotentiaries of these nations settled down to completing the Agreement five months later the United Kingdom government had changed its mind. In its comments on the draft of 13 August the British Foreign Office recommended a Policy Committee of seven members, one of which would be Canada. The presence of the exiled governments in London and the persistent claims of the Canadian government for membership in the executive group in recognition of its position as a potential major supplier of relief goods had evidently influenced the United Kingdom to subordinate its concern about efficiency to a desire to secure the whole-hearted support of all United Nations for the relief project. The Soviets and the Chinese, however, continued to adhere to the concept of a Four Power committee. Upon news of this the Canadian government brought its case directly to the State Department, claiming that a position proportionate to its expected importance as a source of relief supplies was necessary to convince Parliament to accept the financial burden and other sacrifices required in furnishing relief goods. Both the Canadians and the Soviets for different reasons stressed the danger of establishing a precedent in the executive body of the relief organization which should not be adopted by other international bodies likely to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The Canadian government wished to avoid a world directed by the Four Powers. The Soviet government, pointing to the difficulties in selecting one European government for membership for the relief executive, argued that they would be negligible in comparison with the problems encountered if seven Powers had to be chosen to deal with more controversial matters.

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The United States government, while understanding both points of view, had come to believe in a Four Power committee because of its interest in getting UNRRA started. As the moderator in the discussions, Dean Acheson proposed the creation of a standing Committee on Supplies on which Canada and other supplying countries would be represented. When buttressed by the understanding that the Four Powers would favor the choice of a Canadian as Chairman of the Committee on Supplies, of which they themselves would be members, and that the Canadian government's acceptance of a Four Power executive committee for the Relief Administration did not indicate its acceptance of the precedent for future international bodies, the Canadian government, after seriously considering a refusal to participate in UNRRA, yielded to the compromise. The United Kingdom in the meantime had agreed to do likewise at least temporarily, provided that after the circulation of the draft Agreement the Four Powers would meet again to arrive at a workable scheme in the light of the responses of the various nations. No surprise was experienced when, after the release of the draft in June 1943, the Allied European governments made protests against the exclusion of their representatives from the Central Committee—the Netherlands especially objected to the undemocratic nature of the arrangement and the dangerous precedent for subsequent international organizations—but their success in watering down the Committee's power made them resigned in the end to its limited membership.

The Four Powers themselves had sought to prevent a constitutional arrangement permitting them to dominate the relief organization by purposely restricting the power of the Central Committee. The Soviet attempt to require a unanimous vote for all decisions of the Central Committee was overruled by Acheson's suggestion that decision be taken by a majority vote (three out of four members of the Committee), except in specific instances, defined later in the Agreement. In like manner the provisions for any member government to participate in the discussions of the Central Committee when its interests were concerned, for the Chairman of the Supply Committee to attend the Central Committee when supply questions were dis-

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cussed, for relief activities within the territory of a member government to be determined after consultation with and with the consent of that government, and for semi-annual meetings of the Council at which each government could discuss all policy matters were deliberate safeguards for the smaller Powers against any abuse of authority by the Central Committee.

Again the setting up of standing committees for Europe, the Far East, and Supplies which included all nations concerned with the area or the subject and which would recommend policies to the Council and between Council sessions to the Policy Committee was expected, perhaps falsely, to dilute the influence of the Four Great Powers with that of other supplying Powers and the European Allies. Changing the name of the "Policy" Committee to Central Committee in the draft of 27 February 1943 was meant to indicate that "all these committees would be committees of the Council on more or less equal standing, the Central Committee existing merely for convenience at the center of operations between sessions of the Council."[39] There was evidence among the drafters of an almost naïve faith in the democratic value of an extensive committee system.

But these provisions were not enough. In the final stage of the development of the Agreement the Canadian and European Allied governments succeeded in establishing the supremacy of the policy-making power of the Council. Through these last amendments only decisions of an emergency nature could be made by the Central Committee between Council sessions and they were open to reconsideration by the Council at regular or special sessions; the Central Committee could admit new members to the organization between sessions of the Council only on the authorization of the Council; and again the Committee could make emergency appointments to the standing and technical committees only with authorization in advance by the Council, and then its appointments were to continue only until the next session of the Council. It was obviously intended that post-war relief policy should be designed and developed by the United Nations as a whole.

[39] State Dept., Veatch to Acheson, 16 Feb. 1943; Four Power Discussion, State Dept., 17 Feb. 1943, p. 9.

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Regional Control

The drafters of the Agreement divided again over the centralization of administrative authority in UNRRA. There were differences of opinion regarding the function of the regional committees and the appointment of deputy directors general. Keenly aware of the ambitions of the European governments to shape and direct relief policies in the European area, Leith-Ross presented a plan in favor of semi-autonomous area organizations to be established in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East under a regional director and a governmental committee representative of the countries with interests in the respective areas. The Inter-Allied Committee in London was to be maintained as the Committee for Europe. In each area the regional director was to preside at the committee meetings, provide the necessary secretariat, and be advised on policy. Such diffusion of authority and such a close relation between member governments and the offices of the Administration were immediately opposed by the United States representatives. Consistent with their constitutional tradition they sought to minimize the functions of committees and insisted upon a complete separation of the legislative from the executive side of the organization. They believed the Director General must have a free hand to carry on operations. His deputies, the regional directors, would be unable to operate effectively if assisted by regional governmental committees. In the compromise which the Interdepartmental Committee reached with Leith-Ross, the United States view prevailed. Although the group had agreed that there should be provision for coördinated and decentralized planning on a regional basis and that the facilities and work of the Inter-Allied Committee should be fully utilized, the draft Agreement of 13 August 1942 provided that regional committees should be among the standing committees to be established by the Council and that their function should be to *advise* the Council and, in intervals between its sessions, to *advise* the Policy Committee "on the making of plans and formulation of policy for the relief and rehabilitation of Europe, the Far East, and any other areas where such committees may be found desirable." [40]

[40] State Dept., Draft, 13 Aug. 1942, III, 4.

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In their official comments on this draft, both the United Kingdom and the Soviet governments recommended an extension of scope for the regional committees, the latter suggesting that they serve in more than an advisory capacity. Opposition from the United States was immediate. The Department of State consistently held that regional committees and indeed all standing committees should be kept purely advisory to the Council and should not be made part of the administrative or executive branch of the Administration. It was clear, the officials argued, that under the draft Agreement the Director General was free to ask for advice and assistance and might even delegate administrative functions to the committees, but it would tend to paralyze action, if the Director General's executive powers were subject to the control of the regional committees. When Acheson put this point of view before the Ambassadors of the other three Powers, both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom yielded. There was no further consideration of giving the regional committees executive or administrative functions before the summer of 1943. In their comments on the draft of 10 June, the Belgian, Netherlands and Polish governments took the not surprising stand in favor of extending the power of the regional committees to include certain powers of the Council and the Central Committee. Although Acheson revised the article in consideration of their replies, no substantial change was made in the functions of the regional committees. They were defined as advisory bodies in the draft of 20 September, and thence in the Agreement.

The Centralization of Administrative Authority

During the drafting of the provisions concerning the appointment of deputy directors general the United States made a second major effort to keep the executive powers as vested in the Director General free from political control. Here Governor Lehman's own preferences were fully considered. The United Kingdom's desire to subject the selection of regional deputy directors general to the approval of the Central Committee and the Soviet proposal to appoint two regional directors general for Europe, representing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, were both overruled. It was the United

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States view that the administrative machinery should be divorced from political control of any sort, that all members of the UNRRA staff should regard themselves as international civil servants, responsible to the whole body of nations forming the Administration, and not to any separate government. Although the Soviet Ambassador thought it would be realistic to expect that each important administrative official would be influenced or even receive directions from his own national government, he was able to reach a compromise in the final arrangements with the other three plenipotentiaries. Once again Acheson's facile mind provided the solution. It was agreed to place squarely in the hands of the Director General the appointment of all deputy directors general and staff at headquarters and elsewhere, including field missions, and to enable him to delegate to them such powers as he judged appropriate. To meet the United Kingdom's concern about close coöperation between regional deputy directors general and the regional committees it was provided that the deputy directors general who were assigned special functions within a region should attend meetings of the regional standing committee when possible and should keep it advised on the progress of the relief and rehabilitation program within the region. To meet the demand of the Soviet Union and later that of China to be assured of the appointment of deputy directors general of their nationality in Europe and Asia, respectively, a unanimously accepted statement of agreement to this effect was incorporated (ex post facto) in the minutes of the meeting of the Four Powers of 24 March 1943, an understanding of major importance in the shaping of the administrative structure of UNRRA.

Protection of National Sovereignty

A fourth major issue in the development of the Agreement, the fear of the encroachment of an international authority on national sovereignty, was easily resolved. Here the Soviet and Chinese governments took the initiative. In their comments on Article I of the August 1942 draft which dealt with the purpose of UNRRA, both governments made it clear that international relief operations in any state should be based on the

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consent of the government of the recipient nation regarding the forms these operations should take. In cases of differences of opinion the Chinese proposed the Central Committee as a board of appeal. To the Soviets, however, the government concerned was the final authority. In fact they asked that the Agreement should admit ways whereby the recipient government should take the whole responsibility for the fulfillment of the Administration's relief measures within its territory. It was clear from the discussion of these comments that the Soviet government was not concerned with establishing a rigid formula for all governments receiving relief, but merely to keep open the possibility of granting full responsibility for the administration of relief measures to recipient governments in actual control of their territory. The Four Powers agreed it would be unwise to bind the Administration in its dealings with governments of ex-enemy countries and unsettled areas. Again Acheson produced a satisfactory amendment. The originally vague provision for UNRRA " to plan, coordinate, administer, and arrange for the administration " of relief measures for victims of war in any area under the control of the United Nations was strengthened in the interest of sovereign rights. Both the form of relief activities within the territory of a member government wherein that government exercised administrative authority, and the responsibility to be assumed by the member government for carrying out measures planned by the Administration, were made dependent upon the consent of the member government in consultation with the Administration.

At the close of the brief ceremony which marked the signing of the Agreement, President Roosevelt spoke. His far-reaching words placed UNRRA in its war setting and expressed the hope of its members:

> . . . We have acted together with the other United Nations in harnessing our raw materials, our production and our other resources to defeat the common enemy. We have worked together with the United Nations in full agreement and action in the fighting on land, on the sea and in the air. We are now about to

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take an additional step in the combined actions which are necessary to win the war and to build the foundation for a secure peace.

The sufferings of the little men and women who have been ground under the Axis heel can be relieved only if we utilize the production of ALL the world to balance the want of ALL the world. In UNRRA we have devised a mechanism, based on the processes of true democracy, which can go far toward accomplishment of such an objective in the days and months of desperate emergency which will follow the overthrow of the Axis.

As in most of the difficult and complex things in life, nations will learn to work together only by actually working together. Why not? The Nations have common objectives. It is, therefore, with a lift of hope, that we look on the signing of this agreement by all of the United Nations as a means of joining them together still more firmly.[41]

GRACE FOX

WASHINGTON, D. C.

[41] Dept. of State, Radio Bulletin No. 269.

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REVIEWS

Korea Today. By GEORGE M. MCCUNE, with the collaboration of ARTHUR L. GREY, JR. Cambridge, Harvard University Press and the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950.—xxi, 372 pp. $5.00.

If Americans can bear to learn still another lesson from the Korean war, the appearance of this posthumous work by Professor McCune may serve to point it out. It is, first of all, that we can no longer afford to remain as poorly informed as we have been about countries like Korea, where we have become deeply and inescapably committed with little awareness of the difficulties facing us. And secondly, that unless something is done soon by institutions in a position to provide information on these matters, we may indeed find ourselves less informed than at present; for the passing of Professor McCune left us without anyone who might be called a full-fledged authority on Korea. True, there are educated Koreans in this country who have maintained an interest in their homeland; there are Americans who have spent much of their lives working among the Koreans; and some who have obtained a special knowledge of certain aspects of the Korean situation. But we may have to wait a long time before someone appears with the qualifications the author of this book had to offer: a long personal acquaintance with Korea and its people, fine scholarly training, a lifetime devoted to the study of Korea's past as well as its immediate problems, and a knowledge of the languages in which the most important materials for the study of Korean history are written. This last is probably the hardest to come by, since few have the time or the persistence to learn not only the native language, but Chinese, which is indispensable to an appreciation of Korea's cultural heritage, and Japanese, which was the official language for many years and the one in which the most valuable scholarly work has been done so far.

In what is, from the standpoint of educational institutions, a specialized and peripheral field of study, the great demand arising from crises like last June's for trained personnel to serve in the government or armed services, as well as for immediately publishable material, may very well retard rather than encourage the development of more qualified men and the writing of other serious books like *Korea Today.* Trained men in the government, even those assigned to re-

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search, may do highly useful work but little of it is released to the general public. Meanwhile there is no one to conduct independent, long-range studies, nor anyone at our universities to train those who might go further.

With this in mind we can more readily appreciate having this valuable study just when it can be of most help to us. It is true that the book was finished some months before the outbreak of war, and even the attempt to bring it up to date after the author's death, made by his wife, Mrs. Evelyn McCune, and Mr. Arthur L. Grey, Jr., could not anticipate the sudden developments of the last few months. But if we have the advantage of having the answers now to some of the most difficult questions which faced the author, we are also fortunate to have his thoughtful consideration of Korea's post-war problems to guide us in the solving of even greater problems ahead. The unification of Korea, which must certainly be the outcome of the present struggle, is shown again and again in this book to be the prime need today. The resources of North and South are complementary and indispensable to each other. The blocking of trade at the 38th parallel, and the inability to organize an integrated economy, have meant that South Koreans went without essential raw materials and power from the North for their industries, while North Koreans were deprived of many consumer goods and foodstuffs produced in the South. Much of the ECA's work and funds have been devoted simply to offsetting the effects of this unrealistic division; in other words, to doing what the Koreans might have done for themselves to a great extent. "Nothing can contribute so directly to improving economic conditions in both areas as unrestrained economic relations between them, and no extreme of political or ideological differences can make sense out of permitting the 38th parallel to become a more complete barrier to commerce than are actual national frontiers. . ." (p. 360). To non-Koreans the threat of involvement in a general war might seem a sufficient deterrent to forceful penetration of this barrier, but they must remember that the Koreans themselves have already had to suffer the full effects of both cold and hot war, and are plainly unmoved by fears of involvement. To them unification is the only recompense for their sufferings, and the only hope of avoiding another war.

Unfortunately the division of North and South has also had a profoundly adverse effect on the politics as well as the economy of the country. Not only have bitter antagonisms been nurtured between Left and Right, which may not subside for years, but also the polarization of political loyalties around these two extremes has prevented

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the development of any sizable middle-of-the road group, which was one of the objectives of American policy in Korea (though this is not generally known). A big issue dividing the Right and Center was the measures to be taken against revolt and invasion. The Rightists, led by Rhee, favored strong action against elements provoking disorder and adequate preparation against attack from the North. In this respect they had the support of occupation authorities. The Moderates, represented mainly by Kimm Kiusic, who in other respects were strongly supported by General Hodge, feared that repressive measures would intensify the split between Right and Left, making reconciliation and unification impossible. The sympathies of the author are plainly with the latter group. He feels that the threat of war was used by Rhee's régime to consolidate its own power and put off needed reforms. Discussing the likelihood of open conflict at the end of the period studied, he says, ". . . in spite of the poor prospects for amicable settlement, open war did not seem to be an immediate prospect" (p. 265). This is a crucial point, and much of the author's criticism of both the Rhee régime and United States policy may need reëxamination since events have shown the latter's fears to have been justified. Nevertheless, there are considerable grounds for improvement in Rhee's administration, and, unless reformist elements are strengthened, political stability is only a distant hope.

Since direct intervention by the United States and United Nations in favor of certain parties must be ruled out, we may have something to learn from the effectiveness of the indirect means used by the Soviets in the North. Professor McCune attributes much of their success to the fact that they were quick to put Koreans in apparent control of their own affairs, and through mass education to organize the people behind a definite program of reconstruction. Such undercover control is, of course, inconsistent with democratic aims, yet no régime will last in Korea if foreigners, even the best-intentioned of them, continue to play an obvious and dominating rôle. One of the marks of General MacArthur's genius is his awareness of this fact; throughout the campaign he has haken every opportunity to encourage Korean leaders and bolster the people's confidence in themselves, lest the weight of outside assistance crush their sense of self-respect and responsibility. Whatever else is done in the reconstruction period, it must be directed to this end, for material assistance and technical advice are no substitutes for popular initiative and mature acceptance of political responsibilities.

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Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power. By STEPHEN CLISSOLD. New York, Philosophical Library, 1949.—245 pp. $3.75.

Tito. By GEORGE BILAINKIN. New York, Philosophical Library; London, Williams and Norgate, 1950.—287 pp. $3.75; 10*s.* 6*d.*

That new events alter our portrayals of the past is almost absurdly illustrated by a comparison of these two British biographies of Marshal Tito recently published in the United States. One, written in 1947, before Tito's break with Moscow, contains no inkling of the impending crisis: in it Tito is a loyal proconsul of the Kremlin. The second, written in 1949, sees in Tito's obvious turn to the U. S. S. R. in 1945 a reaction to unfriendly behavior by the Western Powers. This turn to "trusted, tried friends" (p. 156) was then betrayed by the Soviet Union's long-standing imperialist ambitions.

Of the two books, the earlier by Mr. Clissold, a liaison officer to Tito's headquarters during the war and subsequently press attaché of the British Embassy in Belgrade, is much the more enlightening, contributing to our knowledge of the Partisan movement and particularly of the tragic, involved, internecine struggle between Tito and Mihailović. Of this infinitely debated issue, Mr. Clissold writes an admirably balanced account, probably acceptable neither to Chetnik nor to Partisan, but in accord with the facts as they are known. He considers Mihailović a man with a "dogged, slow-moving soldier's mind", a pathetic figure caught in problems too complex for him, driven to increasing collaboration with quisling and Axis forces by his conflict with Tito and his unwillingness to provoke German reprisals for active guerilla warfare. The Partisan movement, on the other hand, he regards as unquestionably Communist-inspired from the outset, valiant in fighting the Fascist invader but at all times committed to promoting the Revolution and to achieving the eventual defeat of all temporary allies and associates. One has the impression that the author is a wartime admirer of the Partisans, disillusioned by their actions when in power. The principal shortcoming of his formulation of the Partisan position, his failure to detect any foreshadowing of the rupture with Moscow, is unnecessarily emphasized by the author's fictional device of reading the minds and thoughts of his leading characters. Another weakness of the book is Mr. Clissold's failure to cite or evaluate the sources of certain important pieces of information—such as a secret directive by Tito on the eve of the

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German assault (p. 27) and a Comintern "Directive for Future Work" of May 9, 1941 (p. 238)—beyond a tantalizing general statement in the preface that he had "drawn upon the confidential circulars and directives of the Yugoslav Communist Party."

While Mr. Bilainkin, who has visited Yugoslavia as a correspondent four times since the end of the war, announces that his book "aims at keeping to the path unusual in modern days, objectivity," he is clearly a whole-hearted supporter of Tito against all comers, Mihailović, King Peter, the Anglo-Americans, or the Soviet Union. Moreover, his portrait of the Marshal is not clear, and his interpretations of political events are extremely erratic (for example, his interpretation on page 76 of the Stalin-Churchill agreement of October 1944). The book provides disappointingly little new information. The author's visit to Tito's birthplace and several personal interviews throw little additional light on Tito's early years or the formation of the Partisan movement (obscure also in Mr. Clissold's study). His discussion of the Tito-Stalin break is quite superficial, and the collection of relevant documents which concludes the book adds nothing to the material published in 1948 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (*The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*). A choppy and confused chapter arrangement makes the book difficult to read, as does the writer's style ("The liberator of Yugoslavia and his country stand before the crazy world anvil"). Perhaps Mr. Bilainkin's most useful contribution is to communicate the excessive and self-centered although understandable pride with which the present régime regards its position and achievements.

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America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day. By THOMAS A. BAILEY. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1950.—xi, 375 pp. $4.00.

Late in October 1933, the *New York Times* stated editorially that if recognition of Russia were achieved it would come largely because America agreed with President Roosevelt that the long-standing tradition of Russian-American friendship should be revived. Throughout the previous century both countries had regularly invoked this hallowed tie. As recently as 1944 Foster Rhea Dulles concluded *The Road to Teheran,* his history of America's relations with her temporary war ally, by saying that "The road which has led to Teheran should in the future link Washington and Moscow even more closely." Now, six years and an era later, a new pen has turned to the same topic.

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Professor Bailey broadly surveys American relations with Russia from the earliest days to the attack on South Korea. He weds a moderate tone to sound judgment for the benefit of the general reader. The author feels that the public could deal more intelligently with the problem of Soviet Russia if it had a clearer comprehension of our previous contact with the Slavs. Convinced that less appears new in Russia's present if one understands her past, he devotes more space to the Tsars than to the Commissars. He proceeds by emphasizing American attitudes toward the diplomatic problems with which the book is primarily concerned.

During the nineteenth century, Russian-American amity sprang from common opposition to England and the absence of antagonistic interests, and despite the contradictory systems of government the phrase "historic friendship" was reiterated until it became a stereotype. The author tests and finds this tradition wanting. Old legends are decisively routed, including those of "cordial Catherine", "amiable Alexander", and the purpose behind the visit of Russian vessels in 1863. Contemporary newspapers are cited to prove all was not a love feast, a fact which our ministers to Russia fully realized. Yet, as the author admits, people are motivated by what they *think* is truth, and the cordiality between the two nations was none the less real because Adam-zad walked the path of self-interest in befriending America. Shattering the myths, however, does not eradicate the fact of friendship, but it brings the author close to the danger he warns against—writing off the former harmony now that it no longer exists. Thus, concluding the pre-1881 period, he comes closer to surprising than to summarizing when he states (p. 120) that the death of Alexander II "spelled the end of the golden age in Russian-American relations."

After 1881 Russian pogroms alienated America, while the consequent "new immigration" accentuated existing tensions. Revelations (especially by George Kennan) of Tsarist despotism and unceasing Muscovite expansion further irritated the raw edge of American feeling. When the two nations met in the Far East near the turn of the century, as more amicable ties between the Yankees and John Bull were becoming necessary and possible, the "historic friendship" was left for the orators. This important development is not adequately highlighted.

Bolshevism brought American intervention in Russia and raised Red specters on the national horizon. Recognition failed to restore coöperation, and after Pearl Harbor the nations became "quasi allies, rather than allies" (p. 308). In 1945 began the rupture which

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ended in cold war, grown hot in Korea. Though excellently described, the post-revolutionary period is not always thoroughly explained.

The State Department materials used for the first time extend our knowledge slightly but do not change our understanding of American attitudes toward Russia. The book's main value, however, lies in refocusing the pre-1917 story and relating it to the Soviet period. Yet the statement (p. 355) that "Czarism was about as antipathetic ideologically to democracy as is present-day Stalinism" underestimates the dynamic and aggressive qualities of the latter. To grant the continuity in Russian history is not to deny that Soviet Russia poses new problems for America. The break in 1917 was greater than the author indicates.

A sprightly style is marred by excessive alliteration and a few strained metaphors. Contemporary cartoons enliven a handsome book. The bibliography lists well-known works, but the index is inadequate and not entirely accurate. Nevertheless, this presentation of the roots of a current problem—"the most frightening one of our times" (p. 349)—deserves to be read by the man in the street.

WINTON U. SOLBERG

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War or Peace. By JOHN FOSTER DULLES. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1950.—viii, 274 pp. $2.50; $1.00.

This book suggests comparisons with Wendell Willkie's famous *One World.* In both, Republican leaders better than any Democrats stated for the whole public the form and content of evolving United States foreign policy. But Willkie's book was a rapt vision of utopia; John Foster Dulles' book is a sober redemption of hope after five years of discouragement. The two books are signposts marking the distance we have traversed from the dream of One World right away to an awakening with attendant determination to prevent sad experience from reconciling us permanently to two worlds.

Wendell Willkie reported on his trip, which was little more than an inspirational junket, to the allied nations during the war. Mr. Dulles reports on his experience in the actual making of administration policy. Thus the two books are also signs of the rapid development of bipartisanship in the conduct of our foreign relations. *War or Peace* is furthermore a primer of recent and current events and a preachment of the necessity to strengthen internationalist doctrine and practice as the best means to prevent a third world war.

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It is the best primer available to spell out for citizens the essentials of what has been happening in the main arenas. Specialists will be appalled by Mr. Dulles' distortions-by-omission, which are sometimes severe even for a primer. But specialists rarely speak to the average citizen to any purpose, and Mr. Dulles has a purpose which must be achieved if we are to construct a viable peace or at least win if we are forced to fight. His purpose is to convince Americans that our policy since 1945 has been sound and that no other policy than collective security—neither appeasement in hope of an easy peace nor isolation in hope of security nor aggression in hope of victory over communism—is practicable.

The author is aware that the crux of the struggle between the United States and Russia is their competition for the moral leadership of humanity. He does not stress the religious ambience of his own morality; but his association with a major effort to find a common denominator among religious groups has evidently convinced him that all human beings share the essentials of morality. Honesty, he believes, is really our best policy. He gives us evidence that keen moral sense and respect for it in mankind have guided crucial decisions of our government in recent years. He concludes that the view of the small free nations after the war that they might remain neutral in the struggle between the United States and Russia, that it was merely another old-fashioned, a-moral sruggle for power, was demolished by the actual conduct of the United States.

Specialists will want to know more than Mr. Dulles tells them of recent international relations before they accept his conclusion that good and evil are entirely polarized between the United States and Russia. Busy with data on Arabian oil, West German cartels, dollar shortages abroad, and so forth, political scientists may delude themselves that the value judgments in which Mr. Dulles deals are naïve. A primer for Everyman is just the place to assert the primacy of moral issues in international affairs. Unless everything changes, the American people will in the long run see to it that their government's policy is plainly moral.

As an account of the author's experience in recent international negotiations, *War or Peace* is a disappointment. The text gives the impression that it was dictated from memory unaided by notes, and Mr. Dulles claims a great deal of credit for himself. He implies that his advice to Secretary Byrnes during the September 1945 London Council of Foreign Ministers (p. 30) ended "the epoch of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam," and inaugurated the policy of "no appeasement". It is not true that in the Atlantic Charter "no mention was made of

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an international organization" (p. 33). Section Eight declares Roosevelt's and Churchill's belief that, after disarmament of the aggressor nations, a "permanent system of general security" should be established. Mr. Dulles states that private effort, including that of a committee which he headed for the Federal Council of Churches, "transformed the attitude" of the government (p. 34). He claims that post-war bipartisanship in foreign policy had its "birth" in August 1944, when Governor Dewey asked him to confer with Secretary Hull on the projected United Nations (p. 123). Bipartisanship was actually "born" on September 20, 1939, when President Roosevelt conferred with Alfred M. Landon and Frank Knox on the repeal of the arms embargo, and Wendell Willkie certainly helped bipartisanship to grow.

Mr. Dulles rises above partisan history in the passages of *War or Peace* which plead for strengthened internationalism among our people and in our policy. Besides exhortations, he offers in chapter vi, "The United Nations in Operation", a solid analysis designed to show that its successes were notable even prior to Korea. Other chapters also contain penetrating expositions and arguments in support of collective security.

The book does a great deal to make the meanings of recent world affairs and of our policy available to the public. Its wide popularity encourages hope that public understanding may keep pace with at least the broad outlines of the world situation and that popular American support of the United Nations will survive the failure to realize immediately Willkie's dream of One World.

BASIL RAUCH

BARNARD COLLEGE

The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949. By JOHN C. CAMPBELL and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. With an Introduction by General George C. Marshall. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, New York, 1949.—xvii, 604 pp. $5.00.

This is the third post-war volume of the annual survey, the publication of which was interrupted by the war. Like its predecessors, it maintains the same high standards of objectivity, completeness and clarity; hence its usefulness, further enhanced by an extensive bibliography. It is no mean accomplishment to organize into an orderly presentation the mass of sometimes unfortunate and often bewildering

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moves of which the enactment of American foreign policy consists; but the clarification is not achieved at the cost of oversimplification or distortion.

Being a factual exposition of record, the book does not have any thesis. Yet, out of the very presentation of the record a theme emerges: "the realities of international politics, however, were to be found less in the Charter and the proceedings of the United Nations than in the conflicts and tensions between two hostile blocs" (p. 1). Or, to put it another way, American policy since the end of the war has largely been shaped by its reaction to events on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass at the center of which lies the Soviet state ever alert for opportunities to expand into this periphery.

Containment has been the answer to expansion. But, deprived of the totalitarian possibility of making abrupt shifts of policy in disregard of public opinion, American policy has been relatively slow to adjust itself. It took about two years for the Soviet Union to destroy the fond illusions nurtured in its regard during the war. The year 1947 was the turning point, and this book records in large part the beginnings of a positive American policy. The transition is not yet complete as shown by the difference between our policies and their results in Europe and in the Far East.

It was only natural that the United States should react first and most strongly in Europe, whose over-all problem is aptly summed up: "the revolutionary shift in the balance of power was the essence of the problem of Europe" (p. 32). For the short term, the paramount issue in Europe is indoubtedly that of economic reconstruction, and much of the book is taken up with such matters as the implementation of E. R. P., the reorganization of Western Germany and international trade. But economic reconstruction, if a prerequisite necessity, is not a sufficient condition. The next step, still concretely definable, is the restoration of a substantial degree of military power; hence the North Atlantic Pact follows logically from the commitments implied in Marshall aid. Within this broad framework of policy, many specific and some unpredictable developments (the Berlin blockade, the Tito heresy, for instance) find their place; but the main line remains clear.

Rather different is the Far Eastern situation. Unable to control the course of Chinese events, our policy during the period here recorded remains a wholly negative one. Subsequent volumes will trace the groping beginnings of a positive Far Eastern policy comparable to the one implemented in Europe. Interestingly, we have been led to think of both Germany and Japan as bulwarks of our policy. An essay

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ought to be written on the ghost of the once adumbrated American-British-German-Japanese connection.

The intermediate region—roughly from Greece to Iran (India has been in relatively quiet transition)—is intermediate also in terms of our thinking and action: less active than in Europe, more so than in China. Palestine has seen American policy at its worst, meaning by this irresponsibly conditioned by the less creditable aspects of domestic pressures. The future alone can tell whether we have assisted in the ultimate promotion of justice or in the creation of an additional and unnecessary focus of insoluble tensions.

The African continent, like the rest of the American (other than Canada), while potentially of great importance, has been relatively outside the main path of conflict, hence has understandably received second priority. The operation of the Point Four program will have great possibilities in both areas.

One more thing should be said. Not least significant or important, as seen in this record, is the relation between American policy abroad and the American domestic scene. The case of Palestine has been mentioned. Of greater consequence is the North Atlantic Pact. The State Department finds it at times at least as difficult and delicate to deal with the United States Congress as with foreign nations. The description of the steps which led to the peculiar form that the pact has taken is of great interest in this connection and the author's analysis of the deeper weaknesses, not to say inconsistencies, of the pact is most apt. As much as anything America has done, here is a good measure of the present stage of our evolution: an enormous amount remains to be done—a discouraging amount some would say—but, on the other hand, an enormous amount has been done—more perhaps than one would have had a reasonable right to expect from a country whose motto until recently may be said to have been: *pour vivre heureux vivons cachés.*

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

Reprieve from War: A Manual for Realists. By LIONEL GELBER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1950.—xi, 196 pp. $3.00.

The title of this essay on contemporary world politics derives from the Canadian author's conviction that "Wars to end wars having bequeathed us a peace to end peace, mankind is, like Mahomet's coffin, suspended in mid-air between earth and sky neither making peace nor waging war—denied the one but from the other reprieved." The

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book, consequently, is primarily concerned, through a review of the recent past and an estimate of the present, with propounding the measures required to protract this reprieve, the most that may be hoped for, since no " formula for security " is at hand.

As in his earlier book, *Peace by Power* (1942), Mr. Gelber works within the framework of power politics, which, in his view, is redeemed from being a blindly Hobbesian struggle by the fact that " The tradition of freedom in the civilized West is the inner check on its own ascendancy." Hence he seeks the realization of a balance of world power in which the great preponderance of weight is with the self-restricting and tolerant West, the only situation rendering such a preponderance tolerable. The center of this power combination must clearly be the United States—forced by circumstances to abandon its earlier isolation—working in close coöperation with the British Commonwealth and the other Atlantic Powers. While hoping to bring as much power as possible to this grouping, he vigorously opposes any unification of West and East Germany or even the rearming and reindustrializing of a West German state. Believing that a unified Germany is inevitably a menace to the rest of Europe, that the Germans have as yet failed to demonstrate that they are not incorrigible, and that a strong Germany would be most likely to team up with the Soviet Union, he regards an anomalous and discontented Germany as the lesser evil (" For the experience of a century may prove that German strength and general security are not so much complementary as antithetical; that you can have German unrest and a wider stability or German stability and wider unrest, but not the one without the other ", p. 42).

With regard to the Soviet Union, the opposing weight in the scales, while the author has no illusions about the nature of the present régime or the dangerous implications of its strategic position, ideology and foreign policy, he believes that correct steps by the West may avoid a full-scale conflict. Despite all its vulnerable points, the West can gain over-all military preponderance. Further expansion of Russian power, especially in Asia, would be largely offset by increasing internal strains, both logistic and political. Finally, for all the parallels between the Soviet and Nazi dictatorships, " Russia is not incited by an ideology of race, a *mystique* of tribal self-idolatry, a thunderous Wagnerian lunacy in which the twilight of the gods is the destructive prologue to a barbaric phantasmagoria of eternal night. Coolly and with detachment, if the Kremlin perceives that further competitive effort will not pay, some *modus vivendi* with it may be feasible " (p. 186).

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Such are the main points of the book, which includes scattered observations on the United Nations, Spain and the Far East, a recessional for Britain's decline as a great Power, and a rather intemperate discussion of the Palestine issue. They are, however, expressed in a singularly exasperating manner. Although the chapter headings give some indication of their contents, the reader feels increasingly as though he were on a merry-go-round; chapter after chapter the same themes and propositions appear again and again until the line of argument dissolves in the blur of repeated statements. Even the distraction of the brass ring appears in a disconcerting series of epigrams, most of which involve the same trick of reversing the order of words ("The power of an idea is harnessed to the idea of power," or "To maintain in the world a balance of power we shall, in our behavior, have first to retain the power of balance"). Mr. Gelber's sane and often penetrating views on the state of the world deserve a better mode of presentation.

HENRY L. ROBERTS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

I Was There. By FLEET ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY. New York, London, Toronto, Whittlesey House, McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950.—xi, 527 pp. $5.00.

In his foreword to Admiral Leahy's personal account of his wartime experiences, President Truman states that the record, drawn up at his request, provides "an authoritative source for all those interested in the strategy by which victory was achieved over the Axis Powers in World War II." In addition to the factual material concerning the wartime policies of the United States, it is suggested that the book has two other levels of significance: the light thrown on the operation of government at the top levels and revelations made of the author's personality and opinions.

As a source for the study of American history, 1941-1945, *I Was There* is useful, invaluable at some points, but, in the over-all balance, disappointing. The first 94 pages cover the period of the Admiral's service as Ambassador to Vichy. One might expect to find in this section a wealth of new material on this controversial subject. While not entirely barren, however, it adds very little to William Langer's excellent *Vichy Gamble.* The last third of the book is devoted to the Big Three conferences at Yalta and Potsdam and to the time between. As with the Vichy period this section adds something to our understanding of the important events described, but it by no means replaces

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as a source any of three other works: Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* James Byrnes's *Speaking Frankly,* and Edward Stettinius' *Roosevelt and the Russians.* Admiral Leahy was "there", all right, but each of the three other authors listed apparently had more copious notes on which to draw (in one instance a record in shorthand) and each has been more interested in the meaning and consequences of the positions assumed by the representatives of the three governments.

Certainly it is the middle half (approximately) that will most interest historians and political scientists, although here, too, the student will want to keep close at hand such other accounts as Sherwood's and the two-volume memoirs of Cordell Hull. Also the fact should be borne in mind that Admiral Leahy writes of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from memory and without benefit of either the documents themselves or his own notes (pp. 106-7). Nonetheless as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief Leahy occupied a unique vantage point from which to view the intertwined development of global diplomatic and military policy. His record of the work of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff in hammering out agreements from diverse opinions within the American command and between Americans and their British counterparts is authoritative and should be treated with respect. The story of the formulation of military strategy in the Pacific, including the 1944 Hawaii conference of President Roosevelt with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, for the first time outlines the details of that all-too-confused picture.

As with *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* so should Admiral Leahy's book be studied for the light it throws on the significant difference between theory and practice in American government. Between departments and President was a layer of authority not only serving as channel of communication but performing in some instances important functions of policy formulation and execution theoretically within the province of the individual departments. Admiral Leahy saw the President daily, screened visitors and memoranda for him on nonmilitary as well as military matters, aided in drafting presidential pronouncements; in short, was far more than a liaison officer between Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Admiral did not wish to, nor could he by reason of personality, enter into the type of personal relationship as that existing between Hopkins and Roosevelt. Neither did he undertake the execution of as wide a range of programs as Hopkins. Both, however, by being so close to the President, in themselves constituted an important segment of governmental organization at the highest level.

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It is impossible to read *I Was There* without gaining considerable insight into the personality of the author. Here is no diplomat concealing himself and his attitudes behind polished, noncommittal phrases. Anyone may discover the Admiral's position on such controversial French figures as Pétain (Leahy wrote a letter to be used by the defense at Pétain's trial), Darlan, de la Rocque (favorable), and above all De Gaulle ("self-styled 'leader of French resistance'" [p. 43] etc., etc., throughout the book). Unvarnished adverse comments also appear on Henry Wallace (pp. 94, 294), Wendell Willkie (p. 124), some of de Gaulle's supporters in the United States (p. 136), the New Deal (p. 138). Leahy held strong opinions on the subject of the atomic bomb, did not think "the professors" could produce a weapon as powerful as they claimed, and argues very persuasively that use of the bomb was not necessary to the rapid defeat of Japan and placed the United States in an unfortunate position before the bar of world opinion.

This reviewer cannot repress expression of the wish that the author or his publisher had done a better job of editing. Sentence structure and general composition of the narrative leave much to be desired. In an apparent appeal (probably unavailing) to the mass market, material on social events has been included. Minutiae of no importance in the substantive field also are faithfully recorded, thus interrupting, in annoying fashion, the consideration of far weightier matters. Despite these stylistic faults and other disappointments noted above, however, *I Was There* must be accorded a place among the records of major significance for World War II.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR.

Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany. By PAUL W. MASSING. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949.—xviii, 341 pp. $4.00.

Any history of anti-Semitism is bound to be depressing, but depression deepens to despair when the story is clamped in a deterministic frame, as in Professor Massing's study of political anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany. Throughout, he is at pains to eliminate the possibility of free choice, to eliminate also the influence of ideal values. For him, the effective determinant of feeling and action is group interest, and it is his conviction that the failure even of Germans to understand the peculiar character of the social structure of Germany

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has prevented understanding of German anti-Semitism, and of most things German.

By comparison with countries like Britain, France and the United States, Professor Massing argues, the social structure of Imperial Germany showed two peculiarities. On the one hand, the class structure was more rigid and there was less movement between classes. On the other hand, effective political power remained largely concentrated in the agrarian aristocracy even though economic power had passed to the capitalist bourgeoisie. To maintain its hold on power, the weakened feudal group allied with other social groups. Such alliances were made and broken with cold concentration on political purpose and with complete indifference to moral purpose or consequence.

Through most of the imperial era, one such ally was "the large prebourgeois strata between the middle classes and labor, which German sociology usually refers to as the Old *Mittelstand*" (p. xvi)—clerks, storekeepers, the lower ranks of the professions and of the civil service. In Western countries, this group formed a part of the middle classes; in Germany it remained separated from, and hostile to, both the bourgeoisie and labor. In the industrial age, its existence was precarious at best; in times of economic depression, the *Mittelstand* was ground between organized labor and the ever-encroaching industrial and commercial capitalist. Increasingly, the protest of the "little man" against his fate took the form of racial anti-Semitism, the dream of a day when the *Mittelstand* would prevail "against the Jewish forces of mammonism and Marxism", where there would be "a noncompetitive society based on private enterprise" (pp. 102, 103).

Racial anti-Semitism was potentially revolutionary, and directed not only against the "cultural nightmare" of socialism but also against "the informal and yet most exclusive solidarity of the upper classes". Cynically blind to dangers which were to become obvious under Hitler, the Conservatives tapped "the lower middle-class reservoirs of anti-Jewish hostility" (p. 104) when *Mittelstand* support was needed.

Socialists were, in Dr. Massing's judgment, no less blind. Themselves free from anti-Semitism, they underestimated anti-Semitism "as a mere byproduct of the class struggle" (p. 151); when, inevitably, the *Mittelstand* became absorbed in the proletariat, then anti-Semitism would automatically disappear. Marx had seen deeper. "When Marx had described the Jews as a group whose social function was reduced to money-making pure and simple, he had attacked the problem at its deepest social root. The Jewish question was the question of man under capitalism" (p. 159).

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There is much truth in this analysis of the German situation. But the historian, as well as others, is likely to feel that all the evidence cannot be squeezed into this impersonal frame. Indeed, one wonders how this volume fits into the purpose of the "Studies in Prejudice", sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, of which it is a part. The editors state that the purpose of the series is education, "and education in a strict sense is by its nature personal and psychological" (p. vii).

RAYMOND J. SONTAG

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The Decline and Fall of British Capitalism. By KEITH HUTCHISON. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950.—xiv, 301 pp. $3.50.

Mr. Hutchison's study of the rise of collectivism in Britain is an exceptionally useful book—indeed, a book that has been crying to be written and one whose usefulness is by no means limited to a single category of reader. For the interested nonprofessional it offers an introduction to contemporary Britain and to the half-dozen decades of revolutionary change that lie behind. The college teacher of English history or government now has, in a single volume, a clear and, on the whole, credible interpretation of a period that has been all too spottily treated. Even the unregenerate free enterpriser may gain something, at least negatively, from *The Decline and Fall.* For here, if we may believe the warnings of certain financial writers and columnists, is an object lesson in the insidious ways of socialism—a chilling view of the camel of collectivism which, unless firmly resisted, will presently take over the tent of our economy as it has occupied that of the British.

Mr. Hutchison's theses are not unfamiliar. The decisive step toward socialism, he would hold, was not taken when the Labor government nationalized key industries. There was, in fact, no single decisive step. Rather, British capitalism had been so weakened by a variety of influences, within and without, that it bore little resemblance to the capitalist system of the textbooks. Nationalization was perhaps as much a prescription for an economy in which the motives of the market could no longer operate effectively as it was an attack on a functioning capitalism. The main features of this hobbled capitalism are twentieth-century commonplaces. On the one hand were monopolies, trade agreements, tariffs, exchange controls, trade unions and other restrictions on the automatic checks and balances of classical capitalism; and on the other there were the sharply graduated tax-

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ation and the system of social services which tended to redistribute incomes and limit the accumulation of capital.

But these were resultants of more fundamental historical forces. For one thing there was the normal aging of Britain's industrial economy at home and the emergence of new competitors abroad. By the 1880's the honeymoon of Victorian capitalism was over, and a Cobdenite universe, a world order of free trade and free competition, seemed both less possible and less desirable to the British business man. Furthermore, although this was not immediately apparent, political democracy itself became a formidable engine of social change. It could hardly be expected that the newly enfranchised masses would be content, in their projects for reform, to remain within the Gladstonian orbit or that they would fail to see in the ballot a means of improving their conditions of life. There was more than a little truth in the gloomy prophecy of Robert Lowe and others during the debates of 1866-1867 that neither party would be able to resist the pressure of a democratic electorate, that both would find themselves bidding competitively for the support of Demos. Liberals and Conservatives alike responded to the demands of the electorate—it is astonishing how much collectivist legislation reached the statute books during the tenure of Tory governments—though until after the turn of the century these could be met by reforms which placed no great strain on the public purse. But the traditional parties did not move rapidly enough to prevent the formation of a proletarian party. Middle-class liberalism, in creating democracy, had liberated a force that would destroy the free-market economy. Finally, to an economy that was losing some of its earlier drive and whose free operation was being increasingly modified by the collectivist policies of the state, the two most destructive wars in history administered what was almost a knockout blow. The economic system which the Labor government socialized was a far cry from the free-market capitalism of the nineteenth century.

There will, of course, be differences of opinion about the validity of Mr. Hutchison's analysis and his conclusions. No doubt a writer with a different point of view might draw other inferences from some of his data. The specialist—for whom the book was *not* written—will not learn many new facts, but he will find some interesting interpretations and some tellling characterizations. For example, the heading of Part II, " The Indian Summer of British Capitalism ", suggests a good deal about the period 1900-1914, as does " The Era of Ill-Feeling " (chapter 10) of its last four years. My own impression is that Mr.

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Hutchison is a little more at ease when explaining the economic tangles of the 1920's and 1930's than in handling some of his historical and political material. But, minor criticisms aside, he has written a volume that ought to promote among intelligent Americans a more sympathetic understanding of the British problem.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY DAVID OWEN

The New Society: The Anatomy of the Industrial Order. By PETER F. DRUCKER. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950.—ix, 356 pp. $5.00.

Here is a penetrating piece of social-economic analysis, flanked by informed and suggestive synthesis. The book centers upon the dilemmas posed by the emergence of a mass-production, technological, industrial economy: the dilemma posed by the need for " the mass-production society [to] . . . have a government strong . . . enough to cope with the unbearable menace of chronic unemployment . . . [yet] weak enough and limited enough not to menace the freedom, the happiness and the private life of every citizen "; the dilemma implicit in the circumstance that " industrialization divorces the family from society "; the dilemma of the divorcement of industrial control from industrial ownership; the dilemma of the existence in our society of *two* " prime movers ", the state and the business enterprise; and the dilemma implicit in the necessity for the enterprise to " put economic performance [and profitability] first ", and the seemingly insuperable resistance of its employees and their unions to technological progress and profitability.

It is plain that Drucker does not seek to resolve the dilemmas by any sort of reversion to the primitive. He would not scrap the factory system, nor junk the machine. He would not even disallow " bigness " in business and industry. He would not discourage profitability as the necessary guide and measure of economic performance; it must be, he thinks, the dominant consideration for the enterprise. He would not discourage trade unionism, much less try to abolish it; indeed, he would encourage it.

Although acceptance of a totalitarian state probably would bring resolution of most of the dilemmas which concern him, it is rejected as being necessarily so unlimited in power as to menace the freedom of the citizen and therefore (though it probably would dispose of the problem of mass unemployment) no answer to the first dilemma noted above. Indeed, for reasons which will be noted, Drucker appears to be

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dubious about even "democratic socialism" as an acceptable means of escape from the difficulties of modern industrialism.

The affirmative theme about which Drucker's thoughts cluster is the proposition that the autonomous enterprise, devoted primarily to successful economic performance, and the equally autonomous plant community made up of the employee members of the enterprise can and should coexist in the economy. The enterprise should divest itself of concern and responsibility for the noneconomic affairs of the plant community. "The transfer [to the employee members of the enterprise] of responsibility and control for the objectively petty, but emotionally highly intense, community activities such as cafeteria, recreation, shift assignment, vacation schedule, etc., would . . . remove a source of . . . irritation and antimanagement feeling . . . [and] give the community government a sphere of authority . . . by no means unimportant to the members." There should be the "fullest union participation in the self-government of the plant community . . ."—a participation which is "in the direct interest of enterprise and management." The union would continue to be concerned also about wages and other "economic" matters and would continue to be in conflict with the management of the enterprise with respect to these matters. Drucker does not anticipate that the emergence of the self-governing plant community, with the union "participating", if not under its aegis, will "eliminate the conflicts that underlie and justify" the rise of unionism. "The conflicts would lose none of their sharpness", but being "firmly imbedded in common ground . . . would lose their bitterness." The problem of the "split allegiance" of the worker is not solved, but it is mitigated. Instead of bitter competition between management and union for the allegiance of the worker, there would develop, the author believes, "a new and strong allegiance . . . to the enterprise" in which management and union both would share.

To Drucker the "only meaningful units of local government are enterprise and plant community", the emergence of which he considers to have been the cause of the "decay of the traditional local governments, especially of town, city and county. . . ." But it is with respect to the proper form and pattern of national government that the most formidable problems arise. Nor is it surprising that it is Drucker's treatment of this aspect of the problem that is least conclusive. He suggests that "we [had] better realize that some form of Democratic Socialism—or at least an approximation to it—is the only form in which a good part of the world today can have a free indus-

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trial society." But—he points out that once democratic socialism is established, the trade unions face the choice of maintaining their traditional rôle as pressure groups or becoming "an arm of the government-management." If the first choice were made, he would anticipate nationalization of the unions and, ultimately, a totalitarian government. If the second alternative were seized, the unions would "lose the allegiance of their members", and in the end the government would have to suppress them. The touchstone of the success of democratic socialism, in Drucker's opinion, will be the ability of the government to maintain the autonomy of management and the plant community. The dilemma of the unions is left unresolved.

PAUL F. BRISSENDEN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

British Railways and Economic Recovery: A Sociological Study of the Transport Problem. By KENNETH H. JOHNSTON. London, Clerke & Cockeran Ltd., 1949.—352 pp. 18s.

The title of this book may create erroneous expectations in the minds of prospective readers. The author does not, for example, concern himself with opportunities for contra-cyclical investment in the railway field. His argument does touch on the British balance of payments. But his main theme is reduction of railway costs and improvement of service.

Under private ownership, the author contends, railway management was grossly and persistently inefficient. Interlocking of mineral and rail interests perpetuated the wasteful mine-owned coal cars and prevented the possibilities of electrification from being fairly considered. Railway goods wagons were not equipped with air brakes, which would have made larger and faster trains practicable. Shippers were never offered appropriately low rates on really large consignments; hence the low rail wagon loads. Johnston rejects the theory that the latter were required by the nature of British business: even without rate inducements much traffic was quite heavily loaded. By discriminatory charges, the author thinks, the managers extorted an excessive profit from passenger traffic and used it to subsidize the movement of coal. Selected charges of British railways are compared with selected charges of railways in other countries to prove that British rates and fares are high.

The measures the author would urge upon the new British Transport Commission may be inferred from his criticisms of private management. He believes that electrifying practically the entire rail-

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road system would greatly reduce locomotive capital expense and maintenance as well as train labor expense, and yet would permit much faster and more frequent service. For evidence he relies mainly on the studies of the Weir Committee and the experience, not clearly transferable, of the former Southern railway.

From lower charges and electrification he expects large indirect benefits. Low rates on imported materials would encourage industry to move away from the ports and decentralize. Low fares and fast, frequent service would encourage people to move into the healthy countryside where they could raise their own vegetables. The growth of automobile ownership, highway construction and maintenance expense, and the highway accident toll would be checked. (In further support of this objective, the author would take away the right of traders to haul goods long distances in their own lorries.) The home-grown food and the check to petrol consumption would keep down the need for imports. More efficient conversion of energy, and the use in central stations of fuel too poor for locomotives, would conserve the dwindling coal resources. The smoke-abatement argument is not forgotten.

To the author these benefits justify subsidy. He would have the Treasury absorb rail "overhead" costs, but users should bear the "direct" costs. The reasons for this particular division of financial responsibility are hard to follow. Indeed it is not clear which costs he considers "overhead" and which "direct". In any event, transport economists are coming to realize that this traditional dichotomy represents a great oversimplification.

The size of the indirect benefits is obviously highly conjectural. The owner of a motor car can depart when he likes, has no luggage problem, can take his family at no extra transport expense, and escapes the cost of locomotive drivers, train guards, and ticket takers. How far would lower rail fares and better service prevail against these advantages?

The documentation is meager. No specific examples of interlocking coal and rail directorships are cited. In support of his view that passenger fares are exorbitant, the author quotes Acworth to the effect that the passenger service yields *some* profit. He also compares a purported revenue per passenger train-mile of 2*s*.6*d*. with a purported cost of 5*d*. (p. 233), but it appears in another connection that the 5*d*. covers only "rail wear and tear" (p. 174). The accusation of subsidy to coal movement rests heavily on a situation that prevailed on the Great Western railway in the early 1880's. The statistical and accounting problem of allocating costs between services is nowhere

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discussed. Neither is the difficult problem of selecting rates that fairly represent one country's rail rate structure for comparison with another. Differences between Britain and other countries with respect to governmental railway subsidies and levels of rail wages are considered, but rather casually. The organization of the book is too loose and too randomly repetitive for polemical effectiveness.

Thor Hultgren
National Bureau of Economic Research

Unions and Capitalism. By Charles E. Lindblom. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1949.—xi, 267 pp. $3.75.

One need not commend the method employed by Dr. Lindblom or accept the conclusions he reached to recognize the genuine importance of the problem posed in *Unions and Capitalism.* This tightly written book undertakes a responsible assessment of the short- and long-run impacts of large-scale unionism upon America's going economic system, and, therefore, comes directly to grips with the problem of union power. The organization of mass-production workers and the rise in total trade-union membership over the past fifteen years have produced a widespread and understandable preoccupation with the power exercised by unions. Assertions, frequently in the form of denunciations, about the extent of that power and the consequences which flow from it are met on every hand. Sober, responsible investigations of its character and its effects, however, are still fairly rare. On that score, Dr. Lindblom's book warrants attention from the unspecialized audience for which it is designed.

Recent investigations by labor economists, however, have opened up a new range of problems in looking at the labor organization as a price-making mechanism and in attempting to determine the effect of the powerful union upon the price system. Dr. Lindblom skilfully utilizes the results of such studies in contending that the contemporary, powerful union must engage in activities the consequences of which are destructive to the economic system. This, he maintains, is not the product of calculated purpose. The unions may contemplate only minimum alterations in capitalism and even seek to conserve it. But, if they are at all successful in prosecuting their wage aims, they must actually function to destroy the system.

In large part, Dr. Lindblom's argument turns on his equation of capitalism to a competitive price system. It involves the use of a

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model which is never rigidly specified, and entails some disregard for variations in the price systems historically associated with capitalism. The author readily grants that the price system which obtains is by no means perfectly competitive, but holds that it is competitive enough to be regarded as capitalist. Implicit in this is some notion of a tolerable limit of imperfect competition not yet reached. The major thesis of the volume is that further imperfections caused by unionism, as well as by business monopoly structures and government policy, will undoubtedly destroy the competitive price system.

Under that system, enterprise decisions are, at least in theory, a function of cost and price considerations, and as such made without direct reference to the employes. This means that wage decisions should fall exclusively within the province of the enterprise, and should not be subjected to judgments on personal or ethical grounds. The economically "just" wage is the truly competitive price of labor. In the union, however, the workers possess an instrument capable of preventing the price of labor from being set competitively. Unions perform several functions for their members, but their primary objective is to participate in wage-making decisions—that is, to share in a management function—in order to maintain or increase wage rates. The internal pressures which determine the behavior of the union and its leaders always drive it to demand higher wages without reference to the consequences which increased rates might have for employment or price inflation. Where a union can bring enough power to bear to affect wage decisions, the prices for labor will not be competitive. In this context the collective wage bargain is always the product of a union-enterprise power relationship and not of the factors which determine competitive prices.

The restraints on union power theoretically existing in unemployment, the unorganized workers, and employer resistance are not operative in fact, Dr. Lindblom holds, where the union has sufficient control over the labor force in its field to use the strike effectively. In the strike there lies the means of controlling the buyer of labor—the employer—and it is control over the buyer, rather than absolute and continuous control over the labor force, which is the significant source of what the author calls union monopoly. He finds the powerful union "a monopoly because it can and does raise the price of labor to levels which will in a competitive price system inevitably cause waste, unemployment, inflation, or all combined." The major short-run consequences of reduced employment and inflation make it impossible for a competitive economy to survive in the long run. Once their effects become severe, remedies are sought in governmental action

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which introduce new disruptive elements into the competitive system. Even if the unions were to disappear overnight, the system would still be doomed under the blows of governmental interference and enterprise monopoly.

Dr. Lindblom, in short, sees no way to insure the maintenance of the existing competitive economy. This is most clearly indicated in the final chapters which deal with the various ways which have been suggested for delimiting union power. In the final analysis, his whole argument constitutes a judgment on the primary responsibility carried by powerful unionism for the rapidity with which capitalism is being destroyed. The argument is persuasively made, but it is not conclusive. The competitive model which Dr. Lindblom employs invites too many questions. So do his oversimplified representation of the complex interplay in the economy among the unions, government and enterprise, his somewhat idealized version of employer behavior, his exaggerated reading of organized labor's present strength, and his minimizing of the effects of technological change upon union power. Still more open to question is his contention that the union movement has a long-run objective in the replacement of capitalism by "syndicalism"—a notion borrowed from Henry Simons which involves the use of that term with a meaning far different from that assigned to it by revolutionary syndicalists. None of these observations, however, should raise any doubt about the importance of *Unions and Capitalism*, for it does open up one line of attack upon the problem of union power, and it has a good many illuminating things to say about the sources and use of that power in the American economy.

HENRY DAVID

QUEENS COLLEGE

Technical Assistance for Economic Development: Plan for an Expanded Co-operative Programme Through the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Lake Success, United Nations, 1949. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.—viii, 328 pp. $2.50.

On March 4, 1949, the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted Resolution 180 requesting a report setting forth: "(1) a comprehensive plan for an expanded co-operative program of technical assistance for economic development through the United Nations and its specialized agencies paying due attention to questions of a social nature which directly condition economic development; (2) methods

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of financing such a program including special budgets; and (3) ways of co-ordinating the planning and execution of the program" (p. vii). The United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie then went into consultation with the heads and directors of the International Labor Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, Council of International Civil Aviation Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the International Refugee Organization. The data compiled from those important discussions constitute this United Nations blueprint for economic development for the underdeveloped areas of the world.

The report is divided into two parts. Part I states the over-all objectives and nature of the program, the fields of work covered, and the proposed organizational and estimated financial arrangements. In Part II is set forth the highly detailed technical program which each of the specialized agencies proposes to follow in its particular sphere of activity.

Germane to any proposals for economic advancement will be the expansion of the mechanisms of trade and finance, as well as technical assistance from the more advanced countries. The essential problem, as the Economic and Social Council debates reveal even at this writing, will be the organization and the channeling of such assistance so as to produce "the speediest and most constructive results" (p. 7). Domestic, rather than foreign, development of resources must be the primary objective. Indeed, it is felt, too great and too long-continued dependence on foreign capital and technicians "may impede, rather than accelerate, development along sound lines" (p. 7). Essentially speaking, this presupposes that development should be brought about mainly through the efforts of the local population, with the help of domestic resources, and by means of appropriate changes in economic and social structure. In turn, the political aspect cannot be overlooked.

Emphasis is given to the practical approach which is based on a country's particular needs, desires and potentialities; for it is realized that it is impossible to transfer a given pattern of development intact from one area to another (p. 13). Also, reference is made to obsolete and oppressive systems of land tenure, inadequate credit and marketing facilities, realistic fiscal policies of governments, and the need for trained and skilled workers. What is important, "merchants must learn to think in terms of wider markets and narrow profit margins instead of maximum profits on a small volume of sales" (p. 15).

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Moreover, the expert advice for phases of economic development in terms of decades must come from the graduates of the universities, technical schools, foundations and research institutions of many countries. In very general terms, technical assistance for agricultural and industrial development, the eradication of prevalent diseases in areas of the Asian, African and American continents, and the raising of labor and social standards will consist of five major forms: (1) technical advisory services, (2) training, (3) demonstration projects, (4) pilot plants, and (5) dissemination of technical information (pp. 32-35).

As outlined in this blueprint, the cost of the initial projects of the United Nations and its specialized agencies will approximate $35,862,576 for the first year; $50,179,807, the second year. The International Labor Organization places due emphasis upon employment training and migration, wages policy, social security, industrial safety, and occupational health (pp. 74-135). In order, the FAO will focus its attention upon agriculture, forestry and forest products, economic and statistical services, and fisheries (pp. 136-204); UNESCO, upon advice and assistance on fundamental educational problems, basic to any economic, social or political advancement (pp. 205-236); the World Health Organization, upon health demonstration areas, technical training of medical and auxiliary personnel, environmental sanitation, and maternal and child health (pp. 243-313).

Officials of the World Bank stress the value of technical advice in the making of economic surveys and the need for the analysis and planning of specific projects (pp. 314-318). Likewise in the financial sphere, the International Monetary Fund feels that its main responsibility will lie in furnishing advice relative to the monetary and banking policy and organization of a particular country (pp. 319-321). Indubitably, the proposed International Trade Organization Charter, now awaiting the signatures of its member countries, will have an important bearing upon all plans for economic and social advancement, as well as for political progress.

At this early date it is not possible to analyze and criticize a document which merely states the objectives of economic development, the basis of political well-being, and then outlines the formulative plans to attain those objectives. To be sure, the current Economic and Social Council debates, as well as the actual execution of the plans in the field, will afford a better basis for analytical judgment, particularly in a changing world.

SAMUEL P. PERRY, JR.

BOSTON, MASS.

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From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley: A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor Relations. By HARRY A. MILLIS and EMILY CLARK BROWN. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1950.—xi, 724 pp. $8.50.

This monumental book represents the fruit of seven years' study of the Wagner Act by Professor Brown, and the joint efforts of Professor Brown, the late Harry A. Millis and Seymour Z. Mann in appraising the changes in national labor policy effected since 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act. The authors leave no doubt that, if forced to choose between the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley, they much prefer the former. Professor Brown, however, would have liked to have made certain amendments to the Wagner Act, without altering its basic approach, especially by giving the N.L.R.B. the right to move against unions which attempted to overturn certifications of bargaining representatives by force. Nevertheless, her major criticisms of the N.L.R.B. under the Wagner Act are reserved, not for the union abuses which grew up under it, but rather for the fact that the Board in the final years of the Wagner Act phase grew more moderate in its treatment of industry. Thus she states:

> The major criticisms of policy which the present review of the Board's history finds, however, concern developments of the later years which limited the protection of the rights of employees under the Act. These were the temporary removal of foremen from the protection of the Act; limitations on the protection of the right to strike by the American News doctrine; permitting greater freedom of speech to the employer even where a background of other unfair labor practices and the community milieu made the speech inevitably coercive in its effects; and an apparent trend toward requiring the evidence of a Board certification before a refusal to bargain would be found, thus encouraging unnecessarily the use of the Board's machinery (p. 241).

Certainly these criticisms indicate a lack of understanding of the problems of practical industrial relations out of which the policies arose. Not much can be said for the vacillating foremen policy, but there is a real case for denying foremen complete protection of the Act. As for the American News doctrine, that " limitation " on the right to strike resulted from the fact that the N.R.L.B. did not feel it should sanction support to strikers (it did not limit their right to strike) who struck to force a company to violate a wartime stabilization law. Nor did the N.L.R.B. support " free speech " when that speech was part and parcel of coercion. And if Professor Brown has ever been in the position of an employer faced with a demand for union recognition with all its legal and practical complications, including the safeguard-

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ing of free majority will, perhaps she would have appreciated the relief with which employers greeted the greater tendency of the N.L.R.B. over the years to decline to entertain refusal-to-bargain actions until representation rights were proved by election machinery. It is difficult for this reviewer to understand any complaint of "unnecessarily to use" the N.L.R.B. election machinery in view of Professor Brown's conclusion, which this reviewer heartily supports, that the advent of N.L.R.B. elections to solve representation disputes was one of the major contributions of the Wagner Act, not only toward civilized industrial relations, but also toward the use of the machinery of democratic government. Despite these criticisms, which are mainly ones of emphasis, the reviewer considers the analysis of the Wagner Act a scholarly job, well worth the attention of students and business men.

Part II of the book gives a running account of the forces which led to the Taft-Hartley amendments. Here one finds union abuses which grew up under the Wagner Act, such as cross picketing; the clever campaigns of misrepresentation of N.L.R.B. policy; the post-war strike wave and strike hysteria; and the failure of disunited labor to counteract the propaganda of its opponents. Of special interest is a summary of the activities of the National Association of Manufacturers.

The analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act in Part III is limited in that the Act had been on the books less than two years while this study was being prepared. Nevertheless, there is much that is valuable and all of it is well worth reading. The reviewer agrees with the authors that the bifurcation of the agency was a sad mistake, and the present Denham-Herzog controversy certainly bears this out. Most objective critics have agreed that the N.L.R.B. was a model of administrative procedure once the original secretary, Mr. Witt, was removed, and his office properly streamlined. Like most others, the authors also have little good to say for union-shop election requirements, and they also question the wisdom of giving prior treatment to certain employer charges as the Taft-Hartley Act does.

On the other hand, their opposition to the use of the injunction, which is the only effective remedy in certain disputes, their belief in fact-finding as a means of settling national emergency disputes, and their opposition to giving union members the right to decertify their bargaining agent are likely to evoke critical response. Moreover, their case against compulsory union financial reporting is incomprehensible to the reviewer in the year 1950.

The great value of this book is the wealth of material that is clearly and fairly presented. The differences in evaluation should not trouble

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the careful reader, and this is not a book which the novice will read at length. The reviewer believes that the book suffers from a failure to appreciate the management point of view to the extent to which the views of union and N.L.R.B. are understood. This disagreement, however, is not so deep that it prevents the reviewer from regarding *From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley* as an outstanding research job that will serve as a valuable aid in understanding national labor policy.

HERBERT R. NORTHRUP

SCARSDALE, N. Y.

Capital Imports and the American Balance of Payments, 1934-39: A Study in Abnormal International Capital Transfers. By ARTHUR I. BLOOMFIELD. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1950.—xvii, 340 pp. $6.00.

One of the richest veins for economic mining in the last thirty years has been the adjustment process in international trade. A series of case studies has been prepared, mainly by students of Taussig, to show how the current account in the balance of payments adjusted itself to changes in the volume and direction of capital movements. The ore body appears finally to have run out. Dr. Arthur I. Bloomfield, a student of one of Taussig's most distinguished students, has now undertaken to show why the current account did not adjust itself to the large-scale capital inflow into the United States in the period just before the Second World War. The experience of the 1930s has led to international sanction to exchange control over international capital movements, so that further studies in the area on a similar scale are unlikely.

Dr. Bloomfield's monograph is characteristically thorough and perceptive. An initial introductory chapter deals with facts, terminology and the causes of the capital inflow. Three chapters then treat of the forms of the movement, covering successively short-term banking funds, American securities and foreign securities. Proximate responses are then handled in chapters dealing with gold imports, the American stabilization fund, exchange control (which was not adopted) and gold sterilization. A final chapter sets out the theory of balance-of-payments adjustment and attempts to show why the American experience did not conform to it. Dr. Bloomfield concludes, not that the theory of adjustment is wrong, but that a number of special factors intervened to prevent the mechanism of adjustment from operating.

The resulting study is a valuable one. Part of its value lies in its

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assemblage of the facts of the movement of the period set out in a host of tables and illustrations. (These probably, however, account for the exorbitant price of the book.) More valuable is the fruit of Dr. Bloomfield's broad and careful scholarship in the form of an excellent bibliography and a wide number of footnote surveys of the literature on this and that separate point.

This reviewer, however, confesses to a feeling of disappointment that Dr. Bloomfield did not attempt to achieve a better balance among causes, characteristics and effects of the capital inflow, and that he concentrated so heavily on characteristics. When is speculation stabilizing and when dis-stabilizing? The author treats an interesting case of stabilizing speculation (pp. 57-59) when the British exchange authorities allowed the pound to rise to more than $5 under the impact of the capital flight from the gold bloc, and hence induced speculation against the pound. The result was to divert the gold flow from London to New York. But no discussion is given of the conditions which differentiated this episode from the dis-stabilizing speculation which is the subject of the bulk of the book. And the issue, fundamental in every branch of economics, lies at the root of present proposals for freely fluctuating exchanges as a measure of built-in stability.

With respect to effects, Dr. Bloomfield barely touches upon the critical conditions governing the failure of the adjustment mechanism to work. He asserts twice, both times parenthetically, that the "capital [was] obviously not needed" by the United States (pp. 86, 181). This point and the interconnections among the level of investment in the United States, the marginal propensity to save, the rate of interest, the volume of unemployment, and so on, might well have been spelled out, however, even at the risk of belaboring the obvious.

Had this been done, and had a symmetrical exploration been undertaken of the conditions under which investment fell in the countries losing capital (or failed to decline), Dr. Bloomfield might have been able to expand his conclusion into one of greater generality. It is no conclusion at all to say that the theory is formally valid, but it does not apply—if in fact the theory is intended to apply. Dr. Bloomfield has missed an opportunity to set out a general theory which would explain why no trouble is encountered in moving capital from the United States to Europe, whereas capital cannot on balance be transferred from Europe to the United States.

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Congress and Foreign Policy. By ROBERT A. DAHL. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950.—x, 305 pp. $4.00.

There have been, since the end of World War II, a dozen books or more about the Congress of the United States. Perhaps at no time since the Constitution was adopted has so much attention been given to the operations of the Congress. This recent reëxamination has been the work of many hands: scholars, members (and ex-members) of Congress, publicists and columnists, and men in public and business life. Clearly there are widespread doubts that the Congress is fully meeting the needs of popular government in the mid-twentieth century.

For anyone who has followed these studies of the workings—or failings—of Congress, much of the material in Dr. Dahl's book will be familiar; for such persons the uniquely useful feature of this volume is a series of lists and tables in the appendices showing, for various periods, but mostly since the late twenties: the relationship of public opinion, as shown in polls, with Congressional voting; party voting on foreign policies; the average age and service of members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; foreign policy determinations without Congressional participation (executive); mixed decisions; and policies primarily Congressional in origin and leadership. Persons writing or editing in the field of foreign affairs may find these lists and tables by themselves worth the price of the book.

A student of the American party system might feel that Dr. Dahl underestimates the effects of various features of the Constitution, such as the single-member district, upon party and Congressional behavior; for each state and district is unique, and each congressman and senator knows (or, since he won, thinks he knows) how to win in his state or district. This belief inevitably conditions his attitudes toward his party, his colleagues in committee and house, and the pressure groups which seek to persuade him to follow one or another line that affects foreign policies. Rarely does any foreign policy affect this political calculus. A senator like Byrd, with his state in his pocket, can defy them all and still look forward confidently to reëlection; a senator like Lehman may have to study every vote as if it determined, as well it may determine, his reëlection.

The treatment of pressure groups upon foreign policies (pp. 52-57) seems to this reviewer somewhat scanty. There are more of them; their interests are much more various; and the groups affect many more policies than the reader of this book might gather. "Respon-

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sible parties", writes the author, "would force such pressures to work within the parties rather than in the legislature." To be sure. But how such pressures are to be taken off the legislature and put on the parties when members of the houses are elected by their states or districts, and not by national parties, is the great and unanswered question.

This book is another in a valuable series published for the Yale Institute of International Studies, which was organized in 1935.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE DAYTON D. MCKEAN

Main Currents in Modern Political Thought. By JOHN H. HALLOWELL. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1950.—xii, 759 pp. $4.10.

For Mr. Hallowell main currents in modern political thought are a series of streams rushing over dangerous rapids until they converge in a whirlpool where modern man, overwhelmed, is sucked to his destruction in the murky depths beneath, from which none are recovered. From the sixteenth century on, the history of political thought, as indeed of nearly all philosophic thought, is one long litany of errors, and of their compounding. Rationalism, liberalism, utilitarianism, romanticism, idealism, positivism, socialism, irrationalism, nationalism and fascism, all contribute to the undoing, the lostness, the false progressivism, the misguided and misdirected searching for faith, of our own time. Our age is a crisis age, decadent, dehumanized. Man is lost, with a lostness which far transcends the social. His liberty is a burden, and the authority of authoritarianism, which is one of the roads to escape that burden, is in the event yet more burdensome, and at last utterly destructive of his residual humanity.

How can these things be? Men have lost the sense of sin, the sense of fallibility, and therewith the sense of personality and the proper recognition of the nature of true reason and of the need for faith. How can they be overcome? We must suffer; we must be genuinely humble; we must search to save our souls; we must believe in God, and return to the Christian root of Western civilization. Only through an essentially theological view, through a recognition of a world beyond the world, can we hope to function effectively in the world. How may we so succeed? By rejecting belief in the individual as "the ultimate source or medium of authority"? (p. 38) We must accept authority based on tradition. We must realize that the spiritual nature of man necessitates the recognition of a being greater than man, of a Creator.

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The effectiveness of this position, so far from new, yet not automatically convincing to most contemporary thinkers, depends on supporting argument. Mr. Hallowell's confession of, and plea for, faith needs, in order to be effective as political philosophy, a prior exposition of the positive implications for the social order to be drawn from it. It necessitates an adequate analysis and defense of the resultant concepts of political obligation, of rights and duties, of liberty and equality, and of all the other great issues of political theory. Otherwise it remains unconvincing, even to those who, like myself, find large areas of agreement with the author; who agree that our age does suffer certain major ills, and that those ills are the ones which he chooses for criticism.

What Mr. Hallowell does not demonstrate is how there is any hope of man's survival and salvation. He does not make clear how a combination of spiritual insight and reason may be used to convert men from their errors, and to renew in them a creative, yet chastened, hope. He does not make clear how they may strive effectively; what it is they have to accomplish; what path they may take to the accomplishment. Nor, for all his praise of a long-lived tradition, does he make clear what there is living in it from which growth may take place.

At best, Mr. Hallowell suggests that modern man's despair, his awareness of lostness, and his understanding, in at least some cases, of the inadequacy of individualist reason, and of material progress and control based thereon, may create a seed bed in which new seedlings of ancient dogma and doctrine may be planted, and, being planted, may grow. The Christian view of life has indeed survived, though it is itself in part corrupted by the evils of modern philosophy and modern science. Nevertheless a combination of some insights and techniques of Roman Catholicism, of the essences of Anglicanism, and of the teachings of Reinhold Niebuhr may produce a healthy and purified revivification. We must return spiritually to the medieval world without thereby becoming medievalists, and while accepting and developing, within the proper limitations set by these institutions and insights, the heritage of modern scientific understanding and of industrialism.

Those, I think, are the theses of this book. They are buttressed by exposition of the major thinkers and movements in political thought from the sixteenth century on. The expositions are generally clear, though often all too slight. They are composed of considerable quotations in smaller print, plus quotations from the original writings interwoven in the body of the author's text. To

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these are added further quotations from various authorities, mostly modern, consisting of exposition and, more importantly, of criticism. On these last Mr. Hallowell generally does not comment, though one may infer that they represent his opinions. The viewpoints and the selection of materials are calculated to develop his own essential thesis, and in some cases, at least, I feel that he has not taken due account of the most scholarly and balanced assessments of great thinkers as, for example, in his presentation of Rousseau.

Mr. Hallowell's own summings up and criticisms of movements at the end of each exposition are often interesting, but usually not very penetrating or thorough. Also, while he avoids the temptation to extreme or calculated bias in exposition and acknowledges, as in the case of Marx, the diverse tendencies of a man's thought, he generally does not give sufficient emphasis to those creative insights in a thinker which, duly stressed, would help support, and to give foundation for, his own cause.

Unfortunately, Mr. Hallowell has combined together an essay on his convictions and his criticisms of our society, which would have been enormously improved in forcefulness and in reasoned structure by thorough exposition, and a textbook or reading material, which might indeed supplement and document his theses, but does not, as given, always lead toward their demonstration.

My final judgment is that, despite a few good chapters, of which the one on German Idealism is the best, this long-awaited book is signally disappointing to any reader who, critical of relativism, positivism and materialism, ardently desired a really profound analysis, from the viewpoint of contemporary needs, of significant developments in the political thinking of the last centuries as they live on into our own age. A combination of a faith which is content to assert, and a scholarship which, though well informed, is content to describe, has done less than adequate service to the author, or to those causes he shares with others who, not sharing his ultimate faith, need to be persuaded by demonstration.

Thomas I. Cook

The Johns Hopkins University

The New Federalism. By Samuel Seabury. New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1950.—311 pp. $5.00.

As a citizen and student of public affairs Judge Seabury is concerned with the expanding functions and power of government and the accompanying loss of liberty and opportunity for independent

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action on the part of the individual. This tendency he sees developing in a fashion which is transforming democracy into a "sham". In other words the political state is doing too much, it is undertaking to direct and operate in fields of human enterprise, particularly economic where politicians have little or no competence.

Judge Seabury's remedy for this situation is to develop a new federalism in which the existing political federalism will be much curtailed in its functioning. New units of self-government should be set up in spheres of activity commonly spoken of as economic and social. Economic self-government, for instance, would be supplied by consumers' organizations, like coöperatives. Collective bargaining units would be set up consisting of representatives of capital, labor and the consumer. Industry would be directed by some type of joint committee of industrialists and consumers. These agencies of economic federalism would be federated with the agencies of political federalism and thus these great concerns would be in the hands of those most expert in their operation. There would no longer be the danger of inefficient and dictatorial interference in the intricate mechanism of our economic life which Judge Seabury maintains is sapping initiative, destroying enterprise and promoting some form of statism destructive of liberty.

The author is a learned and brilliant lawyer and this book is a tightly reasoned brief which covers the basic principles of the organization and development of society and the state, and the nature of sovereignty and the law. He argues away much of the classic and mystic structure of political and legal theory and sets about realistically to construct a theory of institutional development based upon fluctuating social sanctions. He builds up a very neat case for the protection of self-government, maintaining that social interdependence is the institutional conditioning most conducive to the highest achievement in civilization. The question which is not answered is how these economic units in the new federalism are to be kept in a healthy state of social conscience. It has been American experience that political watchfulness has been essential to curb some of the socially predatory instincts developing among those who become economically expert and powerful. It is hoped that Judge Seabury will work out this phase of his thinking further.

Theoretically this is an appealing thesis based as it is upon much sound social thinking. But it is still far removed from the public who must be converted to it. The jacket of the book informs us that after Judge Seabury's gallant and effective fight against corruption in New York City he was offered the Republican nomination for Mayor. The

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Judge, as befitted a man of his wisdom, refused. He insisted that the nomination be given to Fiorello La Guardia, a man with a gift for carrying a message to the voters. If the new federalism is to receive popular support, it must find a La Guardia.

ROY F. NICHOLS

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Presidential Agency, OWMR: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. By HERMAN MILES SOMERS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950.—xiii, 238 pp. $4.50.

This timely little book will be of interest to a number of different readers. No doubt some will consult it for a guide to action in the present period of "hot peace", a period of national security mobilization which falls short of "total war" but requires governmental allocation of economic and manpower resources. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion as it functioned from 1943 to 1946 was in many ways a predecessor agency to the present National Security Resources Board. A forecast of the problems of the latter is to be found in this account of the former.

Secondly, this book must be of important concern to all who are interested in our governmental experiences of World War II. Mr. Somers, now a professor of political science at Haverford, worked inside OWMR. He has contributed an essential volume to the many studies which have been made of governmental administration during the war. Probably no period in our national history has been more carefully or fully recorded for future review. And no examination of that experience can be complete which omits attention to this small and vital agency.

Moreover, Mr. Somers redresses certain imbalances which have been created by the "red-hot" recollections of the top wartime administrators. He makes it very clear, for example, in retelling succinctly the story of Donald Nelson's reconversion planning that Mr. Nelson's ascription of the controversy to army "desire to control the economy" was the fiction of an angry apologist.

Finally, Mr. Somers raises a perplexing and continually troublesome issue in our governmental machinery. We have for some time been aware that the American presidency is a unique political position. Over the years it has emerged as the most important branch in that classical threefold division of governing power envisaged by the Founding Fathers. More than this, and without ever "planning" it so, we as a nation are in the position today where our individual wel-

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fare and social welfare depend in very large measure upon how the presidency serves us. In such a situation the presidency is more than a single person, even though the personality of the president may be crucial. The presidency is now a conglomeration of persons and offices, of pressures and influences. No single person, however much a paragon, can carry the political and administrative responsibilities now vested in the position.

The vital issue is how much of this awe-inspiring task of the presidency can be institutionalized? To what extent and how successfully can some of the burdens of the presidency be vested in administrative machinery with some continuity of personnel and procedure? The only long experience in answer to this question is that of the Bureau of the Budget, and no one has yet analyzed the meaning of that experience with real insight and understanding.

Mr. Somers provides us with an excellent account of nearly four years' experience in a total war and immediate post-war period with an institutional device to assist the presidency. He tells us briefly how it worked and illustrates this with accounts of its action in three vital fields of governmental policy: the allocation of resources, the control of manpower, and the preparations for post-war economic reconversion.

He then offers a prescription for future guidance. In general, his suggestions about how such a "top-level" agency must operate seem to make good sense. But he falls into a contradiction which poses the real dilemma. He feels that a top coördinating agency on governmental programs must have "institutional status in the President's Office" (p. 224). But then he acknowledges also that much must depend upon the personality of the program coördinator (p. 229). He admits that Justice Byrnes and Judge Vinson as heads of OWMR were successful in large measure because of their "great public stature". In 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative Management sought presidential aides with a "passion for anonymity".

Can any president afford to bring into the presidency a potential rival? Would not the results be disastrous in divided counsel, in competition for power? And yet how is the presidency to be institutionalized save in terms of prestige and influence, with its constant temptation to seek public recognition, with its constant flattery from special groups, with its constant criticism from outraged citizens who will find satisfaction in the scalp of a scapegoat when they cannot bring down the chief executive himself?

Mr. Robert Sherwood has reported his conclusion that Harry

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Hopkins became truly effective as a Roosevelt confidant when he finally set aside the still small voice of presidential ambition. Must our presidential aides be in the advanced stage of a mortal illness before a president can rely upon them?

Mr. Somers has not answered the basic question. No one else has either.

JOHN D. MILLETT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism. By MORTON G. WHITE. New York, The Viking Press, 1949.—viii, 260 pp. $3.50.

Modern standards in the social sciences seem to require of students a modicum of eclecticism, if they are to deal adequately with their specialties. Dr. White's book treats of thought, but he has found it impossible to consider the problems it has posed without reference to the affairs of the time involved. Similarly, those who are concerned with the times "as such" will profit from a consideration of the problems he has investigated.

Here is described "the development of a group of ideas which dominated American social thought for fifty years or more and which continues to exert an appreciable though diminishing influence on our own thinking." The major architects were Beard, Dewey, Justice Holmes, James Harvey Robinson, Veblen. The author finds a remarkable similarity in their "revolt against formalism", with its bland conviction of righteousness in logic, law, economics and history. *Social Thought in America* does not drive its thesis hard, and Dr. White is aware of traits and predilections which distinguish his protagonists. Yet he finds in them all a pragmatism which attempted to see the truth as it was, and to provide a living discipline—living, one ventures to interpret, in the sense of better representing the varied interests of our civilization.

All Americans have not had the reasoning capacity and cultural resources of the five intellectual leaders mentioned above, and their works have influenced an élite rather than a mass of followers, at least directly. But it is hardly questionable that their fame derived from their voicing the liberal tenets of their age. The major question which others besides philosophers must face involves the adequacy of their work for their own time, as well as that which has come after.

Certainly, their work once provided the highest stimulation. Beard, in his *Contemporary American History* (1914), which Dr. White

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interestingly uses to sketch the period in which they emerged as authorities, attempted to distinguish significant from insignificant problems. Robinson sought to focus attention on the present, as opposed to the past. Holmes urged a distinction between law and morals, and emphasized the need for a scientific understanding of law: what it was, and how it had come into being. Veblen developed his curiously oblique analyses of society in a fashion which suggested the dubious nature of things as they were. And Dewey enunciated a social-minded and practical view of education which captured the imagination of *avant-garde* educators, many of whom, in turn, captured strongholds in their field.

The question of what progressivism was and implied is hardly an academic one, and Dr. White's brilliant treatment of the ideas of these theorists—who were men of their time—helps to explain its strength and limitations. The idea of a clear-eyed method, based on facts and fundamentals, and an essentially optimistic view of human nature, could flourish with little difficulty in an age which saw itself coming into the promised land of freedom and reform. The pragmatist could have used a touch of skepticism, a little less satisfaction with his intellectual and practical accomplishments. He might profitably have concentrated more than he did upon devising a social program which went beyond immediate measures, however worthy in many cases. And his thinking would have gained much had he added to it an international perspective.

The cataclysm of World War I shook all the thinkers, to one extent or another, but not to the extent of causing a radical review of their method. What remains of them in a time which poses dilemmas their earlier thinking failed to take into account? A liberal temper, concludes Dr. White, whose analyses of the detail and development of their thought repay the most careful reading. But it is a good temper, he points out, and seems to imply that it is hardly to be treated with condescension by anyone who has dared less and accomplished less:

> There is little point in regarding their books as manuals of social practice, nor are we justified in tracing all our troubles to their shortcomings. They should be treated neither as scapegoats nor as idols but as models of courageous thinking on social matters. American thought has indelibly incorporated many of their contributions, and American society is considerably in their debt....

LOUIS FILLER

ANTIOCH COLLEGE

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The Atlantic Civilization: Eighteenth-Century Origins. By MICHAEL KRAUS. Ithaca, Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1949.—xi, 334 pp. $3.75.

The mood of this book is expressed by the following sentences in the first chapter:

> The Atlantic civilization resulting from the interrelationship of the Old World and the New belongs in the sequence of civilizations which originated in the region of the Mediterranean and which go back to Sumer and the valley of the Nile.... The interrelationship between the people of the Western World and their Old World homelands, gradually, almost imperceptibly, produced a new civilization (pp. 1, 3).

Thus the Atlantic civilization, which had its beginnings in the expansion of European people and culture around the borders of the Atlantic, is analogous to the Mediterranean civilization that consisted of the peoples and cultures bordering upon the Mediterranean in the time, say, of imperial Rome.

One might question this concept of Professor Kraus's on two grounds: the first is the question whether the "Mediterranean civilization" was actually one civilization, or many. Assuming that it was one civilization, however, a second question, and more serious, is whether the "Atlantic civilization" can be described as one civilization while practically omitting any reference to the Hispanic segments of the Atlantic community. What Mr. Kraus has done here is not so much a description of an "Atlantic civilization" as a very thorough and valuable description of the intellectual relations between the Anglo-Saxon colonies on the continent of North America and Europe, with a heavy emphasis upon England and almost no mention of Spain and Portugal.

The weight of the narrative, indeed, is carried by the west-east flow of intellectual exchange. "It has been my consistent aim", says Mr. Kraus (p. vii), "to point up the impact of the New World upon the Old, because I believe that historians have too often neglected this phase of American-European history." And if he would accept an amendment substituting "the thirteen continental British colonies" for "the New World", there should be no hesitation in commending highly a task that is both a significant one for the growing historical conception of the Atlantic community and one that is well done. For the citizen of the future, indeed, it appears probable that the study of history may be less and less narrowly and provincially nationalistic in outlook and more and more oriented to broader concepts of "civilization" or even to an ultimate concept of "one world" that will be

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broad enough to embrace the cultural strivings of the race in its entirety.

Professor Kraus evidently read an enormous amount of contemporary literature, both in this country and abroad, as a basis for his story. As a result he is able to show convincingly that liberals or scientists or humanitarians, wherever they were, did constitute an international community of mind and of good will. The chapter on "America and the Utopian Ideal", for example, relates the successful accomplishment of "liberty" in America to the dreams of forward-looking idealists everywhere—in Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Ireland and France—especially France. Europeans were impressed by the achievements, in America, of "liberty" in many areas—freedom of the press, religious toleration, political self-government, "love of equality"; as an asylum for the oppressed; and in other areas of human life. The extent of the American influence has never been so convincingly presented before.

The reader of this book, however, is impressed more by the fact of the American influence than by its nature. Mr. Kraus takes it for granted that his readers will know the nature of the ideas involved in the American concepts of "liberty" or of religious toleration. Thus President John Witherspoon of Princeton, a disciple of Thomas Reid, is mentioned on pages 71, 74, 280 and 281, but his major contribution to American thought, which was his teaching of Reid's philosophy of "common sense", nowhere appears. Or, again, John Bartram, Philadelphia botanist, is mentioned on pages 13, 166-169, 170, 171, 176, 199, 200 and 209, but nowhere does it appear just what Bartram's contribution was to the study of botany, except for the shipment of plants and seeds to Europe. One might legitimately remark: "Yes, Bartram wrote a preface to Dr. Thomas Short's *Medicina Britannica*, but what did he say there? What *ideas* did he contribute to Short's or other Englishmen's thinking?" Here is the greatest weakness of this book; it would probably be a more significant contribution—important as it is—had Dr. Kraus devoted a little more attention to the analysis of the ideas and other cultural goods exchanged and a little less to the mere facts of exchange.

Professor Kraus sees in the emergence of the Atlantic community a foreshadowing of the world community, and he closes his book with a bit of nostalgic hindsight:

> America inspired the growth of nationalism all over the world, but she also contributed greatly to the concept of a common humanity which disregarded national boundaries.... Men with a world view and a general interest in science—Franklin, Price, Paine, Rush, Turgot, Condorcet—

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> favored some sort of association of nations, whose task would be to build the international community.... It is a striking challenge that these visionaries in the American Revolutionary era flung at the world. Our world is now planning to give substance to those visions. Franklin and his contemporaries probably would have considered America the logical setting for a United Nations home in which to conjure reality out of their dreams (pp. 306, 307).

The trend of human civilization does appear to be toward some sort of international community of outlook. If so, the "Atlantic civilization" of the eighteenth century seems to have been the first stage upon that road.

MAX SAVELLE

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Lafayette Between the American and the French Revolution (1783-1789). By LOUIS GOTTSCHALK. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1950.—xi, 461 pp. $7.50.

Professor Gottschalk continues his thoroughgoing biography of Lafayette with a stout volume on the six years between 1783 and 1789. Like the preceding volumes,[1] it is meticulous, complete and objective. It is grateful to recognize in it the positive exemplification of the high tradition of George Lincoln Burr, Charles H. Hull and Carl Becker and to applaud the judgment of the American Historical Association in conferring upon it the James Hazen Hyde prize.

The method of the book recalls that other triumph of Revolutionary biography, Douglas Southall Freeman's *The Young Washington*. Like it, the *Lafayette* is the result of an encyclopedic search for all possible materials in all possible repositories and their complete utilization, generally with appropriate valuations but sometimes without regard to their inherent interest. It is something of a descent from the general level of the text to read that Lafayette paid a livery bill of 1100 livres or to follow the details of some *vin d'honneur* offered the hero by a provincial municipality. Lafayette's *itinerarium* is more fully presented than that of any medieval king. A certain idolatry of Washington explains this meticulousness in Freeman's book, but for Lafayette?—I think not.

In these six years, Lafayette cultivated his popularity on both sides of the Atlantic, sought commercial advantages for his Americans in France, got involved in mesmerism and ballooning, joined the *Amis*

[1] *Lafayette Comes to America* (Chicago, 1935) and *Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution* (Chicago, 1942).

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des Noirs, bought a plantation to free the slaves and set it in operation as a free-labor establishment, promoted toleration for the Protestants, lent himself to the dubious maneuvers of the provincial assemblies of Brittany and Auvergne, tried to get involved in the affair of Holland, traveled in Germany and Austria. He was the friend of almost any one with a cause, of Linguet, of Rabaut Saint-Étienne, of Paine, of Clavière and Brissot. All together he led a busy and not in the least a dull or insignificant sort of life.

Nevertheless, Lafayette was on the fringe of affairs. It is just this relativistic aspect of the reality Lafayette that the *itinerarium* does not bring out. France for a century had been one of the poles of an intense rivalry, diplomatic and military: it could hardly make its relations with a minor and still badly organized Power like the United States a central element of its policy. What was in process was an attempt to integrate France, England and Holland: its prosperity could be endangered by indulgent commitments to the United States. Ormesson's ill-advised sortie against the Farm and his fall meant that Calonne as his successor was bound not to attack it directly: thus Lafayette's maneuvers to that end were irrelevant. The abolition of the interior barriers, the plan for which had been laboriously developed in the bureaus for over a decade by Mahy de Corméré and was seemingly just on the verge of realization, was the key both to a proper reorganization of the tobacco monopoly and to cutting down the Farm to size. In a more positive sense, Lafayette was setting a much-needed example in cultivating the public as a basis of political power—a revolutionary step which in its turn is impossible to appreciate without understanding the ironclad secrecy which was *de rigueur* in the government. These phases of the " field " in which Lafayette moved alter the entity that he was.

That was not the kind of picture of Lafayette that Professor Gottschalk chose to make. His is an absolute or positivist picture including effectively all remaining manifestations of Lafayette in the given time period. Lafayette is the subject of every paragraph and, it is hardly too much to say, of every sentence. Within these self-imposed and deliberately adopted limits, it is impossible to withhold admiration for the skill and effectiveness with which the work has been done. The question still remains, whether, in this relativistic climate, the positivist method is adequate or even, in the highest sense, valid. With it, Lafayette's essential mediocrity, which Professor Gottschalk does not conceal, extends to his function as an index of his times.

The complete and skillful searching out of the materials is amply

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reflected in the efficient system of footnotes. It is nevertheless possible to wish for a bibliographical essay that might reflect in more compact fashion the Odyssean quality of the author's adventure. A teacher of history may conclude on the pedantic note that it might be more valuable to his students than many details about Lafayette.

F. L. NUSSBAUM

UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING

The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. By L. F. CRISP. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950.—x, 344 pp. $5.00.

Freedom & Planning in Australia. By A. CAMPBELL GARNETT. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1949.—x, 331 pp. $4.00.

In order to underline the neglect of political science in Australia, it is enough to note that there is no comprehensive study of the federal movement. Scholars have shown little interest in fields of political thought and institutions which in the United States have been exhaustively treated. A serious study of the parliamentary government of the Commonwealth of Australia is therefore an event of importance.

This is not always an objective and scholarly work. It is written by an ardent supporter of the Labor party, and the earlier chapters on the electorate and the political parties are covered more or less in the light of the struggle of labor to achieve its socialist goal. Professor Crisp has no doubts as to the overruling rights of the majority. The problem of the Labor party is to maintain the support of the greatest number and to implement socialism as fast as the majority will allow, recognizing ultimately no rights in the minority, save that of itself organizing a majority. In the author's politics, there is no place for a brake, for a conservative antithesis to a labor thesis. Indeed, in the former, he admits no intellectual content beyond the rationalization of privilege, describing the conservative parties at their weakest level in order the more summarily to dismiss them.

Later, the jibes and sarcasm of the political battle are put aside for a more detached exposition of the working of the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Cabinet, the Public Service, the High Court, and the position of the Governor-General. Here the book is of great value, providing for the first time a connected view of the main elements of Australian government and politics.

To the American reader, a primary interest will be what this work

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reveals of a system of government in which British and American precedents are mixed. In the light of history, the crucial point has been the retention of the British system of responsible government as against that of congressional government. In the one, the executive is drawn from Parliament and dependent upon the support of a majority of the lower House; in the other, it is formally separate from the Congress; and, in so far as each branch is founded on a differently organized electorate, they are bound to be frequently at loggerheads in interpreting the popular mandate.

In adopting the federal principle, the fathers of the Australian Constitution created a Senate with equal representation from each state; but far from giving it privileges, they deprived it of power to amend money bills. More important, they established an executive of members of the House and Senate, responsible to the House, with the right, in the event of a deadlock, to request the Governor-General to grant a double dissolution. Under such a system, the lower House is bound to dominate the political scene. There the Prime Minister sits and the complexion of governments is determined, and consequently, within that House, party discipline is the *sine qua non* of maintaining power. And this discipline has extended also to the Senate where there is even less temptation for the ambitious to resist the party, in whose gift lies endorsement for reëlection and the ministerial portfolios. Potential state loyalties have thus been effectively submerged by the overriding necessities of maintaining the party in power.

On these and other matters such as the operation of the Cabinet system, the Caucus, the prerogatives of the Governor-General, Professor Crisp has much to say of great interest, skillfully weaving his source material into the text. Most of the chapters are worth the detailed treatment of at least a volume; but within the limits of its broad purpose and with the partisan limitations already mentioned, here is an indispensable book for which every student of Australian politics must be grateful.

In *Freedom & Planning in Australia,* Professor Garnett explains the social order of his native Australia to his adopted country. He gives in a compact form a readable description of some aspects of the Australian political and economic scene which frequently attract attention from abroad, but, upon which, up-to-date information is not readily available. Thus, of special relevance are his chapters on the arbitration system, the welfare state, and the trend to socialism. Like Professor Crisp, the author sees the Labor party as the force of progress in Australian life, and brands all opposition with the title of "Anti-Labor Parties". In such a brief account, it is difficult to see the reason

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for the inclusion of the more or less official pronouncements of policy written by prominent members of each party.

A few inaccuracies suggest some haste in preparation. Thus, the British government was thinking of making use of Captain Cook's discovery well before 1788 (p. 4) which was actually the date of the first settlement. In the footnote on page 69, Sir Charles Dilk should read Sir Charles Dilke. The Premier of New South Wales referred to on pages 91 and 95 was J. T. Lang, not William Lang.

EDWARD LITTLEJOHN

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

La Riforma agraria come redistribuzione della proprietà. By MEUCCIO RUINI, ARRIGO SERPIERI, MARIO BANDINI and GIANGASTONE BOLLA. Bologna, Edizioni Agricole, 1949.—91 pp. Lire 450.

This publication describes the policies which the Italian government is pursuing in its attempts to increase farm output and democratize the country's system of landowning.

Italy has about 28 million hectares of productive soil (2.471 acres = 1 hectare). These are distributed roughly as follows: 45.3 per cent is adapted for crop raising; 19.5 per cent is devoted to forest and chestnut groves; 16.6 per cent is meadow and pasture; 8.2 per cent is planted with trees used industrially; 3.8 per cent is permanent meadow; 6.6 per cent of the land is uncultivated. In addition, about 8 million hectares are available for reclamation.

The Italian Constitution states that land shall be expropriated and distributed among the peasants where its size precludes efficient utilization of its resources and where the owner is not sufficiently cognizant of his obligation to improve the living standards of his laborers. President Einaudi has, however, emphasized the need for applying viable standards of maximum utility. The economy prevailing in each area must determine the extent of acreage limit that shall be deemed excessive. Qualitative as well as quantitative factors must be used in determining what estates are too large for the best interests of the community. Thus the Constitution classifies as latifundia not only those estates which are large, but especially those which show a low productive yield for lack of wise and adequate investment. The government will intervene only where its measures will increase output, improve employment opportunities, and extend to the laborer the prospect of individual ownership. It would serve

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little purpose to apply acreage limits in those areas where ownership is at present well distributed and where the owners have already indicated concern for increasing productivity. The general aim is to secure the most profitable combinations of land, labor and capital; and the conditions that obtain in each area must determine the maximum benefits to be secured from the various governmental policies.

Peasants can also become individual owners where land is reclaimed. As noted above, about eight million hectares are available for this purpose. However, large investments of capital will be necessary to rehabilitate these lands and promote their intensive utilization. Furthermore, before land can be parceled out to peasant families or farm coöperatives, an intensive campaign of education must be undertaken to train the new owners for competence in the advanced methods of progressive farming.

The *grande azienda* in northern Italy and the *fattoria* in Tuscany are two examples of agricultural economy which have already achieved maximum output and utility. The irrigation, reclamation and mechanization for which these areas are noted produce at present the greatest possible returns for each unit of capital investment. The *fattoria* or central administration in Tuscany secures excellent cooperation among small, medium and large holdings. To apply any arbitrary measure of acreage limit to either of these sections would be detrimental to the best interests of workers as well as owners. It is chiefly in the depressed areas of southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia that it would be economically as well as socially advantageous to put an end to the prevailing system of land monopoly. Here government could promote a more equitable pattern of land ownership and thus ensure both increased production and a needed enforcement of social stability.

Agrarian reform in modern Italy therefore subserves an all-inclusive program of social reconstruction. It hopes to convert the Italian farmer to the most progressive methods of intensive agriculture. It seeks to reclaim land and establish standards of sanitation; to build homes and roads and irrigation canals; and to bring about other improvements without which peasants could not profitably use the land that is to be distributed among them. All this takes time and money and explains why the Italian government has not yet been able to accomplish the reforms which the poorer peasants have anticipated with increasing urgency.

GINEVRA CAPOCELLI

NEW YORK CITY

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BOOK NOTES

Professor Theodore Plucknett's recent contribution to English legal history, *Legislation of Edward I* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949; xv, 168 pp. 15*s*.), includes the Ford Lectures which he delivered at Oxford in 1947, with some additions. He could, of course, make no attempt to cover the whole vast field to which the legislation of Edward I applied; the topics chosen for discussion were those, he tells us, "which seemed to give an opportunity for combining the traditional interests of lawyers and historians. . . ." Probably the most generally interesting, and perhaps the most important, things he has to say relate to the view of early English statutes taken by contemporaries. After explaining that statutes in the days of Edward I were only one form of legislation and that the essential characteristic of a statute was that the legislation was in the form of a written text known to all members of the legal profession and widely published, Professor Plucknett goes on to remark that the fact they were written enactments eventually gave rise to the conception of a kind of law different from, and contrasted with, the customary common law. But the process was slow. In Edward's reign statutes, he emphasizes, were looked upon as in essence merely modifications of the common law which took place within it, incidents in the development of custom and not documents "thrust upon the courts from outside." And the interpretation of statutes was "the process of their reception into the larger fabric, with such modifications of both as might be necessary to achieve a practically satisfactory result." Later developments, however, are so familiar that conscious effort is needed to recapture the atmosphere of the age under consideration. "We have to forget sovereignty and parliament, and keep our minds fixed firmly upon the common law, thinking of it as a living and changing organism." Professor Plucknett appears to have come appreciably closer to the opinion expressed many years ago by Professor McIlwain in his *High Court of Parliament*, to the effect that the concept of legislation in the modern sense was not present in the Middle Ages, than he was when he wrote his *Statutes and Their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century*, published in 1922. In that work he criticized McIlwain's ideas in considerable detail and drew a sharp contrast, for which he found evidence that seemed to him conclusive in the Year Books of the first three Edwards, between the "special" and "novel" law of the statutes, on the one hand, and the common law, on the other. In the present volume his only mention of McIlwain comes in a footnote in which he characterizes the latter's opinion about medie-

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val legislation as "a paradox brilliantly sustained." Clarification of the modification which his own opinion has undergone would have been welcome.—R. L. SCHUYLER, Columbia University.

Miss Laurence Stapleton has divided her book, *The Design of Democracy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1949; viii, 301 pp. $4.00), into two parts. In the first she undertakes to analyze again the three fundamental principles of democracy, equality, liberty and self-government. In the second, which is entitled "The Context of Democracy", she writes of several subjects which are marginal to citizenship but which concern the culture or "atmosphere" of a democratic society. Among these are the relation between democracy and the economic system, the position of literature, religion and scholarship in a democracy, and finally the prospect for democracy in international affairs and for progress toward world government. The philosophical position developed in the first part of the book posits the interdependence of the three principles. Neither equality nor freedom nor self-government is regarded as sufficient by itself to define democracy. They are, rather, distinguishable aspects of it so related that each involves the others. In application, also, each limits the others, since equality might be pressed to a point where it would become incompatible with freedom. In her analysis of these concepts the author discusses clearly and carefully such questions as the incompatibility that has sometimes been alleged to exist between equality and the recognition of individual differences and degrees of superiority, that between freedom and the universality of causal law, and that between a common good or general community of interests and the powers of a majority and the rights of a minority. In addition to these general subjects she discusses more specifically political concepts such as representation, political parties and governmental responsibility. Students of politics may perhaps feel that she arrives somewhat easily at substantive answers to difficult questions by what is after all an analysis of concepts.—GEORGE H. SABINE, Cornell University.

George III, Lord North and the People, 1779-80 (London, G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1949; distributed by The British Book Centre, Inc., New York; ix, 407 pp. 30s.; $7.50) by H. Butterfield is one of three works published by the author in 1949. The breadth of his interests is shown by the titles of the other two: *Christianity and History* and *The Origins of Modern Science*. Certainly publishing three works of this kind in a single year deserves to be ranked as one of the outstand-

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ing achievements in the field of history in the twentieth century. Professor Butterfield states that his objectives are to describe the incredible chaos of the ministry of Lord North late in 1779; and then to trace the emergence into effective politics of three very significant movements: one, the semirevolutionary crisis in Ireland; two, the Yorkshire Association organized on a national scale to reform Parliament; and three, the opposition campaign within Parliament which began with Burke's plan for economical reform. In the narrative covering these movements late in 1779 and early in 1780, the author has given his own as opposed to what he terms the "Whig Interpretation of History". The book is written entirely from source material and no secondary historical work appears to be mentioned in the Preface, Introduction, narrative, or footnotes. Thus only a reader well acquainted with this period in English history can really appreciate when interpretations vary from those generally accepted. Brilliantly written sentences and paragraphs appear frequently in the narrative although not in as great profusion as in Professor Butterfield's other works. The reviewer feels that the author has succeeded admirably in his self-imposed task, for he has shown great skill in tracing the development of the three movements, their relationship, the effects on the North ministry, and the place that each occupied in later English constitutional developments. But the reviewer also feels that the book would have been even more valuable to far more readers if the following changes and additions had been made. One, if, instead of the clever interpretation which he devotes to George III, eighteenth-century parties, and Lord North in the Introduction, the author had given the older interpretations and shown to what extent they have been modified by the researches of Professor L. B. Namier and others, then it would have been clearer to the reader what is new and original in this work. Two, if the revolutionary movement in London and Westminister, which manifested itself in the Gordon Riots of 1780, had been made the fourth thread in the narrative along with the Irish crisis, the Yorkshire Association, and the campaign in Parliament for economical reform, the picture of the forces demanding reform would have been better rounded. Less than ten pages are devoted to the Gordon Riots. Three, a concluding chapter in which the influence of all four movements on the continuation of the constitutional crisis from 1780 to the General Election of 1784 would have produced a conclusion less abrupt than the one written. It is to be hoped that Professor Butterfield will give us a second volume of the same calibre on the years 1780 to 1784.—DONALD GROVE BARNES, Western Reserve University.

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After belatedly discovering the West in the 1890's, American historians devoted the next forty years to an unrestrained apotheosis of it. Yet up to now students have skirted the transcending question: What have Americans conceived the West to be? That question has been answered with great distinction and sagacity by Henry Nash Smith in *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950; xiv, 305 pp. $4.50)—a book that will grow in reputation with the passing of time. Starting with the dream of the West as a broad highway to the Pacific (the ancient notion of the Northwest Passage, translated into land terms), Smith lays down the conception of American empire based on the engrossment of the Asiatic trade that animated, in turn, the Lewis and Clark Expedition, Thomas Hart Benton's plan for a Central National Road, and the crusade of Asa Whitney for a Pacific railway. In this vision the United States would be in the succession to Byzantium, Genoa and Venice, Portugal, the Netherlands, and England, each of which achieved an imperial greatness that rested on the Oriental mart. The more absorbing focus of life in America was, however, the agricultural frontier. Here was created another view, that of the West as the Garden of the World, a mass phantasy of a new Eden, fertile and undefiled, incorruptible and secure. Such a picture contradicted the facts of an agrarian society that depended on railroads and a world grain market, both beyond the control of an innocent yeomanry. The Garden's walls went up, nevertheless, and, as Smith shrewdly observes, these served powerfully to stimulate isolationism. Squaring fact with myth was a disillusioning enterprise, though, and when it proved impossible, the emergent agrarian bitterness burst out in the fierce upheaval of the decades after the Civil War and joyous hopes turned to ashes in the fire of the Industrial Revolution. By this time, and until its revival in a modified form in 1898, the idea of empire "no longer beckons onward toward the Pacific and the Far East, but becomes, like the myth of the garden, an introspective, even narcissistic symbol." Some of Smith's conclusions may appear contrived; an occasional quotation torn from its political context acquires a new and unintended meaning; and now and then the Eastern reaction to the West seems confused with the Westerners' own. However, within his matrix the author brilliantly and with uncommon insight analyzes the attempt to find an adequate literary form for the West. In the process, Frederick Jackson Turner slips into his proper place in the history of the search—one from which even his most persistent disciples will not easily extricate him.—HENRY F. GRAFF, Columbia University.

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Students and teachers of modern English history, government, and political and social thought would do well to become familiar with *British Prime Ministers of the Nineteenth Century: Policies and Speeches* (New York, New York University Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1950; xii, 377 pp. $4.75). Compiled and edited by Dean Joseph Hendershot Park, of New York University, author of *The English Reform Bill of 1867* (1921), the volume contains the more important speeches delivered by seven of the leading political figures in nineteenth-century Britain. Since many of these speeches are unavailable in most college libraries, Dean Park deserves thanks for making them accessible in a handy and handsome volume that does credit to one of the youngest of university presses. There is little in the book to which even the most fault-finding critic could properly object. The interpretive essay that precedes the section on each of the prime ministers (Canning, Wellington, Peel, Palmerston, Disraeli, Gladstone and Salisbury) invariably reveals wide learning and insight; and the brief introductory comments that precede each of the speeches in the volume are helpful and unpretentious. The selection of the speeches themselves—what, after all, makes or unmakes a collection of sources—shows mature historical judgment. Although Dean Park has often included documents that have striking contemporary relevance, he has remembered constantly that he is dealing with the nineteenth century, and not with the twentieth. Accordingly, he has made sure to include materials which may not seem to be important to men of the twentieth century but which were of overwhelming importance to men of the nineteenth. In the event that the volume goes into the second edition that it deserves, Dean Park should make several basic additions to the work. In the first place, he should prepare a detailed and critical bibliographical essay on each of the prime ministers in his volume. In view of his knowledge and understanding of nineteenth-century British politics, such an essay would be well worth having. In the second place, he should enlarge his conception of the nineteenth century and start his book with Pitt the Younger instead of Canning and conclude it with Asquith rather than Salisbury. These additions would make all the more useful what is already a most useful volume. —HERMAN AUSUBEL, Columbia University.

An invaluable aid to understanding recent developments in Mexico is the volume *Industrial Revolution in Mexico* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1950; x, 331 pp. $3.75) by Sanford A. Mosk. For the past two decades the increasingly domi-

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nant view in the colonial economies of Latin America has been that industrialization is the panacea for economic and social ills. The experience of the depression and the Second World War combined with a raising tide of nationalism to strengthen this conviction. Dr. Mosk has presented a case study of this development through a penetrating analysis and evaluation of the industrial revolution in Mexico. The author is primarily concerned with the new industrialization that has appeared in the last decade. A new group of industrialists, vigorous and nationalistic, who are convinced that rapid industrialization is the only answer to better living for Mexico, has come on the scene. Their program has enjoyed the approval and support of the present and preceding administrations. Government support of industrialization has taken the forms of tax exemption, protective tariffs, import controls and the encouragement of foreign capital. The results have been extremely impressive. "In a few years time Mexico has made great headway in establishing a base for a full-scale industrial development" (p. vii). In the second section of the volume the author skillfully presents available data on the main lines of industrial development giving due credit to the progress made. However, the evidence suggests that "Mexico, in its current industrialization drive, has been engaged more in building industrial plants, than in producing goods" (p. 121). This line of policy and development marks a change, not conceded but none the less real, from emphasis on agrarian reform which was the driving force of the Revolution and reached a climax during the administration of Cárdenas. The change is a fundamental one in social outlook as well as economic structure. The divergence of interest between *agrarismo* and *laborismo* is not something new. Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama recognized and defined it in the early nineteen twenties. However, the new emphasis on industrialization makes appraisal of the problem and consequences critical. In the concluding section of this outstanding study the author examines the problems confronting Mexican industrialization: the limited domestic market; financing; shortages of personnel; inflationary effects; and the effects on Mexico's international economic position and policy. For the second time this year a penetrating student of Mexico warns of the danger that industrial expansion will be pushed more rapidly than is warranted by the remainder of the economy which must support it to the detriment of the mass of the population. Paralleling conclusions stated by Frank Tannenbaum in *Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread*, Dr. Mosk believes that a wiser policy would involve a reduction in the rate of industrial development to permit basic development work in agriculture, irrigation, reclamation, power, and

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road building. Progress along these lines not only is desirable as an end, but also is essential for a sound industrialization. The fact that the Mexican government has substituted, in practice, industrialization for agrarian reform and development and that there is no trend toward rounded economic planning explain the pessimism of objective and thoughtful students.—Stanley R. Ross, University of Nebraska.

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